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Will the New ICAO-Beijing
Instruments Build a Chinese Wall
for International Aviation
Security?
Alejandro Piera*
Michael Gill**
ABSTRACT

The last 6 years have seen an unprecedented level of
activity in the field of international aviation law, with the
adoption of three new conventions and one new protocol. This is
a testament to ICAO's leadership role and its ongoing relevance,
particularlyin the field of aviation security.
The tragic events of 9/11 highlighted some weaknesses in
the internationallaw regime and were the impetus behind the
nine-year process that led to the adoption of the 2010 Beijing
Convention and Protocol. This Article reviews the historical
background to the new treaties, including the journey taken
through the ICAO process. It also analyzes in detail the
provisions of the new treaties, assesses the views expressed in
support as well as in opposition of their adoption, and considers
the important perspective of the airline industry. Finally, the
key question of whether or not the Beijing instruments will lead
to improvements in aviation security is addressed.

* Alejandro Piera serves as Permanent Advisor of the United Arab Emirates
Diplomatic Mission on the ICAO Council. He is based in Montreal where he focuses on
international policy and regulations. Mr. Piera is a graduate of McGill's Institute of Air
& Space Law and the Faculty of Law of the National University of Asuncion-Paraguay.
He is also a Doctoral of Civil Law (DCL) candidate at McGill University's Faculty of
Law.
** Michael Gill serves as a Senior Legal Counsel of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) based in Geneva. He is qualified as a solicitor (England & Wales)
and a French avocat. Mr. Gill graduated LL.B from King's College, London, and
Mattrise en droit from the Sorbonne in Paris and also obtained an LL.M from the
University of Edinburgh. He was a member of the IATA delegation to the ICAO
Diplomatic Conference that adopted the Beijing Convention and Protocol in 2010. The
authors have written this Article in their personal capacities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Aviation security enjoys a unique position in international
aviation law. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has now developed seven international conventions in the field-five
of which enjoy almost universal acceptance and "have served as
valuable precedents for other conventions in the [UN] family."' In
fact, ICAO was the first UN specialized agency to adopt three
international instruments related to the prevention and suppression
of acts of international terrorism.2
The first international treaty on aviation security was the Tokyo
Convention. 3 This focused primarily on jurisdictional issues of
offenses against penal law that are committed on board aircraft, as

1.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Report on the Work of the Legal
Committee During Its 34th Session
2.1, (ICAO, LC/34-WP/4, Sept. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter ICAO, LC/34-WP/4] (Opening Address of Mr. Roberto Kobeh Gonzalez,
President of the ICAO Council).
2.
These instruments are the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 10106 (entered into force
Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo Convention]; the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 12325 (entered into force Oct.
14, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention]; and the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded on Sept. 23, 1971, 974
U.N.T.S. 14118 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
For the full list of the UN-sponsored international conventions on this field, see
UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND
SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2008). As of April 1, 2013, 185 states

were party to the Tokyo Convention and the Hague Convention, and 188 states were
party to the Montreal Convention. See Current List of Partiesto MultilateralAir Law
Treaties, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], http://www.icao.int/secretariat/
legallLists/Current%201ists%20of%2Oparties/AllItems.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
3.
Tokyo Convention, supra note 2.
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well as those acts that may jeopardize the safety, good order, and
discipline of an aircraft or of persons therein. 4 In addition to
establishing the powers of the aircraft commander and the duties of
states involved, the Tokyo Convention also adopted the expression
"unlawful seizure of aircraft" to denote "aircraft hijacking" or the
"wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft."5 The Tokyo Convention
did not, however, expressly make the "unlawful seizure of an aircraft"
an offense. 6 In fact, as one commentator noted, the Tokyo Convention
"was never intended" to be an aviation security convention.7
This explains why 7 years later ICAO adopted the Hague
Convention to try to address this type of criminal behavior.8 Given
that the Hague Convention did not tackle acts of sabotage against
civil aviation,9 ICAO adopted the Montreal Convention just eleven
months later.1 0 In 1988, this instrument was further expanded to
cover unlawful acts of violence at international airports.1 '

4.
5.

See id. at art. 1 (Scope of the Convention).
See id., at art. 11 (Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft); see also Michael Milde,

Law and Aviation Security, in AIR AND SPACE LAW: DE LEGE FERENDA 93, 95 (Tanja L.

Masson-Zwaan & Pablo M.J. Mendes de Leon eds., 1992) [hereinafter Milde, Law and
Aviation Security] ("[The Tokyo Convention] coined, in the English version, the term
'unlawful seizure of aircraft' ....
).
6.
The preparatory work that led to the adoption of the Tokyo Convention
mainly focused on issues relating to the legal status of aircraft. It was only in 1962 that
the United States and Venezuela jointly tabled a proposal to make specific reference to
aircraft hijacking. Under that proposal, the state of first landing should facilitate the
restoring of the aircraft and should also permit the aircraft, crew, and passengers to
continue on their journey. See EDWARD MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 36 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
7.
See Michael Milde, The InternationalFightAgainst Terrorism in the Air, in
THE USE OF AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE FOR ALL MANKIND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 141,

146 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1995) [hereinafter Milde, International Fight Against
Terrorism] (discussing the original purposes of the Tokyo Convention and stating that
the mention of "unlawful seizure of aircraft" was an "afterthought" dealing only with
the duties of states to restore possession of the aircraft and release passengers).
8.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as
offenses, unlawfully seizing or exercising control of an aircraft by force, threat of force,
or intimidation; attempting to perform such an act; and being an accomplice to a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act).
9.
See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 243 (2008)
("One inadequacy of the Hague Convention was its failure to address the issue of
aircraft sabotage.").
10.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as
offenses, unlawful and intentional acts of sabotage likely to damage, destroy, or
endanger the safety of an aircraft; attempting to perform such acts; or being an
accomplice to a person performing or attempting to perform such acts).
11.
See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, concluded on Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 14118
(entered into force Aug. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Airport Protocol]. As of April 1, 2013, 172
states are party to the Airport Protocol. See Current List of Partiesto MultilateralAir
Law Treaties, supra note 2. The Airport Protocol was negotiated and adopted over a
process of less than fifteen months. See Philippe Kirsch, The 1988 ICAO and IMO
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The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
on December 21, 1988, where it is alleged that the plastic explosive
Semtex was detonated, 12 prompted another stand-alone international
instrument on the marking of plastic explosives.1 3
ICAO and the aviation community can rightly be proud to have
been at the forefront of international lawmaking for the prevention
and suppression of acts of international terrorism.1 4
Yet, more recently, acts of unlawful interference against civil
aviation "[have] taken unexpected forms."1 5 None more unexpected,
one might say, than the events of September 11, 2001.16
In the words of a political leader at the time, the implications of
9/11 were vast:
If the terrorists could have killed more, they would have. If instead of
3,000 it had been 30,000, they would have rejoiced. For world leaders
wondering and worrying where the next hostility would come from, the
contemplation not only of what had happened but what might happen
17
was continuous, urgent and nerve-racking.

Reports of incidents of unlawful interference have not gone away
since 9/11. ICAO notes a yearly average of twenty incidents from
2007 to 2010.18 Although incidents dropped below that level to only
five in 2011 and nine in 2012, the problem still persists.1 9

Conferences: An International Consensus Against Terrorism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 5, 8
n.16 (1990) (outlining the timeline of the proposal, preparation, review, revision,
submission, and adoption of the Airport Protocol between September 1986 and
December 1987).
See R.I.R. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil
12.
Aviation on World Peace and the Social Order, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 449, 480 (1995)
(discussing the Pan Am 103 explosion and the reaction of ICAO).
See Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
13.
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 36984 [hereinafter Plastic Explosives
Convention]. As of March 10, 2013, 147 states are party to the Plastic Explosives
Convention. See Current List of Partiesto MultilateralAir Law Treaties, supra note 2.
14.
See MCWHINNEY, supra note 6, at 36 (discussing the specific suggestions
made in 1962 to incorporate aircraft hijacking into "the proposed new Convention on
the Legal Status of Aircraft"); NANCY DOUGLAS JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIME 122-24 (1974) (discussing the study, proposal, and adoption of
the Tokyo Convention by ICAO as the first international action on aircraft hijacking).
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT: AIR LAW, at ch. 33 (J.D. McClean et al. eds.,
15.
LexisNexis Butterworths Issue 132, 2012).
See generally Brian R. Johnson, Christine A. Yalda & Christopher A.
16.
Kierkus, Property Crime at O'Hare International Airport: An Examination of the
Routine Activities Approach, 5 J. APPLIED SEC. RES. 42, 43 (2011).
TONY BLAIR, A JOURNEY: MY POLITICAL LIFE 356 (2010).
17.
18.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Aviation Security Panel, Acts of Unlawful
Interference in 2008 app. C at 7, 8 (ICAO, Working Paper No. AVSECP/20-WP/9, Mar.
5, 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, AVESELP/20-WP/9] (identifying twenty-three acts of
unlawful interference in 2007); Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on Acts of Unlawful
Interference for 2008 1 2.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13269, Jan. 13, 2009), in
ICAO, AVSECP/20-WP/9, supra, at app. A (identifying twenty-four acts of unlawful
interference in 2008); Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on Acts of Unlawful Interference
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In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the ICAO Assembly
(Assembly) directed the ICAO Council (Council) to review the
adequacy of the existing aviation security conventions to deal with
new and emerging threats to civil aviation. 20 This was conducted in
parallel with the initiative to reform the 1952 Rome Convention, 21 a
process that led to the adoption of the two Montreal Conventions in
2009.22

The review of the aviation security conventions culminated at
the Beijing Diplomatic Conference with the adoption on September
10, 2010, of two new international treaties: the Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
(Beijing Convention) 23 and the Protocol Supplementary to the
for 2010 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13683, Dec. 21, 2010) (noting twenty-three
acts of unlawful interference in 2009 and fourteen acts in 2010).
19.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Acts of Unlawful Interference in 2011 (Oral
Report presented by the Director of the Air Transport Bureau, 195th Council Session)
(2012). These five incidents of unlawful interference included two attempted seizures,
one sabotage, an attempted sabotage, and an in-flight attack. Id.; Acts of Unlawful
Interference Database,INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (Apr. 1, 2013), https://portal3.icao.int/
auid/pages/AUIOfPastl2Months.aspx.
20.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft As
Weapons of Destructionand Other TerroristActs Involving Civil Aviation, Assemb. Res.
A33-1 (2001), compiled in Assembly Resolutions in Force TT 7-8 (ICAO Doc. 9958, Oct.
8, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, Resolution A33-11; see also Int'l Civil Aviation Org.,
Consolidated Statement on the ContinuingICAO PoliciesRelated to the Safeguardingof
International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Assemb. Res. A3620 (2007), compiled in Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly - 36th Session 1 2
(provisional ed. Sept. 2007). ICAO defines new threats as "acts that make use of
methods, actions or objects not previously considered to pose a serious threat to civil
aviation," whereas emerging threat relates to "those existing methods, actions or
objects that could conceivably be used in an act of unlawful interference which have not
yet been employed or documented for use against civil aviation." Int'l Civil Aviation
Org., Study on Legal Measures to Cover the New and Emerging Threats to Civil
Aviation 2.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. A35-WP/88, 2004) [hereinafter ICAO, Study].
21.
See Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface, opened on Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 4493 (entered into force Feb. 4, 1958)
[hereinafter 1952 Rome Convention] (promulgating a multilateral convention to
"ensure adequate compensation for persons who suffer damage caused on the surface
by foreign aircraft, while limiting in a reasonable manner the extent of the liabilities
incurred for such damage in order not to hinder the development of international civil
air transport").
22.
See Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third
Parties, adopted May 2, 2009, ICAO Doc. 9919 [hereinafter General Risks Convention]
(moderniz[ing] the 1952 Rome Convention); Convention on Compensation for Damage
to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft,
adopted May 2, 2009, ICAO Doc. 9920 [hereinafter Unlawful Interference Convention]
(outlining compensation principles for third parties for damage by aircraft due to
unlawful interference).
23.
See Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to
International Civil Aviation, opened on Sept. 10, 2010, ICAO Doc. 9960 [hereinafter
Beijing Convention] ("Strengthen[ing] the legal framework for international
cooperation in preventing and suppressing unlawful acts against civil aviation."). At
the time of writing, thirty states are signatories to the Beijing Convention and there
have been five ratifications and three accessions. The instrument is not yet in force. See
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Beijing Protocol).24
Thus, the last 4 years or so have seen unprecedented activity in
the field of international aviation law, with the adoption of three new
25
conventions and one new protocol within less than eighteen months.
Interestingly, that process was preceded by a similarly unusual
amount of domestic legislation in this field in a number of countries. 26
In addition to consolidating certain provisions, the Beijing
Convention expands on both the Montreal Convention and the
Airport Protocol. 2 7 But, with the creation of a number of new criminal
offenses, the Beijing Convention seeks to address new types of
behavior that pose threats to international civil aviation. In the same
way, the Beijing Protocol supplements the Hague Convention.
Whilst each of these new treaties is a stand-alone international
instrument and although most controversial issues apply to both, the
majority of new criminal offenses were introduced in the Beijing
Convention.28 Where the term Beijing instruments is used in this
Article, any comments should be taken to refer to both the Beijing
Convention and the Beijing Protocol.
This Article has four objectives. First, it will seek to trace the
process that finally led to the adoption of the Beijing instruments.
This should allow a better understanding of the predominant
influence of the models on which the instruments were based and the
main drivers behind this laudable initiative. Second, the Article will

List of Parties to Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International
Civil Aviation, Done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%/2OParties/BeijingConv-EN.pdf (last visited
Dec. 21, 2013).
See Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
24.
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened on Sept. 10, 2010, ICAO Doc. 9959 [hereinafter
Beijing Protocol] (supplementing the Hague Convention, supra note 2). At the time of
writing, thirty-two states are signatories to the Beijing Protocol and there have been
five ratifications and two accessions. The instrument is not yet in force. See List of
Parties to Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft Done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
(last
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legallList%20of%/2OParties/BeijingProtEN.pdf
visited Dec. 21, 2013).
General Risks Convention, supra note 22; Unlawful Interference
25.
Convention, supra note 22; Beijing Convention, supra note 23; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24.
After 9/11, various countries passed legislation to empower their armed
26.
forces to use force against civil aircraft that are presumed to have been hijacked. This
also includes the authorization to shoot down such aircraft. See, e.g., Norberto E.
Luongo, "Shooting-Down Laws'" A Quest for Their Validity (unpublished LL.M thesis,
McGill University, Montreal, Dec. 2008), available at https://www.mcgill.cal
iasl/alumni/thesisllm#L1.
27.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23.
28.
See id. at art. 1 (defining the following as offenses: performing acts that
endanger the safety of aircraft; using a device, substance, or weapon to endanger to
safety of an airport; making a threat of any of the former; or attempting, organizing,
being an accomplice to, or otherwise aiding any of the former).
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seek to analyze the main features of the new instruments and their
most controversial provisions. 2 9 In particular, it digs into some old
diplomatic incidents brought to the consideration of ICAO in order to
examine whether they could somehow explain the unwavering
position of states on some of the most controversial clauses during the
instruments' negotiation process. Third, the authors will consider
whether or not the controversial issues discussed and the fact that a
vote was required by the Diplomatic Conference to adopt these
instruments may have weakened their prospects of ratifiability.
Finally, this Article examines whether more international lawmaking
will, in fact, provide for improved aviation security or whether ICAO
and the international community should better employ their
respective energies elsewhere.
II. THE LONG ROAD TO BEIJING: A NINE-YEAR PROCESS

Going as far back as June 3, 1996, the Council decided to include
the issue of acts or offenses of concern to the international aviation
community not covered by the existing law instruments in the Legal
Committee's work program.3 0 However, that item referred to the legal
aspects of unruly and disruptive passengers, which was ICAO's main
concern at the time.3 1 As a result of circumstances unforeseen and, in
many people's eyes, unforeseeable at that time, the focus shifted after
9/11.
In October 2001, less than a month after the 9/11 incidents, the
Thirty-third Session of the Assembly responded with a comprehensive
resolution on aviation security. 3 2 This resolution directed the Council

29.
This Article does not purport to give a comprehensive overview of the
Hague Convention and Montreal Convention regimes on aviation security.
30.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., General Work Programme of the Legal Committee
3.2 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11655, Oct. 22, 2001).
Before the 9/11 events, ICAO's Legal Committee work program covered the
31.
following issues:
i) Consideration on establishing a legal framework for CNS/ATM;
ii) "Acts or offences of concern to the international aviation community"
not covered by the existing international air law regime;
iii) International interests in mobile equipment (what later came to be
known as the Cape Town Convention);
iv) Modernization of the Rome Convention 1952 (which later culminated
with the adoption of the General Risks and Unlawful Interference
Conventions);
v) "Review of the question of the ratification of international air law
instruments; and"
vi) Implications of the application of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea for the Chicago Convention.
Id. T 2.1.

32.

See ICAO, Resolution A33-1, supra note 20.
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and the secretary-general to "act urgently to address the new and
emerging threats to civil aviation, in particular to review the
adequacy of the existing aviation security conventions; to review the
ICAO axiation security programme, including a review of Annex 17
and other related Annexes to the Convention." 33 It has been
suggested that the direction was "symptomatic of the frantic search
for any conceivable prevention that would protect aviation against
the repetition of a similar tragedy." 34 The resolution also instructed
the Council to convene a high-level, ministerial conference on
aviation security (AVSEC-Confl2).35 AVSEC-Conf/2, which took place
in March 2002, concluded that "gaps and inadequacies appear to exist
in international aviation security instruments with regard to new and
emerging threats to civil aviation." 36 The conference recommended
that ICAO "carry out a detailed study of the adequacy of the existing
aviation security conventions and other aviation security-related
documentation with a view to proposing and developing measures to
close the existing gaps and remove the inadequacies." 37 It also noted
that there was a need for ICAO to develop an Aviation Security Plan
of Action and called upon the Council to do so.3 8 Later in 2002, the
Council approved the ICAO Secretariat's action plan that included a
legal component-namely, Project 12, which addressed a "review of
existing legal instruments in aviation security so as to identify gaps
and inadequacies as to their coverage in relation to the new and
emerging threats." 39

Id. 7.
33.
MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 256 (2008)
34.
[hereinafter MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw]. More recently, Milde has also noted
that "[n]obody claims that the tragedy of 9/11 was contributed to by a void in
international law or by any inadequacy or shortcomings in codified international
instruments. It was a single event targeting the territory, airlines and airports of one
single State." Michael Milde, The Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol Adopted at
the InternationalConference on Air Law Held under the Auspices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization at Beijing, 30 August to 10 September 2010, 60 GERMAN J.
ZEITSCHRIFr FUR LUF'r- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 1, 60 (2011) [hereinafter Milde, Beijing
Convention].
35. The term new and emerging threats may include "improvised explosive devices,
unconventional terrorist attacks on airports and aircraft facilities, cyber attacks on
aviation systems, including air traffic management systems, and threats concerning
general and other forms of aviation." Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Review of the Report of
1.2, (ICAO, Working
the Twentieth Meeting of the Aviation Security Panel, at app.,
Paper No. C-WP/13338, Mar. 27, 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, Working Paper No. CWP/13338].
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Outcome of the High-Level, Ministerial Conference
36.
on Aviation Security, at A-3 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/1 1786, Feb. 27, 2002).
Id. at A-4.
37.
Id. at A-11.
38.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., State Letter from the ICAO Secretariat to ICAO
39.
Contracting States 1 (State Letter No. LE 4/65-05/45, Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter State
Letter No. LE 4/65-05/45] (accompanying a questionnaire circulated to members states
to ascertain the need and possibility of amending the then-existing aviation security
conventions).
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As part of this action plan, in 2004, the Secretariat presented the
ICAO study to the Thirty-fifth Session of the Assembly. 40 This
highlighted the fact that while "[t]he existing five aviation security
conventions have been widely accepted by States as useful legal
instruments for combating unlawful interference against civil
aviation," they should be updated in several instances to respond to
new and emerging threats, 4 1 such as:
i) misuse of civil aircraft as a weapon;
ii) use of civil aircraft to unlawfully spread biological,
chemical, and nuclear (BCN) substances;
iii) attacks against civil aviation using such substances;
iv) electronic attacks using radio transmitters or other
devices that may jam or alter signals used for air
navigation;
v) computer-based attacks to destroy data essential for
operation of the aircraft;
vi) the unlawful and intentional delivery, placing or
discharging of a lethal device at an airport or on board
aircraft; and
vii) the threatening of the use of a lethal device. 42
Interestingly, the ICAO aviation security instruments do not
provide a specific definition of what constitutes an act of unlawful
interference. 43 Rather, they qualify certain types of conduct as
criminal offenses against international civil aviation.44 Annex 17 to
the Chicago Convention qualifies acts of unlawful interference as

40.
See ICAO, Study, supra note 20. The ICAO Study was presented to the
Thirty-fifth Session of the Assembly as an information paper. This means that the
Assembly was not required to take any decision on the matter but simply to "note" the
content of the paper.
41.
Id. at A-9, 1 6.1.
42.
Id. at A-1, A-10.
43.
Hague Convention, supra note 2; Montreal Convention, supra note 2;
Airport Protocol, supra note 11; Beijing Convention, supra note 23; Beijing Protocol,
supra note 24.
44.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as
offenses, unlawfully seizing or exercising control of an aircraft by force, threat of force,
or intimidation; attempting to perform such an act; and being an accomplice to a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act); Montreal Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as offenses, unlawful and intentional acts of
sabotage likely to damage, destroy, or endanger the safety of an aircraft; attempting to
perform such acts; or being an accomplice to a person performing or attempting to
perform such acts); Airport Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 2 (defining the following as
an offense, unlawfully and intentionally using a device or weapon to perform acts
endangering or likely to endanger safety at an airport); Beijing Convention, supra note
23, at art. 1 (defining the following as offenses, performing acts that endanger the
safety of aircraft; using a device, substance, or weapon to endanger to safety of an
airport; making a threat of any of the former; or attempting, organizing, being an
accomplice to, or otherwise aiding any of the former); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at
art. 2 (defining the following as offenses, unlawfully and intentionally seizing or
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acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation,
including but not limited to: unlawful seizure of aircraft, destruction of
an aircraft in service, hostage-taking on board aircraft or on
aerodromes, forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on
the premises of an aeronautical facility, introduction on board an
aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material
intended for criminal purposes, use of an aircraft in service for the
purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to
property or the environment, communication of false information such
as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of
passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport
45
or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.

The ICAO study went on to say that existing public international
air law governing acts of unlawful interference focused on persons
actually committing illegal acts, either on board an aircraft or at an
airport, but not attempts to do so.46 Furthermore, there were no
specific provisions tackling the issue of persons organizing and
directing others in the commission of such offenses, 47 a point already
identified by the ICAO Secretariat back in 1999.48
Thus, under the existing regimes, certain ancillary acts falling
under the notion of "conspiracy" may not constitute a primary offense,
but acts that include the planning, facilitating, or contributing to the
commission of a primary offense that are recognized by the
international legal regime may be included.49 In the ICAO study, the
ICAO Secretariat recognized that the current international regime

exercising control of an aircraft by force or coercion or by credible threat; or attempting,
organizing, being an accomplice to, or otherwise aiding in any of the former).
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17, Security:
45.
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference 1-1
(9th ed. Mar. 2011) [hereinafter Annex 17].
46.
Cf. ICAO, Study, supra note 20, at A-3 (noting that "some of these
instruments are also applicable to attempted offences and accomplices" but "the
existing aviation security conventions focus on the penal aspects relating to unlawful
interference"). As I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor notes, the existing legal regime did not
cover, for instance, a false bomb alert. See I. H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN
INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 304 (8th rev. ed. 2006).
47.
See ICAO, Study, supra note 20, at A-3 ("[The conventions] do not, however,
expressly and specifically refer to persons organizing or directing others to commit the
offences.").
48.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., InternationalConvention for the Suppression
of TerroristBombings (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11065, Mar. 10, 1999).
49.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Protocol to the Montreal Convention Conspiracy or Association de Malfaiteurs' Offence 1 (ICAO, Legal Comm. Working
Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-1, July 31, 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, Legal Comm. Working
Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-1] (proposing the addition of a conspiracy offense to the
Montreal Convention to "ensure that acts which do not constitute the primary offence
but which include planning, facilitating or contributing to the primary offence are
recognized as international crimes and are subject to the mutual assistance and
international cooperation provisions of the Convention").
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did not provide legal tools to punish offenders for their involvement in
the commission of such ancillary offenses.5 0
Taking 9/11 as an example, the regime existing at the time
would have criminalized the hijacking of the four aircraft involved
and any acts of violence committed against airline crew or other
passengers on board.5 1 However, it would not have criminalized the
very use of the aircraft itself as a weapon, nor the preparation for and
organization of those hideous crimes. 52
On December 15, 2004, the Council was informed that a
questionnaire would be circulated to Member States to determine
whether the ICAO study's conclusions merited further work.53 By a
state letter dated March 24, 2005, the ICAO secretary-general
circulated the ICAO study and that questionnaire. 54 The questionnaire
sought to find out if Member States thought that new and emerging
threats, such as the misuse of aircraft as weapon or chemical and
biological attacks, needed to be criminalized in an international air law
instrument. 55 On the basis of responses to this survey, the ICAO

50.
It is noteworthy that both the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism not only criminalize the conduct of those persons who
participate as accomplices in the commission of the offense, but also that of those who
organize or direct others to commit the offense and contribute in any other way to the
commission of one or more offenses by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. This would cover the actions of the mastermind behind the offense. See
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 2, Dec. 15,
1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 37517 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention] (defining the
following as offenses, the act of placing or detonating of an explosive, the attempt to so
act, being an accomplice to the act, organizing or directing others to so act, or
contributing to the commission of such an act); International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2, § 5, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S.
38349 [hereinafter Financing of Terrorism Convention] (stating that any person
commits an offense who participates as an accomplice, organizes or directs others to
carry out, or intentionally contributes to the commission of an offense).
51.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as
offenses, unlawfully seizing or exercising control of an aircraft by force, threat of force,
or intimidation; attempting to perform such an act; and being an accomplice to a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act); Montreal Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 1 (defining the following as offenses, unlawful and intentional acts of
sabotage likely to damage, destroy, or endanger the safety of an aircraft; attempting to
perform such acts; or being an accomplice to a person performing or attempting to
perform such acts).
52.
The misuse of aircraft encompasses various concomitant offenses, such as
"the unlawful seizure of the aircraft in flight and the intentional destruction of an
aircraft in service, as well as misusing aircraft as weapons to cause death, injury and
damage on the ground." ICAO, Study, supra note 20, at A-3, 1 4.1.2. The ICAO study
recommended further examination on whether the misuse of aircraft as a weapon
should be criminalized as a separate offense under international law. Id. at A-4,
1 4.1.4.
53.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., General Work Programmeof the Legal Committee
T 3.3.2 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/12326, Feb. 12, 2004).
54.
State Letter No. LE 4/65-05/45, supra note 39.
55.
Id.
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Secretariat prepared a report to the Council. 56 Initially only fifty-seven
states responded to the questionnaire 57 -less than 30 percent of
ICAO's membership. Although ICAO stressed that 92.5 percent of the
total responses were in favor of a new international legal instrument to
address new and emerging threats, the responses actually represented
less than 30 percent of ICAO Member States.58 On January 20, 2006,
ICAO issued a second state letter on this issue,5 9 and, in 2007, ICAO
reported to the Thirty-sixth Session of the Assembly that eighty-four
states had responded to the survey. 60
With the survey report, the ICAO Secretariat proposed that the
Council convene a meeting of a subcommittee of the Legal Committee
to prepare the text of an appropriate international legal instrument. 6 1
However, during discussions in the Council, it became evident that
there was some discomfort with the proposal. For instance, Pakistan
expressed disappointment on the low number of responses to the
ICAO survey. 6 2 The United Kingdom indicated that, given the low
number of responses, it was premature to convene a subcommittee.6 3
And Austria opposed the Secretariat's proposal outright. 64
As a compromise, the Council formed a Secretariat study group
to lay the foundations for proposed texts for later consideration by the
full membership of the ICAO Legal Committee. 65
The Secretariat study group held three meetings and concluded
again that the existing legal regime should be updated to criminalize
new categories of unlawful interference with international civil
aviation. 66 Furthermore, there was consensus amongst the members

56.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/12326, supra note 53, 1 3.3.2.
57.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting 19
(ICAO, C-MIN 176/12, Jan. 24, 2006).
58.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on the Survey Concerning the Need to
Amend Existing International Air Law Instruments on Aviation Security 3,
2.8
(ICAO, Council Working Paper No. C-WP/12531, Nov. 4, 2005) ("Based on this
understanding, it may be concluded that fifty States, representing 92.5 percent of the
total replies, have been supportive of a new international legal instrument, either in
the form of an amendment or a separate convention.").
59.
State Letter No. LE 4/65-05/45, supra note 39.
60.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Acts or Offences of Concern to the International
Aviation Community and Not Covered by Existing Air Law Instruments 2,
1.1 (ICAO,
Working Paper No. A36-WP/12, Aug. 14, 2007) ("Eighty-four out of 189 Member States
replied [to the questionnaire], with an overwhelming majority affirming the need to
review and amend the Conventions.").
61.
See ICAO, Council Working Paper No. C-WP/12531, supra note 58, at 3,
T 3.2(c) (proposing future work "to convene a meeting of a Legal Sub-Committee to
prepare a text of an international legal instrument to cover the new and emerging
threats to civil aviation").
62.
ICAO, C-MIN 176/12, supra note 57, T 20.
63.
Id. 22.
64.
Id. T 32.
65.
Id. 41.
66.
The final report suggested that the following acts, regardless of motive,
should be criminalized in an international treaty:
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of the Secretariat Study Group that the existing conventions did not
contain sufficient measures relating to cooperation between law
enforcement agencies, extradition, and prosecution of offenses against
civil aviation security. 67 However, other recommendations were
discarded, such as a potential amendment to the Tokyo Convention to
cover acts of violence performed by unruly and disruptive passengers
and the criminalization of the mere transport of certain prohibited
material on board aircraft. 68
On March 7, 2007, the Council instructed the then chairman of
the ICAO Legal Committee 6 9 to convene a meeting of a Special SubCommittee (SSCLC) in order to draft proposals to address new and
emerging threats. 70 The SSCLC met in Montreal, Canada, for the

i) use of civil aircraft as a weapon;
ii) use of civil aircraft to unlawfully spread biological, chemical and
nuclear substances; attacks against civil aviation using biological,
chemical, and nuclear substances;
iii) acts of organizing or directing offenses;
iv) wilful contribution to an offense even in those cases where the actual
commission thereof might have not taken place; and
v) credible threat to commit an offense.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Final Report Relating to the Secretariat Study Group on
Aviation Security Conventions 2-3 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/12851, Dec. 20,
2007); ICAO, Working Paper No. A36-WP/12, supra note 60, at 2-3,
2.1.2.1
(highlighting acts identified by the study group for criminalization through treaty
provisions, independent of motive).
67.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/12851, supra note 66.
68.
The majority view within the Council was that legal issues involving
unruly and disruptive passengers were "of a somewhat different nature." Int'l Civil
Aviation Org., Summary Minutes of the Ninth Meeting 1 53 (ICAO, C-MIN 180/9, Mar.
5, 2008). Criticism that the Beijing instruments do not address air rage ignores the fact
that the new and emerging threats initiative post 9/11 was never really intended to
introduce amendments into the international regime in that area. See Ruwantissa
Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010: An Important Milestone in the Annals of
Aviation Security, 36 AIR & SPACE L. 243, 254 (2011) (identifying the noninclusion of
air rage as one of the instrument' shortcomings). Incidentally, in 2011, ICAO reestablished its special study groups on unruly and disruptive passengers. This group
was tasked with examining whether the international regime-namely, the Tokyo
Convention-merits further amendments. The group recommended that the
organization should embark in a holistic modernization of the instrument and on
November 9, 2011, the ICAO Council decided to convene a SSCLC. That SSCLC met on
May 22-25 and December 3-7, 2012. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Special SubCommittee of the Legal Committee for the Modernization of the Tokyo Convention
Including the Issue of Unruly Passengers (ICAO, Report No. LC/SC-MOT, May 2012).
Further regarding the work of the SSCLC, the Council recommended that the Thirtyfifth Session of the Legal Committee be convened. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report
of the Second Meeting of the Special Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee to Review
the Tokyo Convention 4.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/SC-13931, Feb. 2, 2013).
That meeting took place place May 6-17, 2013.
69.
Gilles Lauzon QC (Canada).
70.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary of Decisions of the Tenth Meeting 4
(ICAO, C-DEC 180/10, Mar. 9, 2007); Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Special Sub-Committee
of the Legal Committee for the Preparationof One or More Instruments Addressing New
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first time in July 2007.71 At that meeting, the Australian delegate,
serving as rapporteur,7 2 proposed two draft protocols to amend the
Hague Convention 73 and the Montreal Convention, as amended by
the Airport Protocol, respectively. 74 The rapporteur noted that the
proposals were in large part inspired by the previous work of the
International
Maritime
Organization (IMO), giving strong
consideration to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)75 and
the 2005 Protocol. 76 Thereafter, the Council convened a second
meeting of the SSCLC from February 19 to 21, 2008. Following those
two meetings, the SSCLC agreed on two draft protocols as proposed
by the rapporteur.7 7 That second meeting of the SSCLC also produced
a second report, approved by the Council at the sixth meeting of its

and Emerging Threats (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13032, Nov. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13032].
71.
Terry Olson (France) chaired the meetings of the SSCLC.
72.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4, supra note 1, 2.3; Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary
Minutes of the Eighth Meeting 13 (ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8].
73.
Under the Hague Convention, the criminal offense has three basic
elements. First, it involves an act that is unlawful. Second, there is a degree of force or
threat of force that has been used. Third, the offense consists of a seizure of aircraft,
exercise of unlawful control, or an attempt against such aircraft. DIEDERIKSVERSCHOOR, supra note 46, at 299.
. 74.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Special Sub-Committee on the Preparationof
One or More Instruments Addressing New and Emerging Threats 1 74 (ICAO, Working
Paper No. LC/SC-NET-WP/2, July 6, 2007) ("The development of the two Protocols, one
to the Hague Convention and one to the Montreal Convention, will update those
Conventions by criminalising acts which affect not only the safety of the aircraft but
also of persons and property on board and outside of the aircraft.").
75.
See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, concluded Mar. 10, 1988, 1-29004 U.N.T.S. 1678 (entered into
force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter SUA Convention] ("[A]dopting effective and practical
measures for the prevention of all unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation."). As of December 2, 2013, 161 states were party to the SUA Convention.
See Int'l Maritime Org., Status of MultilateralConventions and Instruments in Respect
of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-GeneralPerforms
Depositary or Other Functions, 421 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202013.pdf.
76.
See Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Oct. 14, 2005 [hereinafter SUA Protocol].
As of December 2, 2013, only twenty-four states were party to the SUA Protocol. See
Int'l Maritime Org., Status of MultilateralConventions, supra note 75, at 446.
77.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report of the Special Sub-Committee on the
Preparationof One or More Instruments Addressing New and Emerging Threats (ICAO,
Report No. LC/SC-NET-2, Feb. 2008) [hereinafter ICAO, Legal Sub-Committee Second
Report] ("[R]efin[ing] certain provisions of the two draft texts developed at its first
meeting.").
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184th Session. 78 The Council also decided to convene the Thirtyfourth Session of the Legal Committee (LC/34).79
Sixty-four ICAO Member States and six international
organizations8 o attended LC/34, 81 which took place in Montreal from
September 9 to 17, 2009. 82 LC/34 achieved significant and
considerable consensus on the fact that the existing treaties needed to
be amended to address the emerging threats to international civil
aviation.8 3 But a number of controversial issues remained where no
agreement w reached, in particular the so-called military exclusion
clause and the inclusion of the transport offense.84
Nonetheless, the Council approved LC/34's report and decided to
convene a Diplomatic Conference-the culmination of a nine-year
process. 85
The Beijing Diplomatic Conference, the first meeting of its kind
in the People's Republic of China, took place from August 30 to
September 10, 2010.86 Seventy-six ICAO Member States and four
international organizations were represented at the conference.87 The
Conference elected Xia Xinghua from China as its president, but the

78.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary Minutes of the Sixth Meeting
30-40
(ICAO, C-MIN 184/6, June 23, 2008).
79.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., State Letter from Secretary-General to Member
States, LM 2/19.1-09/27, at 1 (Apr. 9, 2009).
80.
Airports Council International (ACI), Latin American Air & Space Law
Association (ALADA), International Air Transport Association (IATA), European Union
(EU), EUROCONTROL, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
See generally Int'l Civil Aviation Org., List of Delegates No. 2 to the Thirty-fourth
Session of the Legal Committee (ICAO, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, Sept. 2009) [hereinafter
ICAO, List of Delegates No. 2] (listing delegates); Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report of the
34th Session of the Legal Committee T 5.1 (ICAO, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, 2009)
[hereinafter ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194] (providing attendance information).
In the absence of Henrik Kjellin (Sweden), Michael Jennison (United
81.
States) chaired LC/34.
ICAO, List of Delegates No. 2, supra note 80, at 1.
82.
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/4, supra note 1, T 2.4 (providing the opening address
83.
of the acting chairman of the legal committee in which he "emphasized the urgent need
to amend the existing conventions to cover the new and emerging threats to civil
aviation").
84.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Report on the Work of the Legal
2:125-36 (ICAO, LC/34-WP/5-2, Sept.
Committee During Its 34th Session, Report
16, 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, LC/34-WP/5-2] (reporting on the Council's discussion
concerning the "military exclusion" language); see also id. 2:1158 (highlighting that
"[s]ome delegations reiterated ... opposition to the inclusion of the transport offence").
85.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., State Letter from Secretary General Raymond
Benjamin to Member States, LM 1/16.1-10/10, at 1 (Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO,
State Letter LM 1/16.1-10/10] (announcing the Diplomatic Conference and inviting
participation).
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on the Diplomatic Conference on Aviation
86.
Security (Beijing, 30 August to 10 September 2010) and the Related Action of the 37th
Session of the Assembly ! 1.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13660, Oct. 29, 2010).
87.
Id.
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Commission of the Whole, under the chairmanship of Terry Olson
from France, dealt with the most problematic issues.88
By way of comparison, 106 states attended" the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the adoption of the Montreal Convention
1999.90 Delegates from sixty-eight states and observers from fourteen
international organizations 91 attended the Diplomatic Conference
convened under the joint auspices of ICAO and the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law to adopt the Cape Town
Convention92 and its Protocol 2001.93 Finally, eighty-one states and
sixteen international organizations attended the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the adoption of the Montreal Conventions
2009.94 Participation at the Beijing Diplomatic Conference might
suggest a rather moderate level of interest from Member States.9 5

III. THE NEW

REGIME

A. Temporal Scope
The Hague Convention criminalizes the unlawful "seizure" of an
aircraft. 96 The convention only applies once the "aircraft [is] in
flight,"97 which means that the offense may only be committed once

88.
See Int'l Conference on Air Law (Diplomatic Conference on Aviation
Security) Held Under the Auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization,
Final Act (Beijing, Aug. 30, 2010-Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Int'l Conference on Air
Law, Final Act]. The Conference also elected the following officers: Terry Olson
(France), First Vice-President; Hisham El-Zimity (Egypt), Second Vice-President;
Levers Mabaso (South Africa), Third Vice-President; David Sproule (Canada), Fourth
Vice-President; Cesar Fernando Mayoral (Argentina), Fifth Vice-President. Siew Huay
Tan (Singapore) was elected chairperson of both the Drafting and Preambular and
Final Clauses Committees. See ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13660, supranote 86.
89.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., InternationalConference on Air Law 1 2, 3 (ICAO,
Doc. 9775-DC/2, May 1999).
90.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 39917 [hereinafter Montreal Convention 1999].
91.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on the Outcome of the Diplomatic
Conference to Adopt a Mobile Equipment Convention and an Aircraft Protocol 1 1.1
(ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11654, Nov. 27, 2001).
92.
See Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16,
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 41143 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
93.
See Protocol to the Convention on International Interest in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2011 [hereinafter Cape
Town Protocol].
94.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on the InternationalConference on Air Law
(20 April - 2 May 2009) 1 1.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13341, May 25, 2009).
95.
Milde, Beijing Convention, supra note 34.
96.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (defining as an offense,
unlawfully seizing or exercising control of an aircraft by force, threat of force, or
intimidation).
97.
See id. at art. 1 (defining the following as offenses, when "any person who
on board an aircraft in flight" seizes or exercises control of that aircraft by force, threat,
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all the aircraft doors are closed and only until the moment when they
are opened after disembarkation. 9 8 This differs from the concept
adopted in the earlier Tokyo Convention, where-following the
precedent established by the Rome Convention 1952 9 9-an aircraft is
deemed to be in flight "from the moment when power is applied for
the purpose of take-off until the moment when the landing run
ends." 0 0
The Montreal Convention opted for a dual system. For certain
offenses such as assaults on persons aboard, 101 destruction of or
interference with air navigation facilities, 102 and transmission of false
information endangering safety, 0 3 the convention applies from the
moment the aircraft is in flight.104 However, the convention also
expanded the temporal scope to "aircraft in service" for offenses such
as the destruction of the aircraft making it incapable of flying' 0 5 and
the introduction of devices or substances that may destroy the
aircraft. 106 An aircraft was deemed to be in service "from the
beginning of the preflight preparation of the aircraft by ground
personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours
after any landing." 0 7
The Beijing Protocol adopted the concept of "aircraft in service,"
leaving aside the notion of "aircraft in flight" adopted by the Hague
Convention. 08 This expanded temporal scope will apply to behavior
such as the unlawful seizure of an aircraft. The Beijing Convention
followed the Montreal Convention's dual system, retaining the same
distinction for existing offenses and applying to the new criminal

or intimidation; attempts to perform such an act; or is an accomplice to a person who
performs or attempts to perform such an act).
See id. at art. 3, § 1 (defining when an aircraft is considered to be "in flight"
98.
for purposes of the convention).
99.
Robert P. Boyle & Roy Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 30 J. AIR. L. & COM. 305, 331 (1964).
100.
Tokyo Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(b), § 3; see also Rome Convention,
supra note 21, at art. 1, § 2. The drafters of the Hague Convention were doubtless of
the view that it did not make much sense to follow the Tokyo Convention's approach
with regard to the temporal scope, given the fact that there might be cases where the
unlawful seizure of an aircraft may be committed after the boarding process but before
the pilot applies power to the aircraft's engines.
101.
Montreal Convention, supranote 2, at art. 1, § 1(a).
Id. § 1(d).
102.
Id. § 1(e).
103.
See id. §§ 1(a), (d), (e) (referring to acts that "endanger the safety of aircraft
104.
in flight").
Id. at art. 1, § 1(b).
105.
Id.
106.
107.
Id. at art. 2(b).
108.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 5, § 1 (replacing Hague
Convention Article 3(1)-"aircraft in flight"-with the following language: "an aircraft is
considered to be in service from the beginning of the pre-flight preparation of the
aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours
after any landing. . . .").
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behavior discussed below-such as the use of an aircraft as a weapon
of mass destruction, 109 release of BCN weapons or explosive
radioactive materials from an aircraft, 110 and the use of BCN
weapons against an aircraft" '-once the aircraft is in service. 1 12
An aircraft that is not in service but is used to perpetrate an
offense would fall outside the scope of the Beijing instruments.
Domestic law would govern those cases, because before an aircraft is
in service, it carries very little, if any, transnational component. The
Beijing instruments are not intended to cross the boundaries of
domestic law.
In addition, the Beijing Convention incorporates those offenses
set forth by the Airport Protocol, such as the use of devices,
substances, and weapons to carry out acts of violence against persons
at, or the facilities of, international airports. 11 3 Here, the Beijing
Convention does not provide for a specific temporal scope.1 14 The
instrument will apply as long as the offense is carried out against
persons or facilities of such airports.11 5

B. PhysicalScope of Application
Just like its predecessor, the Beijing Convention applies to
offenses involving aircraft, air navigation facilities, and airports

109.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 1(f) (defining the
following as an offense, "us[ing] an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death,
serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment").
110.
See id. § 1(g) (defining the following as an offense, "releas[ing] or
discharg[ing] from an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive, or
similar substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily
injury or serious damage to property or the environment").
111.
See id. § 1(h) (defining the following as an offense, "us[ing] against or on
board an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar
substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or
serious damage to property or the environment").
112.
The Beijing Convention's definition of the term aircraft in service remains
unaltered from that adopted by the Montreal Convention. Id. at art. 2(b).
113.
Specifically, Article 1, § 2 states:
Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally, using any device, substance or weapon: (a) performs an
act of violence against a person at an airport serving international civil
aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death; or (b)
destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving
international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or
disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act endangers or is likely
to endanger safety at that airport.
Id. at art. 1, § 2.
114.
Id.
115.
See id. ("Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally, using any device, substance or weapon [performs certain acts] ... if such
an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.").
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serving international civil aviation. 116 With regard to the offenses
committed from an aircraft in flight, against or with an aircraft in
service, the instrument applies to three different scenarios. 1 1
First, it applies when the aircraft's actual or intended place of
takeoff or landing is in a state other than the state of registry of the
aircraft. 118 The word actual captures a situation in which the aircraft
is forced to divert from its route, landing in most cases in a place
other than its original destination.11 9 Intended refers to the planned
itinerary.120
Second, it applies where the offense takes place in the territory
of a state other than the aircraft's state of registry.121 In these two
scenarios, it is immaterial whether the aircraft in question is engaged
in an international or domestic flight. 122 The instrument could be
applicable to an entirely domestic operation to the extent that the
aircraft involved is diverted and forced to land in a state other than
its state of registry.'2 3 This is so because when an aircraft engaged in
a purely domestic operation is hijacked, it is simply impossible to
establish where that aircraft will end up landing.124 The instrument
also applies to domestic flights where the operator "dry leases" the
aircraft. 125 In this situation the aircraft is, in most cases, registered
in another state. 126 Here, both the state where the offense was

116.
See id. at art. 1 (including offenses involving aircraft, as well as interfering
with aircraft operation by destroying or damaging navigation facilities); id. § 2
(including offenses endangering the safety of an airport).
117.
See id. at art. 5 (outlining when the Convention applies).
118.
Id. at art. 5, § 2(a); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7.
119.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 5, § 5; Beijing Convention, supra
note 23, at art. 5, § 2(a).
120.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5, § 2(a).
121.
Id. at art. 5, § 2(b).
122.
See id. at art. 5, § 2.
123.
JACQUES DE WATTEVILLE, LA PIRATERIE AERIENNE [AIRCRAFT PIRACY] 83
(1978).
124.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Options Paper for Amendment of Article 4 of
the Montreal Convention 3,
4.1 (ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 5, July 15, 2010) ("It was
considered that where aircraft are hijacked it is impossible to determine where they
might land and that the Convention should apply where the aircraft lands in another
State even though the flight was scheduled as a domestic flight at the point of takeoff.").
125.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(d) (requiring parties to
take measures to establish jurisdiction over Article 1 offenses "when the offence is
committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose
principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, whose
permanent residence is in that State").
126.
A dry lease involves a leasing arrangement where the lessor provides the
aircraft and the lessee is in charge of securing the crew to operate it. The lessee is
responsible for making the necessary arrangement to secure the crew. See ICAO,
DCAS Doc. No. 5, supranote 124, at 5-6, n.9 (defining dry-lease aircrafts).
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committed and the state of registration of the aircraft would have
jurisdiction.' 2 7
Third, the instrument also applies where the alleged offender is
found in a state other than the aircraft's state of registry. 12 8
In each of these scenarios, it is worth noting that the instrument
speaks about "State[s]," not "State[s] Part[y]."1 29 This was done to
avoid safe havens in states that do not adhere to the convention,
because the adoption of State Party would have limited the
instrument's scope of application only to those states that ratify or
accede to the convention. In other words, even if one assumed that
France had ratified, but Germany had not, the instrument would still
apply to an incident taking place on board a German-registered
aircraft within two points in France. It would also apply if the alleged
offender was found in Germany.
With regard to the offenses such as damaging or destroying air
navigation facilities, the instrument will be applicable to the extent
that such facilities are used for international air navigation.13 0 Given
that these facilities are in most cases used interchangeably for
domestic and international operations, an entirely domestic, terrorist
attack against, for instance, an air traffic control center, where all
offenders and victims are nationals of the state in whose territory the
act took place, may very well trigger the application of the
instrument.13 '
The Beijing Convention is silent as to the scope of offenses
against airport facilities or persons located in such facilities.1 3 2 Just
like the Airport Protocol, the Beijing Convention does not provide a
definition of "an airport serving international civil aviation". 133
Although a definition was considered, the Twenty-fourth Session of
134
One
the ICAO Legal Committee opted to leave the term undefined.
may therefore infer that the Beijing Convention should apply to the
35
extent that these offenses take place at international airports.'

During the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, an unsuccessful attempt was
127.
made to carve out from the application of the instrument entirely domestic flights
when the aircraft is subject to a dry lease. Id. at 5, 1 5.8.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5, § 3.
128.
Id. at art. 5.
129.
Id. at art. 5, § 5.
130.
131.
Id.
See id. (referencing Article 1(1)(d), which makes it an offense to destroy air
132.
navigation facilities but does not include an explanation of what this might entail).
Id. at art. 1, § 2(a).
133.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Legal Opinion on Application of AVSEC-CONF/2
134.
Recommendation 4.1 (Locking of Flight Deck Doors) to Domestic Flights 1 3.3.3 (ICAO,
Working Paper No. C-WP/11795, May 14, 2002); Kirsch, supra note 11, at 10-11 ("In
the end the Legal Committee decided to dispense with both the definition and the
designation of airports serving international civil aviation . . .
135.
The offense reads:

166

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 47-145

Thus, the tragic suicide-bombing attack at Moscow Domodedovo
International Airport on January 24, 2011, where thirty-seven people
were killed and another 180 were severely injured, would have fallen
under the Beijing Convention. 136 The acts of accomplices, organizers,
and those who attempt to commit offenses from an aircraft in flight;
acts against or with an aircraft in service; and acts involving air
navigation facilities and international airports are also subject to the
above rules.13 7
Following the long-standing precedent set by the Chicago
Convention, neither of the Beijing instruments applies to aircraft
used in military, customs, or police services.1 38
C. The New PrincipalOffenses
The Diplomatic Conference incorporated most of the new
offenses in the Beijing Convention. These are:
-the use of an aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction;
-the release of BCN weapons; and
-the transport offense.
The Beijing Protocol added the offense of hijacking by coercion or
technological means.1 39
Both the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol
criminalized a number of ancillary offenses, including the offense of
concealment. 140 Each is examined further below.
1.

Use of an Aircraft as a Weapon

The most novel aspect of the Beijing Convention is the creation
of a new criminal offense of using an aircraft in service for the
purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to

Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally,
using any device, substance or weapon: (a) performs an act of violence against a
person at an airport serving international civil aviation which causes or is
likely to cause serious injury or death; or (b) destroys or seriously damages the
facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in
service located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 2(a)-(b).
136.
Alexei Anishchuk, Suicide Bomber Kills 35 at Russia's Biggest Airport,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-russiablast-airport-idUSTRE70N2TQ20110124.
137.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5, § 6; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 4.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5, § 1; Beijing Protocol, supra
138.
note 24, at art. 6, §2.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 2.
139.
See id. at art. 2 (referencing generally that there are ways other than
140.
affirmative means to commit the offense of hijacking).
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property or the environment. 141 This new offense is a very obvious
response to the factual scenario that arose on 9/11,142 but it also
addresses the fact that a terrorist's use of an aircraft as a weapon of
mass destruction contravenes the spirit of the Chicago Convention. 143
Previous proposals that had emerged from the SSCLC included
the wording "in a manner that causes or is likely to cause" 144
damages rather than "for the purpose of," and indeed, that proposal
resurfaced in the course of the Diplomatic Conference. 14 5 In light of
the fact that "the use of an aircraft is not in itself, as is the case with
dangerous substances, likely to cause the required damage"146 and in
order to align the proposal with the 2005 SUA Protocol, LC/34 had
rejected that proposal.147 At the Diplomatic Conference, the point was
also made by a number of states148 that if the offense referred to the
manner in which an aircraft is flown, this might inadvertently bring
acts of criminal negligence or mere operational errors and similar
concepts within the scope of the offense, going well beyond the
intention of the original proposals and the consensus reached at the
previous stages of the process.
The inclusion of environmental damages was also a contentious
issue. 149 Some delegations were of the view that such damages should
not be included in a treaty of this nature and deserved separate
treatment. 150 However, by the time of the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference, those reservations had disappeared and most states
favored the retention of "the reference to the environment,
considering that it serves the purpose of covering indirect damage to
persons or property."151

141.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 1(f).
ICAO rapidly condemned these events as "terrorist acts contrary to
142.
elementary considerations of humanity, norms of conduct of society and as violations of
international law." ICAO, Resolution A33-1, supra note 20, at VII-1.
Convention on International Civil Aviation arts. 3-4, Dec. 7, 1944, 15
143.
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; see ICAO, Resolution A33-1, supra note
20, at VII-I, 1 3 ("Urges all Contracting States to ensure, in accordance with Article 4
of the Convention, that civil aviation is not used for any purpose inconsistent with the
aims of the Convention on International Civil Aviation .... ).
144.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Report on the Work of the Legal
Committee During Its 34th Session, Report 2-2,
2:9 (ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, Sept. 15,
2009) [hereinafter ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1] (providing an overview of the discussion
regarding intentionality).
At the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, Germany tabled this proposal from
145.
the floor, and this was supported, at least initially, by Canada and Sweden. (authors
own notes).
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, at 2-2.
146.
147.
Id.
This was raised by South Africa, Singapore, Uganda, and New Zealand.
148.
(authors' own notes).
See ICAO, LCL34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-2, 1 2:9 (highlighting one
149.
delegate's belief that environmental damages should not be a focus of the Convention).
150.
Id.
Id. at 2-2, 2:10.
151.
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Release or Discharge of BCN Weapons

The Beijing Convention creates the new criminal offenses of
releasing or discharging any BCN weaponl 5 2 or explosive, radioactive,
or similar substance from an aircraft in service.' 5 3 The instrument
also criminalizes using such weapons or substances against another
aircraft or on board an aircraft in service. 154 Those in favor of
including this offense argue that international civil aviation must
also address the potential use of an aircraft for proliferation
purposes.15 5 During LC/34 discussions, however, a numbers of states
expressed serious concerns on expressly referring to BCN weapons.156

152.
Drawing inspiration from the 2005 SUA Protocol, Article 2(h) of the Beijing
Convention defines a BCN weapon as follows:
(a) biological weapons, which are:
(i) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their
origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes; or
(ii) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
(b) chemical weapons, which are, together or separately:
(i) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for:
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical
a.
or other peaceful purposes; or
b. protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related
to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection
against chemical weapons; or
c.
military purposes not connected with the use of chemical
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic
properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
d. law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes, as
long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes;
(ii) munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or
other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals
specified in subparagraph (b) (i), which would be released as a
result of the employment of such munitions and devices;
(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in
subparagraph (b) (ii)
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
(c)
Beijing Convention, supranote 23, at art. 2(h).
153.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(g).
154.
Id. at art. 1(h).
155.
See International Conference on Air Law, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Transport of Certain Materials Offence and the Use of Civil Aircraft for Proliferation
Purposes 1 (ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 10, May 8, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc. No.
10] ("To ensure that international civil aviation is not used for any purpose
inconsistent with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention),
we must address the use of civil aircraft for proliferation purposes.").
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-2 (documenting various
156.
state concerns regarding BCN weapons).
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In the end, LC/34's plenary session retained the definition, which was
later incorporated unaltered by the Beijing Diplomatic Conference.1 5 7
3.

Hijacking by Coercion or Technological Means

The Hague Convention made it an offense to seize or exercise
control of an aircraft in flight unlawfully by force or other form of
intimidation. 158 The Beijing Protocol creates a new principal
offense'6 9 if the unlawful and intentional seizure or exercise of control
of an aircraft in service is carried out by "coercion or by any
technological means." 160 This new concept tries to capture the
possibility that, for instance, "control [of the aircraft] could be
obtained by a person on the ground jamming the [air navigational]
signals without seizing [it] physically."161
It will be interesting to see whether the increasing instances of
pointing or shining laser signals into aircraft cockpits will fall under
this offense.162 Obviously, a prosecutor would still need to establish
the perpetrator's intent to commit such an offense.1 63
4.

Transport Offense

One of the most controversial aspects of the Beijing Convention
relates to the "transport offense"-the creation of a new substantive
criminal offense of unlawfully and intentionally transporting, causing
to transport, or facilitating the transport on board an aircraft of:
i)

any explosive or radioactive material (knowing that it is
intended to be used to cause death or serious injury or
damage);164

ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be so;1 65
iii) source material (including fissionable material);1 66 and

157.
See id. at 2-2, T 2:11 ("At the end, it was decided to retain the reference to
BCN weapon without square brackets and refer these provisions to the Drafting
Committee.").
158.
Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(a).
159.
Or, strictly speaking, expands the scope of the existing offense under the
Hague Convention.
160.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 2, § 1.
161.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Report on the Work of the Legal Committee
DuringIts 34th Session, 2-14, T 2.99 (ICAO, LC/34-WP/5-2, Sept. 16, 2009).
Shining laser pointers at aircraft is a rising phenomenon. In the United
162.
States, this type of behavior is subject not only to fines up to $250,000 but also up to 5
years of federal imprisonment. Tom Fontaine, Feds Get Tough on Laser PointerAircraft
Attacks, TRIB LIVE (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/s 783830.html.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1 (placing emphasis on the
163.
term intentionally).
164.
Id. at art. 1(i)(1).
165.
Id. at art. 1(i)(2).
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iv) any equipment, materials or software, or related
technology that significantly contributes to the design,
manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon. 167
In general terms, the transport of such materials will constitute
a criminal offense if done unlawfully and with knowledge or intent to
cause damage. Discussions at LC/34 and the Diplomatic Conference
demonstrated consensus that the criminalization of this offense is
"not intended to capture ordinary operational behaviour." 168 Those
who supported the notion of the transport offense have often said that
its inclusion was justified because the IMO had already set a
precedent with the SUA Protocol.16 9 Failure of ICAO to follow might
"result in greater reliance upon civil aircraft by proliferators to
transport material thereby even further compromising the objectives
of ICAO and the operation of civil aircraft for peaceful purposes."170
This argument is based on the (arguably incorrect) presumption that,
before deploying an attack, terrorists make an assessment of the
existing legal framework and that the decision to pick one mode of
transport over another depends on the legal gaps that they have
identified. But surely terrorists are more practical than academically
oriented. They would strike where they identify flaws in screening
systems or security checkpoints. It is hard to imagine the applicable
legal framework as being a decisive factor-far from it. As it will be
explained below, the airline industry also expressed very significant
concerns on the practical implications of this new offense for air
carriers.'17
The inclusion of the transport offense was merely a legal hiccup
at LC/34 but constituted a major barrier at the Diplomatic
Conference. 172 Although the majority of delegations at LC/34
supported its inclusion, a significant number of states expressed

166.
Id. at art. 1(i)(3). The text that came out of the SSCLC's second meeting
criminalized the unlawful and intentional transport of "source material" and "special
fissionable material," but did not provide for a definition of these terms. ICAO, Legal
Sub-Committee Second Report, supra note 77, at A4-2. The Russian Federation argued
that these terms require definitions and that such definitions should follow those found
in Article XX of the Statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency. See ICAO,
LC/34-WP/2-6, supra note 49, at 2, 1 2.2 (affirming the IAEA's definitions of source
material and special fissionable matter). The Diplomatic Conference retained that
suggestion in square brackets and the Diplomatic Conference finally adopted those
definitions. Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 2(j) (providing the definitions of
source material and special fissionable matter).
167.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(i)(4).
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-2, 2:10.
168.
See id. at 2-2 (referencing comments that favored the SUA Protocol
169.
inclusion of "transport offense").
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 10, supra note 155, at 4, t 4.5.
170.
See infra Section 4.
171.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-3 to 2-4 (noting that "the
172.
definition of the transport offences itself was a cause for concern").
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serious concerns. 173 Such was the opposition to this offense that
Egypt not only firmly opposed its inclusion in the final text but had
also managed to force a voting process on this issue at LC/34.174 This
had not happened in quite some time in a meeting of this kind, where
delegates most often strive to achieve results by consensus, following
long-standing ICAO practice. 175 Egypt's motion to vote on the
inclusion of the offense halted discussions for a couple of hours.
Initially, LC/34's chairman was hesitant to call for a vote, although
that possibility is set out in the rules of procedures of ICAO's Legal
Committee.1 7 6 However, after extensive consultation, the chairman
did call for a vote on the issue.1 77 In the end, the motion from Egypt
was defeated, although that was not expressly recorded at all in the
LC/34 report. There were considerable legal and political hurdles on
display at LC/34, arising from the issue of the transport offense that
were not resolved prior to the Beijing Diplomatic Conference. 178
Reflecting this disparity of positions, the text that was submitted
to the Diplomatic Conference included the offense only between
square brackets. 179 In Beijing, Australia, 180 Azerbaijan, 181 Saudi
Arabia, 18 2 China,1 8 3 India,184 and the International Air Transport

Id.
173.
174.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, 1 2:160.
175.
See ICAO LC/34-WP/5-2, supra note 161, at 2-12 (noting that if delegations
did not have a consensus, they were not adopted).
176.
Legal Committee, Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Rules of Procedure 16 (ICAO,
Doc. No. 7669-LC/139/5, 1998).
177.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, 2:160.
178.
Id. 2:25.
179.
Id. at D-1; Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Consolidated Text of the Montreal
Convention of 1971 as Amended by the Airports Protocol of 1988 with Amendments
Proposed by the Legal Committee 2, (ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 3, Feb. 2, 2010).
180.
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 10, supra note 155, at 1.
181.
See International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Proposals,(ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 12, Aug. 11, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc. No.
12] (identifying Azerbaijan as a presenter of a working paper submitted to the Beijing
Diplomatic Conference).
182.
See International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Essential Corrections and Additions to the Draft Texts Prepared by the Legal
Committee, (ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 11, Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc.
No. 11] (identifying Saudi Arabia as a presenter of a working paper submitted to the
Beijing Diplomatic Conference).
183.
See International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Comments on the Draft Protocols to the 1971 Montreal Convention and the 1970 Hague
Convention, (ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 15, Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc.
No. 15] (identifying China as a presenter of a working paper submitted to the Beijing
Diplomatic Conference).
184.
See International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Proposalfor Deletion of Article 4 Ter of the Montreal Convention of 1971 as Amended by
the Airports Protocol of 1988, with Amendments Proposed by the Legal Committee,
(ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 14, Aug. 30, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 14]
(identifying India as a presenter of a working paper submitted to the Beijing
Diplomatic Conference).
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Association (IATA)18 5 submitted working papers that dealt with this
issue.
Australia argued strongly that ICAO was indeed the correct
forum for this issue because it was the guarantor of the operation of
aircraft for peaceful purposes.' 8 6 It referred to the view of the UN
Security Council, which made a clear link between the proliferation of
dangerous substances and the growth of terrorism. 8 7 That view was
supported by a number of states, including France, the Netherlands,
Japan, and the United Kingdom.
Its opponents argued that its inclusion in an ICAO treaty was
unnecessary because its objective was already covered by other
international treaties and does not fall within ICAO's remit. 8 8 Such
was the level of disagreement that the matter was referred to a
Special Working Group, which ultimately produced a compromise
text. 189 This formed part of the compromise package that the
Diplomatic Conference ultimately adopted, albeit not without
controversy.
One might consider that the recourse to the voting procedures at
LC/34 on the transport offense set something of a precedent, which
was seen again at the Diplomatic Conference. And, although the
Diplomatic Conference ultimately incorporated the transport offense
into the Beijing Convention, given such tremendous opposition, one
may certainly wonder whether its inclusion may eventually hinder
the instruments' chances of widespread ratification.
The term transport is not defined.o9 0 Instead, both LC/34 and the
Diplomatic Conference decided to describe the conduct that
constitutes the offense.' 9' In order to ensure that the new offense

185.
See International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
The Views of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) on the Proposed
Instruments to Address New and Emerging Threats to Civil Aviation, (ICAO, DCAS
Doc. No. 13, Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13] (identifying IATA as
a presenter of a working paper submitted to the Beijing Diplomatic Conference).
186.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 10, supra note 155, at 1 ("This paper sets out
exactly why a prohibition on the use of the civil aircraft to intentionally and unlawfully
transport biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN) weapons . . . is . . . entirely consistent

with ICAO's objectives.").
187.
See id. at 2 (discussing the UN Security Council's statement of affirmation
regarding the existence of a link between terrorism and the proliferation of dangerous
substances).
188.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4, supra note 1, at 2-3 to 2-4, 2-11 (highlighting the
issue's divisiveness).
189.
International Conference on Air Law, Beijing, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Informal Group on Transport Offences, (ICAO, DCAS Flimsy No. 3, Sept. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Flimsy No. 3].
190.
See ICAO, Legal Committee Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-1, supra note
49, 1 4.1 ("The term 'transport' is not defined in the Draft Protocol"); Beijing
Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(i) (outlining the types of transport that would be
criminalized, but not exclusively defining the word transport).
191.
ICAO, Legal Committee Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-1, supra note 49,
T 4.1; see Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(i) (describing the conduct that
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covers the full range of possible criminal actions involved, the acts of
"transporting, causing to transport, or facilitating transport on board
an aircraft" were each criminalized.192 That solution is not unusual in
the aviation field.1 93 The drafters of the Montreal Convention 1999
also struggled to find a definition for the term transportl94 and simply
adopted the term carriageby air without further definition. 9 5
Instead of extending the scope of the transport offense to all
cases, some states had proposed at LC/34 an opt-in or opt-out
approach that would allow states the flexibility to decide whether
they wished to incorporate this concept into their domestic legal
systems. 196 In the absence of any similar precedent in other UN
counterterrorism conventions, the majority of states at LC/34 thought
that this was not appropriate in the context of an international treaty
dealing with criminal law, and the proposal was abandoned. 97
For an act to constitute a criminal offense, it must be carried out
"unlawfully" and "intentionally." 9 8 However, those terms are defined
nowhere in the texts. Some states raised this concern at LC/34 and
again at the Beijing Diplomatic Conference. 9 9
One observer noted at LC/34 that these terms may appear
redundant, but they are the standard language originating from the
criminal law of the common law systems. 200 The Hague Convention
only used the qualification "unlawful," 201 whereas the Montreal
Convention and the Montreal Protocol 1988 used both. 202 And with a

would constitute the offense); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 2 (noting not only
that the term transport is not defined but also that it is not used).
192.
See, e.g., Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(i) (outlining a range of
items and materials that are prohibited from being transported on board an aircraft);
ICAO, Legal Committee Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-1, supra note 49, 4.1.
193.
International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, Can., May 10-28, 1999,
Minutes and Documents, (Doc. 9773-DC/1) [hereinafter ICAO, Doc. 9773].
194.
Id.
195.
See Montreal Convention 1999, supra note 90, at arts. 1, 18 (highlighting
examples in which the term transporthas been redefined as "carriage by air").
196.
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-4, 1 2:24 ("A few delegations
supported the idea of exploring the merits of an opt-in/opt-out approach in relation to
the transport offences.").
197.
See id. at 2-4, 2:31 (explaining that the "preponderance of views" was not
to accept this proposal).
198.
Beijing Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1, § 1; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2, § 1.
199.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-6, §§ 2:46, 2:47.
200.
Id.
201.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(a) ("Any person who on board
an aircraft in flight: (a) unlawfully . .. seized, or exercises control of that
aircraft. . . .").
202.
See, e.g., Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 ("Any person commits
an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally . . . ."); Airport Protocol, supra note 11, at
art. 2 ("1 bis. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally, using
any device, substance or weapon . . . .").
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few exceptions, 203 most other international conventions also use both
terms. 204 LC/34 opted to maintain those terms unaltered, and
ultimately the new treaties mirrored the Hague and Montreal
regimes to impose the double requirement of unlawful and
intentional. 205 Michael Milde takes the view that "'unlawful' [means
that the act] must be contrary to a general duty imposed by law."2 06
Thus, Milde argues it would not be unlawful, for instance, "if a
qualified person were to take over the control of the aircraft for an
incapacitated crew member." 207 The word intentional, on the other
hand, encapsulates the mens rea concept that the act cannot simply
involve a degree of negligence on the part of the wrongdoer.20 8
5.

From the Transport of Fugitives to Concealment

The first meeting of the SSCLC had considered an Australian
proposal to criminalize the intentional and unlawful transport of
fugitives. 209 This would have made an offense of the act of knowingly
transporting on board an aircraft in service a person attempting to
evade criminal prosecution for offenses set out in a number of other

The Financing of Terrorism Convention requires the conduct to be carried
203.
out "unlawfully and wilfully." E.g., Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 50,
at art. 2, § 1. Likewise, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material opted for the word
intentional only. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents art. 2, Dec. 14, 1973,
1035 U.N.T.S. 15410; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material art. 7,
Oct. 26, 1979, 1456 U.N.T.S. 24631.
204.
See, e.g., SUA Convention, supra note 75, at art. 3 (exemplifying an
international treaty that uses both the terms unlawfully and intentionally);
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art. 2, Apr.
13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 44004 ("Any person commits an offence within the meaning of
this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally;"); Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf art. 2, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 29004 ("Any person commits an
offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally;"); Terrorist Bombings Convention,
supra note 50, at art. 2 ("Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers. . . ."); SUA Protocol,
supra note 75, at art. 4 ("Any person also commits an offence within the meaning of
this Protocol if that person: (a) unlawfully and intentionally. . . ."); Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf art. 4, Oct. 14, 2005 ("Any person commits an offence within the
meaning of this Protocol if that person unlawfully and intentionally. . .
205.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, T 2:62.
206.
MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 34, at 231.
207.
Id. at 223.
208.
Id.
209.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report of the Special Sub-Committee on the
Preparationof One or More Instruments Addressing New and Emerging Threats 2-2 to
2-12 (ICAO, Report No. LC/SC-NET, 2007) (explaining that the rapporteur of the Legal
Committee, Ms. J. Atwell (Australia), had submitted a proposal to criminalize the
unlawful and intentional transport of fugitives).
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international treaties, not only those related to international civil
aviation. 210
The original proposal was to follow the SUA Protocol, creating a
criminal offense or alternatively developing standards within the
context of Annex 18211 of the Chicago Convention.2 1 2 During the
SSCLC discussions, a number of states expressed strong reservations
with regard to the proposed offense. 21 3 From the outset, the proposed
language was extremely unclear and the element of "knowledge,"
which was required, did not necessarily remove that vagueness. 214
The SSCLC also noted the potential liability for airlines. 2 15 There was
no agreement within the first meeting of the SSCLC, so the issue was
submitted to the Council for consideration because it was thought
that the inclusion of such an offense was a matter of policy.21 6 The
Council opted to include this offense for consideration at the second
meeting of the SSCLC, which took place from February 19 to 21,
2008.217

210.

See id. at 2-3 (discussing the "intent" aspect of the offense).

211.
See INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 18 TO THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION-THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUs GOODS BY AIR

(3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ANNEX 18] (providing a description of the Annex 18
standards).
212.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13032, supra note 70.
213.
See ICAO, LC/SC-NET, supra note 72, at 2-12, § 10.12.4 ("A number of
members expressed serious reservations and/or declined to take a premature position
on the mere transport issue given its technical, legal and political complexity and need
for further research and discussion.").
214.

Id.

215.
Id.
216.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/12851, supra note 66.
217.
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72,
18. The original wording of the
offense reads:
Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally ...
(j) transports, causes to be transported, or facilitates the transport of another
person on board an aircraft knowing that the person has committed an act that
constitutes an offence set forth in the treaties listed in the Annex, and
intending to assist that person to evade criminal prosecution.
Id. See ICAO, LC/SC-NET, supra note 209, at A4-2 (showing the amendments to
Article 1 proposed by the SSCLC). The Annex would have included reference to the
following international instruments: i) Hague Convention 1970; ii) Montreal
Convention 1971; iii) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1971; iv) International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 17 December 1979; v) Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979; vi) Protocol for the Suppression
of Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; vii) Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixes Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
done at Rome on 10 March 1988; viii) International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15
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On November 28, 2009, the Council reexamined the SSCLC's
final report and the proposed offense was the subject of heated
debate. 218 Those in favor argued that this offense closed the gap of
having civil aircraft used to assist fugitives to evade criminal
prosecution for security-related acts. 219 Strongly supporting its
inclusion, Australia contended that since the IMO had already
adopted the SUA Protocol, "it was ICAO's responsibility to address
[such an] offence [because it is] entirely consistent with ICAO's
objectives." 220 Furthermore, Australia advised that "a failure by
ICAO to work towards prohibiting said offense in the aviation context
could only be considered as a failure to encourage the operation of
civil aircraft for peaceful purposes." 22 1
Member States who supported this proposal also indicated that
the criminalization of the transport of fugitives is in line with UN
Resolution 1373.222 Whilst one cannot but fully support the spirit of
UN Resolution 1373 to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts, there is no express reference in that resolution to the transport
of fugitives. 223 Its aims can be best achieved by multilateral
cooperation arrangements to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks
and the enhancement of effective border controls.
Sounding a note of caution, Japan warned that "careful
consideration should be given to the differences between maritime
and air transportation." 224 Aviation differs significantly from the
maritime environment, particularly with respect to the security
controls that are in place to gain access to vessels. 225 Indeed, it can be
argued that security controls in air transport are noticeably more
rigorous than in other modes of transport. 226
France noted that since the issue involved other considerations,
such as extradition and legal cooperation, the transport of fugitives
was not directly linked to the safety of international civil aviation. 22 7
It also noted that ICAO's approach had always been to criminalize
those acts that endanger the safety of international civil aviation. 228

December 1997; and ix) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December
1999. See id. at A4-2, n.2.
218.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13032, supranote 70.
219.
Id.
220.
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72, at 70.
221.
Id.
222.
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
223.
See id. (noting that the term terrorists,rather than fugitives, is used).
224.
See ICAO, WP/12851, supra note 66, at 4, 1 2.2.1 (highlighting concerns
that existed regarding air transportation and maritime law).
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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Brazil and Italy were equally skeptical on the inclusion of the
offense of the transport of fugitives. 229 And, expressing its own
discomfort, Germany noted that the SUA Protocol had attracted an
insignificant number of ratifications. 230
However, the offense was nevertheless included in the draft text
submitted to LC/34 and the Beijing Diplomatic Conference. 2 31
In this context, the offense arguably does not add anything to the
overall initiative that the Beijing Diplomatic Conference considered.
In practice, it is almost impossible for an airline to make a reasonable
assessment to establish:
i) that a person has committed an offense; and
ii) that such person intends to evade criminal prosecution.
For instance, a reservation, ticket, or gate agent may be found to
have "facilitated" the transport of the fugitive and therefore be
criminally liable. At LC/34, one delegation suggested that it was
necessary to include objective criteria that airlines could rely upon.23 2
Other delegations highlighted the fact that since this offense did not
clarify the duty of care imposed on airlines, the offense should be
dropped because of the potential negative repercussions on the
industry. 233
One may well question the benefit of creating this offense when
in practice a number of measures are already in place, such as no-fly
lists, to prevent the transport of those suspected or convicted of illegal
activities. 234 The wording of the offense also makes cross-reference to
other international instruments, which are well beyond the scope of
international civil aviation. 2 35 This creates discomfort because some
states may be parties to some but not all of the instruments listed in
the offense. 236 It was for these reasons that at LC/34 and indeed at
the Diplomatic Conference, the airline industry suggested the
complete deletion of any language that would attempt to criminalize
the transport of fugitives. 2 37

ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72, at 77-78.
229.
230.
Id.
231.
See ICAO, Legal Sub-Committee Second Report, supra note 77,
2.14
(opting not to delete the offense but noting "that a large majority at the meeting did not
favour the inclusion of the transport of fugitives offence").
232.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, 1 2:36.
233.
Id. 2:37.
234.
Id. 2:40.
235.
Id.
236.
Id.
237.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., The Views of the InternationalAir Transport
Association (lATA) on the Preparation of One of More International Instruments
Addressing New and Emerging Threats 6, 2.4.8, (Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-3,
Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter ICAO, Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-3] ("In light of the
foregoing arguments, IATA would respectfully suggest the complete deletion of any
language that would attempt to criminalize the transport of fugitives.").
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Discussions at LC/34 had reached no consensus on the need to
criminalize the transport of fugitives. 23 8 In an attempt to bridge this
divide, LC/34's chairman had decided to form a small. working
group.23 9 Because that group's composition weighed heavily in favor
of those states who supported the criminalization of the transport of
fugitives, Egypt declined to participate and reserved its position. 240
During the work of this group, Argentina proposed replacing the
offense of transporting fugitives with the introduction of the offense of
concealment," a civil law equivalent of the common law notion of
"accessory after the fact." 241 This would only criminalize the
assistance provided to a person who has committed an offense and
tries to escape investigation, prosecution, or punishment. 242 This
proposal was immediately supported by Canada, who enhanced the
language of the original Argentinean proposal. 243 Thus, it was
proposed to make it a criminal offense to give assistance to a person
who intends to evade investigation, prosecution, or punishment,
knowing that such person has committed an act that constitutes a
criminal offense. 244
Although the Argentinean proposal-as enhanced by Canadawas presented as the final recommendation of the small working
group to LC/34's plenary, to the surprise of many, Australia and
Saudi Arabia presented a separate "flimsy." 245 The supporting
language of the flimsy was more in line with the SUA Protocol
because it would criminalize the transport of a fugitive wanted for
criminal prosecution by law enforcement authorities who had
committed an offense as set forth in one of the treaties listed. 246
Needless to say, the presentation of a separate proposal just
when consensus seemed to be around the corner greatly confused all
participants. Regrettably though, Argentina's flimsy did not form part
of LC/34 report, which is rather surprising given that Australia and
Saudi Arabia's proposal does appear in the report.
After extensive discussions, LC/34 finally accepted Argentina's
proposal, and the draft going into the Beijing Diplomatic Conference
included the offense of concealment. 247 The original Argentinean

238.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, 1 2:42
239.
This small working group was composed of Argentina, Australia, Canada,
China, Egypt, Germany, India, Japan, Lebanon, the Russian Federation, South Africa,
and the United States. Id. T 2:43.
240.
Id.
241.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, at D4.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
A "flimsy" is a term used in ICAO to refer to a paper that is of a rather
descriptive nature.
246.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, at E-1.
247.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 3, supra note 179, at art. 1 ter ("Any person also
commits an offence if that person makes a credible threat or unlawfully and

2014/

THE NEW ICAO-BEIJING INSTRUMENTS

179

proposal was to criminalize assistance provided to a person to evade
investigation, prosecution, or punishment knowing that: i) such
person has committed an offense or been convicted of an offense as set
forth in the convention; or ii) law enforcement authorities require
such person for criminal prosecution. 248
At the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, the offense was once again
subject to extensive discussions. Again, the airline industry proposed
deletion of the offense. 249 In order to reach consensus and agree on a
final text, a special working group composed of the Netherlands,
China, Argentina, Australia, and Egypt was established. The group
maintained the basic elements of the original proposal but introduced
editorial changes that significantly enhanced its wording. 250 The
group also very wisely suggested including the words unlawfully and
intentionally in order to avoid unintended criminal liability.2 51
The Commission of the Whole accepted the working group's
recommendation and the transport of fugitives offense finally became
the Beijing instruments' offense of concealment. 252 To be punishable,
the offense requires two concurrent elements. 253 First, the person
being transported would need to have been convicted of a crime. 25 4
Second, the accused would need to knowingly assist that convicted

intentionally causes any person to receive a credible threat to commit any of the
offences in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (0, (g), and (h) of paragraph 1 or an offence in
paragraph 1 bis.").
248.
See International Conference on Air Law, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,
Introduction of the Offense of "Concealment"[Encubrimento] to Replace the Offense of
"TransportingFugitives" 5 (DCAS Doc. No. 7, July 15, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO,
DCAS Doc. No. 7] (explaining the details of Argentina's alternative proposal).
249.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, TT 2-2.1.3 ("For this reason,
the potential criminal liability of an airline and its employees should be excluded in
certain limited circumstances as discussed below.").
250.
See International Conference on Air Law, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010, Proposed
Amendment Regarding Article 1, Paragraph 2(D) ("Concealment Provision')
2.1
(DCAS Flimsy No. 2, Sept. 7, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO, DCAS Flimsy No. 2] (proposing
three major changes to the "concealment" provision).
251.
See id. 1 4.1 (suggesting including the language unlawfully and
intentionally in order to avoid unintended criminal liability).
252.

The final text of the offense now reads: "Any person also commits an
offence if that person: . . . (d) unlawfully and intentionally assists
another person to evade investigation, prosecution or punishment,
knowing that the person has committed an act that constitutes an
offence set forth [in the convention], or that the person is wanted for
criminal prosecution by law enforcement authorities for such an
offence or has been sentenced for such an offence."

Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at
art. 1, § 3(d).
253.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
254.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
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person to evade prosecution. 2 55 The offense does not require that the
convicted person be prosecuted. 256 In fact, the act of assistance is, of
itself, a criminal offense. 25 7
From a practical perspective, the prosecution would likely have
to establish four criteria.2 5 8 First, the accused would need to have
transported the convicted person. 259 Second, the accused would
require knowledge of the convicted person's status. Third, a warrant
or its equivalent would need to have been issued. 2 60 Finally, the
accused would need to have had the intention to assist the fugitive
with knowledge of his or her status and with knowledge that a
warrant had been issued for such fugitive to escape criminal
prosecution. 261
Both the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol now
incorporate this offense. 26 2 This is a welcome outcome, for it removed
the uncertainties and potential abuses that the transport of fugitives
offense might have given rise to. The new offense provides much
clearer objective criteria, 26 3 which, one might hope, will ease the
discomfort expressed by a large number of states. This should
enhance the instruments' chances of ratification.
D. Ancillary Offenses
The Hague Convention and Montreal Conventions already
contained the ancillary offenses of attempting to commit an offense or
being an accomplice in the commission of an offense. 264 However, one
of the novelties of the Beijing instruments is also the creation of
ancillary offenses that relate specifically to the newly created

255.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft Protocol to the Montreal Convention Transport Offences 3, 1 2.8.2 (ICAO, Working Paper No. LC/34-WP/2-2, July 31, 2009)
[hereinafter ICAO, Working Paper No. LC 34-WP/2-2] ("This act of assistance is a
criminal act of itself.").
256.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
257.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
258.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
259.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
260.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
261.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
262.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
263.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(d); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 2.
264.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1, §§ 2(a)-(b); Hague
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 §§ (a)-(b).
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principal offenses against civil aviation. These will be examined
below.
1.

Making a Credible Threat to Commit an Offense or Unlawfully
and Intentionally Causing Any Person to Receive Such a Threat

It is now an offense to make a credible threat to commit any
offense against civil aviation (including those new offenses created by
the Beijing instruments) or to unlawfully and intentionally cause any
person to receive such a credible threat. 265 The concept of "credible
threat" merits further examination. This language constitutes a
significant advance on existing international law on aviation security.
The Hague Convention is silent on this issue. 266 The Montreal
Convention makes it an offense "[to communicate] information which
[the alleged offender] knows to be false, thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight." 267 Similarly, the Airport Protocol
criminalizes the disruption of "the services of the airport, if such an
act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport." 268 Both
of these behaviors do not expressly address a credible threat, such as
a hoax bomb, and are subject to the fact that the act in question must
endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight or an airport. This is a
rather broad and vague concept, never desirable when codifying
criminal law. In this context, the new offense that is now captured in
the Beijing instruments represents a significant advance.
Nonetheless, the use of the qualification credible has been
subject to some criticism, for it may also be considered vague,
subjective, and prone to conflicting interpretations. Suggesting that a
definition was needed, China also underlined that some jurisdictions
do not criminalize simple threats that do not lead to the actual
commission of an offense. 269 Determining whether someone's conduct
meets the elements of a credible threat will depend on the facts of the
case. It will be interesting to see, however, how national courts apply
this provision.
2.

Organizes or Directs Others to Commit an Offense

This new offense criminalizes the conduct of a person who
"organizes or directs others to commit an offence," finds its source in
the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized

Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
265.
supra note 24, at art. 1, §§ 2(a)-(b).
Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1.
266.
267.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(e).
Airport Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 2(b).
268.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 15, supra note 183, $ 5.1 (suggesting "that a
269.
definition or a clarification provision for 'credible threat' be introduced into the draft
Protocol').
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Crime, 2 70 and "does not require the primary offence to have been
commenced or completed." 27 1
The chairman of the SSCLC has remarked that "although some
jurisdictions may not recognise either offence, it is essential that the
[Beijing instruments criminalize] any concerted action." 272 All
previous ICAO studies highlighted the gap that existed in aviation
security with regard to this type of conduct.27 3 Its inclusion, to a great
extent, responds to the scenario that gave rise to the 9/11 incidents,
where the existing ICAO instruments would not have caught the
conduct of those who masterminded those terrorist incidents. 274 This
may explain why this issue was not subject to much controversy.
3.

Agreeing with One or More Other Persons to Commit an Offense

Under the Beijing instruments, an agreement to commit an
offense and the intentional contribution in any way to the commission
of an offense, with the purpose of furthering the general criminal
activity of a group or with the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit such offense, shall itself constitute an offense.2 75 That
applies regardless of whether or not an offense has actually been
committed or attempted.27 6
The concept of "agreement" intends to capture the notion of
conspiracy in common law jurisdictions, where this type of
participation is punishable in itself,2 77 whereas that of "contribution"
reflects the principle of association de malfaiteurs that exists in
French and other civil law jurisdictions. 278 As Australia noted, the
latter "requires the commission of a preparatory act . . . to carry out

the group's purposes in order to give rise to criminal liability."279

270.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, § 4(b); Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 1, §§ 2(a)-(b). This offense has also been incorporated in the Terrorist
Bombings Convention. See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 50, at art. 2,

§ (3)(b).
271.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/2-1, supra note 49.
272.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, 1 2:55.
273.
Id.
274.
Id. T 2:57.
275.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
supra note 24, at art. 1, §§ 2 (a)-(b).
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
276.
supra note 24, at art. 1, §§ 2 (a)-(b).
277.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
supra note 24, at art. 1, §§ 2 (a)-(b).
278.
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/2-1, supra note 49 ("The proposed text incorporates
two alternative provisions, one to address the crime of conspiracy in common law
jurisdictions .... [A]nd one to encapsulate the concept of 'association de malfaiteurs' in
civil law jurisdictions .....
279.
Id. at 2.
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E. Military Exclusion Clause
The so-called military exclusion clause was the single most
controversial issue of the entire negotiations from their beginning
through to the instruments' adoption by the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference.280

The Beijing instruments contain a provision whereby, under
certain circumstances, any activities of armed forces against civil
aviation during an armed conflict are excluded from the scope of the
new regime. 281 In other words, conduct that would otherwise
constitute an offense under existing international aviation security
treaties would not be amenable to prosecution if carried out by armed
forces during an armed conflict. The latter would fall under the rules
of international humanitarian law.282
1.

Objectives

The military exclusion clause pursues three objectives.
First, it confirms that the new regime does not alter the rights,
obligations, and responsibilities of Member States and individuals
under international law-namely, the Charter of the United Nations,
the Chicago Convention, and international humanitarian law.2 83 One
might argue that this objective is in itself superfluous because those
obligations and responsibilities exist whether or not they were
expressly retained in the new regime.
Second, the clause seeks to exclude not only those actions that
armed forces carry out during an armed conflict but also the actions
of military forces of a state in the exercise of its official duties, to the
extent that such conduct is governed by international humanitarian
law. 284 This means that, under certain circumstances, certain acts of
military forces during times of peace may also fall outside of the new
regime.
In the discussions that preceded the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference, this objective caused significant discomfort in some

280.
Id.
281.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 6, § 2; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 3 bis.
282.
See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 711 (2008) ("The United Nations has established a number of
commissions to investigate or assess violations of international humanitarian law in
different conflicts.").
283.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
supranote 24, at art. 3 bis, § 1.
284.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1, §§ 3(a)-(b); Beijing Protocol,
supra note 24, at art. 3 bis, § 2.
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quarters. 285 Some states categorically stated their unwillingness to
accept a clause that completely exempts actions of military forces
even during peacetime. 286 Other states asserted that there should be
a distinction between "a military conflict and an act of military
aggression, as well as between a military conflict during a time of
peace and a military conflict during a time of war."2 87 Still other
states said that the clause should only apply "in case of formal
declaration of war by a State against another, as formal declaration of
war brings the conflict into the ambit of other international
treaties."2 88 If the clause is applicable even in those cases where there
is no formal declaration of war, these states contend that the
aggressor state is not "subject to any international accountability." 289
Similarly, as the SSCLC noted, the reference to international
humanitarian law may be confusing, and it may be difficult to
integrate it with civil aviation regulations. 290
Finally, the clause aims to make it clear that it does not purport
to legitimize acts that otherwise would be unlawful or to preclude in
any way the possibility of prosecution.2 9 '
2.

Rationale

As the rapporteur to the Diplomatic Conference noted, the
military exclusion clause finds its origins in the Terrorist Bombings
Convention, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, and the SUA
Protocol. 292 Its inclusion in those conventions is justified by the fact
that, in the view of some states, it addresses conduct already covered
under international humanitarian law, which deals with issues such
as a state's right to resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum) and what

2:74-2:78 (highlighting
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144,
285.
various delegations' perspectives on the proper scope of the military exclusion
provision).
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report of the Legal Commission for the
286.
General Section of Its Report and on Agenda Items 7, 8, 45, 46, 47 & 48 1 46.2-46.3
(ICAO, Report A36-WP/341, Sept. 25, 2007) (believing that such "an exemption would
constitute a violation of the- principles set out in the preambles of The Hague and
Montreal Conventions").
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72, T 21.
287.
ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 11, supra note 182, at 3.
288.
289.
Id. (discussing the military exception clause).
See ICAO, LC/SC-NET, supra note 209, at 2-9 (discussing action by other
290.
ICAO bodies).
291.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 6, § 3; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 3 bis, § 3.
292.
See ICAO, LC/34-WP/4, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting on the work done by
the legal committee during the session); see also Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra
note 50, at art. 19 (discussing which aspects of international law the Convention
governed).
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is acceptable in using such force (jus in bellum).2 93 Thus, the clause is
not an exclusion of international criminal liability, but rather a
qualification of the applicable field of international law. 294 Perhaps
the discomfort of some states with this clause was due to the fact
that-as many commentators have pointed out-terrorism poses
significant challenges to international humanitarian law and it is not
precisely clear where its boundaries lie. 295
Those in favor of inclusion of the military exclusion clause
contend that most recent counterterrorism conventions adopted
under the auspices of the United Nations now contain this clause,
which makes it clear that military activities are not within those
conventions' scope of application. 296 Its inclusion in the Beijing
instruments arguably preserves the status quo, simply reflecting
"established practice." 297 Those in favor also claim that ICAO's
aviation security conventions have been "commonly understood not to
apply to military activities, which are governed by other laws."298

10
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary Minutes of the Sixth Meeting
293.
(ICAO, MIN-188/6, Nov. 19, 2009) ("[I]n time of war, military activities were covered by
international public law, namely, the UN Charter, which addressed . .. the issues of
the prohibition of force and a State's right to self-defense, and international
humanitarian law, which addressed. . . the issues of jus ad bellum (when it is right to
resort to armed force) and jus in bello (what is acceptable in using such force), etc.").
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, 2:74.
294.
295.
See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security
Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 760
(2004) ("The law of armed conflict as it currently exists is the product of decades of
evolution and substantial international consensus . . . ."); Louise Arimatsu, Territory,
Boundariesand the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 Y.B INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 157 (2009)
(explaining that "the primary intent is to examine how contemporary law of armed
conflict (LOAC) is framed by pre-conceptions of our spatial environment and the
consequences that this territorialised viewpoint evokes"); Allan Rosas & Par Stenback,
The Frontiersof InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 24 J. PEACE RES. 219 (1987); Alex J.
Bellamy, When Is It Right to Fight? International Law and Jus ad Bellum, 8 J.
MILITARY ETHICS 231 (2009) (discussing "a renewed interest in the normative issues
prompted by contemporary forms of armed conflict, in particular questions related to
pre-emptive and preventive self-defence and humanitarian intervention"); Olivier
Dilrr, HumanitarianLaw of Armed Conflict: Problems of Applicability, 24 J. PEACE
RES. 263, 263 (1987) ("As there is no supranational jurisdiction, respect for these
fundamental rules protecting the human being must be implemented through a
stronger sense of responsibility on the part of the international community."); K.J.
Riordan, Shelling, Sniping and Starvation:The Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons
of the Siege of Sarajevo, 41 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 149, 156 (2010) ("Siege
warfare is not per se an unlawful method of combat. It is not proscribed in any
convention, nor is it prohibited by customary international law.").
296.
See Michael Jennison, The Beijing Treaties of 2010: Building a "Modern
Great Wall" Against Aviation Related Terrorism, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 9, 11 (2011)
("[Some delegations] wanted to apply the criminal provisions of counterterrorism
instruments to what they called 'state terrorism'.").
Id. (noting that deleting the provision "would have been a radical departure
297.
from established practice").
298.
Id. at 12 (pointing out that "although no such provision appears in the 40year-old underlying conventions, those conventions have never been applied to military
forces").
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Some Council decisions and certain state practices, which will be
examined further below, do not necessarily confirm that point of view.
Given the different nature of the aviation security conventions, it
could be argued that the fact that the military exclusion clause has
been incorporated in other international counterterrorism
conventions should not be viewed as sufficient justification. Although
it has been said that it is only of a declaratory nature,2 99 given the
previous history of incidents of the activities of armed forces involving
civil aircraft and infrastructure, a military exclusion clause can play
a much more striking role, for it excludes numerous actions that
would otherwise be considered unlawful.
Throughout the negotiation process of the Beijing instruments
there were a number of attempts to introduce significant
amendments to the military exclusion clause. 300 Nonetheless, the
final wording of the clause remained almost unaltered throughout the
whole process since the first meeting of the SSCLC. 30
3.

Scope

The key question is whether or not acts committed by armed
forces of a given state that satisfy the different elements of the
offenses defined in the Beijing instruments fall within their scope. 302
Yet, establishing which conducts fall within or without the regime
may be particularly difficult. In many situations, a thin line separates
what falls under the ICAO regime from what is governed by other
fields of international law, such as the rules of armed conflict.
The following questions may best exemplify the complexity of the
problem at hand:
i)

Would the destruction of an international airport by
armed forces constitute an act of unlawful interference
under the Beijing instruments or rather a justified act of
self-defense?
ii) Would the seizure of a civil aircraft by a newly formed
state's secret service agents be covered by the Beijing
instruments or would it instead constitute the legitimate
expression of the right of self-determination?

299.
See ICAO, A36-WP/12, supra note 60, at 3 ("Comparable UN counterterrorism conventions concluded after 1997 contain a military exclusion clause, which
expressly specifies that the conventions do not govern the activities of armed forces
during an armed conflict, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in
the exercise of their official duties.").
300.
During the Diplomatic Conference, for instance, Azerbaijan proposed to
include a reference to human rights. ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 12, supra note 181.
301.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, at G-3.
302.
See generally KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2011) (defining terrorism and
examining regimes of state responsibility).
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iii) Is military aggression against civil aviation in times of
peace, as opposed to self-defense, captured by the military
exclusion clause?
iv) Should the activities of armed forces against civil aviation
during an armed conflict be recorded as acts of unlawful
interference against international civil aviation?
v) Where do the NATO bombings of Libyan airports that
took place in the summer of 2011 fall?3 03
vi) If those bombings do not fall within the scope of the ICAO
aviation security instruments, why then has the
Assembly repeatedly condemned "all acts of unlawful
interference against civil aviation whenever and by
whomsoever and for whatever reason they are
perpetrated"?304
The above statement by the Assembly does not distinguish
between actions carried out by military forces and those that are
standard acts of unlawful interference. If the Assembly unanimously
condemns all such acts, regardless of the nature of the aggressor, one
is certainly entitled to ask why attacks of armed forces against civil
aviation would not also constitute acts of unlawful interference. And
although the answers to the above questions would inevitably depend
on the specific facts of each case, they illustrate that there is no onesize-fits-all approach.
It may well be the case that a state, or its organs or agents, carry
out (unlawful) acts that meet all of the elements required for the
commission of an offense, yet given that such actions fall within the
scope of other legal regimes (such as international humanitarian
law), they are not in fact prohibited.30 5 These other regimes may
establish the basis for other justifications not provided in the ICAO
aviation security conventions. This will certainly be the case for
lawful acts of war, such as self-defense. 30 6 Clearly, if for instance,
military forces bomb civil aviation infrastructures, the belligerent
state will not be under an obligation to extradite or prosecute the

303.
As part of its bombing operations in Libya, in July 2011, NATO forces
bombed Tripoli's international airport. See Libya: NATO Continues to Bomb Civilian
Targets, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Oct. 14, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.globalresearch.ca/
libya-nato-continues-to-bomb-civilian-targets/25841.
304.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A37-17, Consolidated Statement on the
Continuing ICAO Policies Related to the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, app. A, General Policy 1 1, at 29 (2010)
[hereinafter ICAO, Resolution A37-17] (endorsing "the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation
Security Strategy and its seven strategic focus areas, as adopted by the Council on 17
February 2010").
305.
See TRAPP, supra note 302, at 148 (noting the coordinators "approach to
regime interaction").
306.
See id. at 119 (discussing obligations to prevent and punish acts of
international terrorism).
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offenders, for their actions fall outside the scope of ICAO's aviation
security conventions.30 7
The activity of military forces will fall within the scope of the
ICAO aviation security instrument to the extent that such actions are
not carried out in the exercise of official duties.30 8 Likewise, where
the activities of armed forces are carried out beyond the context of the
rules of armed conflict, such actions will not be subject to the military
exclusion clause, and, if they satisfy the elements of the Beijing
instruments, they will be subject to that regime.3 0 9
Another interesting question is whether acts of military forces
against civil aviation, carried out in furtherance of a particular
struggle for self-determination, fall within the scope of the Beijing
instruments or whether the military exclusion clause captures those
acts and makes them subject to other rules of international law. This
is probably one of the most difficult hypothetical questions to resolve.
Of course, it would depend on the fact pattern involved. Kimberley
Trapp suggests that those acts would only be excluded from the
Beijing instruments "to the extent [that they are] committed in the
course of an armed conflict by an organized group subject to command
responsibility."3 10
One can certainly question if the actions of nonmilitary state
officials, such as those of secret service or counterintelligence agents,
would be covered by the military exclusion clause or whether such
conduct would be covered by ICAO's aviation security instruments.3 1 1
Strictly speaking, the military exclusion clause refers to "military
forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties." 3 12 This
wording makes it very difficult to categorize where the acts of these
agents fall. Here, it would be crucial to establish the linkage between
the agent committing the (unlawful) act and the state.31 3 Those
agents may or may not be members of their states' military forces.
In some countries, such agents are part of the military, and in
those situations, one would assume that it would be rather easy to
attribute the acts of the agents as being those of "military forces in

307.
See id. at 118 ("Bombings that are excluded from the scope of the Terrorist
Bombing Convention will not be subject to a prosecute or hand over obligation under
the Geneva Conventions or API . . . .").
308.
See id. at 151 (explaining that the second basis of exclusion "requires only
that the conduct of a state's armed forces be in exercise of their official duties and
governed by other rules of international law").
309.
See id. at 24 (recognizing the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism).
310.
Id. at 121.
311.
See id. at 172 ('The TSCs with express military exclusion clauses very
clearly do not apply to military operations-even when those operations meet the
material elements of the terrorist offences defined therein.").
312.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 6, § 2; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 3 bis, § 3.
313.
See generally MALCOLI N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (3d ed. 1991).
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the exercise of official duties." 314 In that scenario, the military
exclusion clause would remove the agents' actions from the scope of
the ICAO aviation security instruments.
In other countries, however, these agents operate in a completely
unconnected manner from the state's armed forces, most often
through undercover operations. They may have no relation at all with
military forces. If the agents' actions cannot be attributed to the
armed forces in the exercise of official duties, one would suppose that
the Beijing instruments would not exclude liability for such conduct.
Commentators rightly point out that when states engage in a form of
terrorism, such activity will most likely be executed by secret service
agents, as opposed to military forces.3 15 According to that rationale,
and despite the lack of clarity over the military exclusion clause, the
potential application of the ICAO aviation security instruments to
these types of activities would still remain quite large. 3 16
4.

The Positions of Different States

From the outset, the United States made it clear that it would
not countenance discussing proposed amendments to the existing
international aviation security regime without the inclusion of the
military exclusion clause. 31 7 In the United States' view, the wellestablished rules of international humanitarian law of both the
Hague 3 18 and Geneva Conventions 31 9 should govern states' use of

314.
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 6, § 3; Beijing Protocol, supra
note 24, at art. 3 bis, § 3.
315.
This Article does not seek to comprehensively address the issue of state
responsibility for sponsoring acts of terrorism. For an excellent analysis of the issue of
state responsibility involving acts of terrorism, see Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting
Terrorists:Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failingto Prevent TransborderAttacks?,
23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615 (2005).

316.
TRAPP, supra note 302, at 173.
317.
See ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72,
38 ("The Representative of the
United States averred that . .. ICAO would be derelict if it did not update the said
conventions by incorporating the standard provisions on military exclusion.").
318.
See Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 205 Consul. T.S. 277; Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215;
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (agreeing upon the listed provisions as
a result of the damage done to cultural property as a result of armed conflict); Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflicts, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769, 2253 U.N.T.S.172 (listing the
terms agreed upon by the high contracting parties).
319.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 12
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armed forces against civil aviation. 32 0 Closer examination of previous
international incidents involving the use of force by military forces
against civil aviation may shed some light on the United States'
unyielding position.3 21
During Council discussions, Canada and Romania expressed
serious concerns to the contrary.322 Canada even noted that the issue
of the military exclusion clause remained unresolved in the
negotiations of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism. 323 In those circumstances, the Canadian representative
felt that the text was not ready for submission to the Diplomatic
Conference.3 24 Similarly, Spain cautioned that this posed a risk to the
successful conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference. 325 Others,
including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Greece, Cuba, Venezuela,
and Nigeria, had warned much earlier that the inclusion of the
military exclusion clause in the draft was premature. 326
Although the Diplomatic Conference eventually retained the
clause without a single amendment to the draft that came out of
LC/34, such was the strength of some opposing states that they
successfully managed to force a vote. 3 2 7 The discontent with the
inclusion of this clause is self-evident. Rightly or wrongly, for some
states, the military exclusion clause is seen as a carte blanche, which
may immunize the conduct of states in a wide range of circumstances.
One cannot help but wonder if the convenience of pushing its
inclusion was achieved at the expense of endangering its ratifiability.
5.

A Redundant Clause?

It may be argued that, given the nature of the offenses
prescribed in the Beijing Protocol, the inclusion of the military
exclusion clause would presuppose, for example, that the seizure to
exercise control could only take place inside of the aircraft. It is
unlikely then that the conduct of a state, or that of its servants and
agents, could meet the elements of the offense because in most cases

August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 12, 1977; Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940.
320.
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72, 1 38.
Id.
321.
Id. 11 19-20.
322.
Id.
323.
Id.
324.
Id. 1 42.
325.
Id. 21.
326.
327.
Id. 1 47.
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such state conduct takes place outside of the aircraft (e.g.,
intercepting and forcing the diversion of civil aircraft). 32 8
That reasoning overlooks the fact that one of the new
enhancements of the Beijing Protocol is that it expressly captures a
situation in which the aircraft is seized not only by the use of force
but also by any technological means. 32 9 It was intended to catch
potential cyber attacks where offenders could gain control and seize
the aircraft through computer equipment or other technological
means from remote locations but without the use of force at all.33 0 In
theory, at least, a state's military forces or agents thereof could
launch a cyber attack to gain control of an aircraft without the use of
force. Some years ago, ICAO's Aviation Security Panel already
concluded that the "threat of cyber-attacks is real and cannot be
ignored."3 3 ' In that context, the application of the military exclusion
clause to the Beijing instruments may not be superfluous after all.
6.

Previous International Incidents

An examination of recent incidents involving the activities of
military forces and civil aviation, where ICAO has been asked to take
a stance, is most revealing in seeking to interpret the conduct of
Member States. 332 In addition, these historical precedents may
indirectly have led to the inclusion of the military exclusion clause in
the Beijing instruments.
On February 21, 1973, an Israeli fighter aircraft shot down a
Libyan civil aircraft that had lost its course over the occupied
Egyptian territory of Sinai, which resulted in 108 fatalities. Following
this incident, the Nineteenth Session of the Assembly instructed the
secretary-general to institute a thorough investigation. 333 When
examining the investigation's report, the Council found no
justification for Israel's actions and urged Israel to comply with the
aims of the Chicago Convention. 334
Later that year, on August 10, 1973, Israeli military aircraft
allegedly violated Lebanon's airspace in order to force the diversion

328.
See TRAPP, supra note 302, at 171 ("The Hague Convention defines the
relevant offences as acts committed inside the aircraft . . . .").
329.
Beijing Protocol, supranote 24, at art. 1, § 1.
330.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13338, supra note 35.
331.
Id.
332.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A19-1, Shooting Down of a Libyan Aircraft by
Israeli Fighters on 21 February 1973 [hereinafter ICAO, Resolution A19-1] (directing
"the Council to instruct the Secretary General to institute an investigation in order to
undertake fact findings and to report to the Council at the earliest date"); see also
UNITED NATIONS, JURIDICAL YEARBOOK 37, 59 (1973) (reviewing ICAO's settlement of
disputes between contracting states).
333.
ICAO, Resolution Al9-1, supra note 332.
334.
Id. ("Condemning the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 106
innocent lives.").
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and seizure of a Lebanese-registered civil aircraft leased to Iraqi
Airways. 335 Twenty days later, at its Twentieth Session, the
Assembly passed a resolution strongly condemning Israel's actions as
constituting an act of unlawful interference in violation of the
Chicago Convention. 336
Similarly, on February 4, 1986, Israeli military aircraft
intercepted and forced the diversion of a Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft
flying over the high seas. 3 3 7 Shortly thereafter, the Council again
condemned Israel's actions as a violation of the principles of the
Chicago Convention.3 3 8
In 1988, ICAO condemned acts of sabotage perpetrated against a
Cuban aircraft, CU-T 1201, which killed seventy-three people. 33 9
Likewise, when in 1990, Iraqi armed forces plundered Kuwait
International Airport and later seized and removed to Iraq fifteen
aircraft belonging to Kuwait Airways, the Assembly firmly
condemned the violation of the sovereignty of Kuwait's airspace. 340
In all of these cases, either the Council or the Assembly has
condemned the acts of an infringing state's armed forces against
international civil aviation as being contrary to the principles of the

335.

See UNITED NATIONS, JURIDICAL BOOK, supra note 332, at 37, 59 ("On 20

August, the Council, meeting in Extraordinary Session, condemned Israel for violating
Lebanon's sovereignty and for the diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft on
10 August .... ).
336.
See id. at 60 ("On 30 August,... the Assembly strongly condemned Israel
for violating Lebanon's sovereignty, for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese
civil aircraft and for violating the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation. . . ."); Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A20-1, Diversion and Seizure by Israeli
1-3 [hereinafter ICAO, Resolution
Military Aircraft of a Lebanese Civil Aircraft
A20-1]. It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council also condemned Israel's actions
involving the diversion and seizure of this aircraft. See S.C. Res. 337, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/337 (Aug. 15, 1973). Similarly, in 1968, before the adoption of both the Hague
and Montreal Conventions, the UN Security Council had condemned Israel's attacks on
the Beirut International Airport, which resulted in the destruction of thirteen
commercial aircraft that were on the tarmac. See S.C. Res. 262, U.N. Doc. S/RES/262
(Dec. 31, 1968).
337.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 117th Session, Resolution Adopted 28
February 1986, ICAO Doc. 9485-C/1094 (1986); see Press Release PIO 1/86, Int'l Civil
Aviation Org., Council Condemns the Act of Israel for Its Interception of Libyan Arab
Airlines Aircraft (Feb. 28, 1986) (condemning Israel for its interception and diversion of
a Libyan-Arab aircraft within international airspace).
338.
See Press Release PIO 1/86, supra note 337 (considering that Israel
"committed an act against international civil aviation in violation of the principles of
the Chicago Convention").
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A22-5, Sabotage and Destructionof a Cuban Civil
339.
Aircraft on Scheduled Service in the Caribbean with the Loss of 73 Passengers and
Crew (1977).

Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A28-7, Aeronautical Consequences of the Iraqi
340.
Invasion of Kuwait (1990); see Michael Milde, Aeronautical Consequences of the Iraqi
Invasion of Kuwait XVI, 16 AIR L. 63 (1991) [hereinafter Milde, Iraqi Invasion] (noting
that "international civil aviation has become one of the first victims of this act of
aggression").
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Chicago Convention. 34 1 None of these ICAO pronouncements made a
single reference to the Hague or the Montreal Conventions, let alone
declared that acts of military forces were contrary to those
instruments. 342 This would tend to suggest that ICAO's practice has
always been to exclude acts carried out by military forces from the
scope of aviation security conventions.
The Council seemed to reinforce that idea through a working
paper presented to the Thirty-sixth Session of the Assembly that
stated that at ICAO "it has been widely understood that the aviation
security instruments which criminalise certain acts are not applicable
to military activities." 34 3 This (apparent) ICAO approach would seem
in line with that of the IMO, where terrorist-suppression conventions
such as the SUA Convention or the SUA Protocol "have not generally
been invoked to condemn a state's military activities against the
safety of civil maritime navigation." 344
If it is implicit that the existing ICAO aviation security
conventions do not apply to acts of armed forces, Why did several
states, such as the United States, repeatedly request that the
exclusion be made explicit in the new regime?3 45 After all, one may
certainly argue that ICAO does not have jurisdiction over the
activities of a state's armed forces. 346 Why does it appear that some
states conditioned their signing up to the Beijing package on the
inclusion of the military exclusion clause? If this in fact has been
ICAO's practice, Why did the Beijing instruments need specifically to
incorporate the military exclusion clause? The determination

341.
The shoot down of civil aircraft off Cuba is another interesting case where
ICAO was required to deal with armed forces taking action against civil aviation. On
February 24, 1996, whilst within the Havana "flight information region," a Cuban MiG29 military aircraft shot down two U.S.-registered private civil aircraft that had
deviated from their original "visual flight rule" plans. See Press Release PIO 6/96, Int'l
Civil Aviation Org., ICAO Council Concludes Consideration of the Report on the 24
February 1996 Shootdown of Civil Aircraft of Cuba (June 28, 1996). ICAO instituted a
formal investigation, whose final results were brought to the attention of the Council.
What is most interesting about this case is the fact that, although the Council
ultimately decided to adopt a resolution, it refrained from condemning Cuba's actions
as contrary to international law. The resolution nonetheless restated general
principles, such as "the condemnation of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight." See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 148th Session, Resolution Adopted 27
June 1996, ICAO Doc. PIO 6/96 app. A (1996) [hereinafter ICAO, Resolution Adopted
27 June 1996].
342.
ICAO, Resolution Adopted 27 June 1996, supra note 341.
343.
See ICAO, A36-WP/12, supra note 60, at 3 (discussing the integration of
specific provisions that are common in some recent UN counterterrorism conventions).
344.
See TRAPP, supra note 302, at 163 ("While the use of military force against
merchant ships . . . is very unusual, incidents involving such uses of force are dealt
with as a matter of general maritime law and the jus ad bellum.").
345.
ICAO, C-MIN 182/8, supra note 72,
37-38.
346.
Id.
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demonstrated by some states on this issue is not without precedent
and the incidents below may shed further light.34 7
In 1999, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) requested the
involvement of the Council after a Congolese Airlines aircraft was
shot down at Kindu Airport on October 10, 1998, presumably by
Rwanda and Burundi military forces. 348 Given insufficient
information to adopt a resolution, and, following the organization's
long-established practice of condemning actions of military forces
against civil aviation, on March 10, 1999, the Council opted to pass a
more general declaration urging Member States to be "guided by the
principles" of the Chicago Convention and the aviation security
conventions. 349 While acknowledging that both the Hague and
Montreal Conventions have enhanced "the protection of civil aviation
from acts of unlawful interference,"3 5 0 the declaration only called
upon states to refrain from the use of weapons against civil
aircraft. 351 Although the declaration mentions the ICAO aviation
security conventions, 35 2 such a reference does not form a sufficient
legal basis to establish the unlawfulness of the use of armed forces
against civil aviation.
On December 4, 2001, Israeli military forces heavily bombarded
Gaza International Airport, destroying all air navigation facilities,
runways, and taxiways.3 53 The attack rendered the airport completely
inoperative. 354 Just when Palestine had nearly completed repairs to
the damage, on January 11, 2002, (roughly a month before the
convening of ICAO's Second Aviation Security Conference (AVSECConfl2)) Israeli armed forces again launched a heavy bombing attack

Id.
347.
Press Release, PIO 03/99, Int'l Civil Aviation Org., ICAO Adopts
348.
Declaration on Unlawful Acts Against Civilian Aircraft (Mar. 12, 1999).
Id.
349.
350.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 156th Session, Declaration Adopted at the
Ninth Meeting on 10 March 1999, ICAO Doc. PIO 03/99, app. A (1999) [hereinafter
ICAO, Declaration Adopted 10 March 1999]; Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary
Decisions of the Tenth Meeting (ICAO, C-DEC 156/10, Mar. 3, 1999) [hereinafter ICAO,
C-DEC 156/10].
See ICAO, Declaration Adopted 10 March 1999, supra note 350 ("States
351.
must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight as being
incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity."); ICAO, C-DEC 156/10,
supra note 350.
See generally ICAO, Declaration 10 March 1999, supra note 350 ("A
352.
specialized agency of the United Nations, [ICAO] sets international standards and
regulations necessary for the safety, security, efficiency and regularity of air transport
and serves as the medium for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 185
Contracting States.").
See HistoricalBackground, GAZA INT'L AIRPORT, http://www.gazaairport.com/
353.
history.html ('The airline ... was forced to move to El Arish International Airport in
December 2001, after destruction by Israeli military forces of the runway at its previous
base.. . .") (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
Id.
354.
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on
the
airport,
making
the
aeronautical
infrastructure
unserviceable.3 5 5
This prompted Member States of the Arab Civil Aviation
Commission (ACAC) to lodge a formal complaint at AVSEC-Confl2. 3 56
Arab states argued that Israel's attacks constituted a flagrant
violation of international law. as7 What is interesting about this
complaint is the fact that they invoked not only the principles of the
Chicago Convention but also made reference to those of the Hague
and Montreal Conventions.3 5 8 Despite the fact that Palestine was not
a Member State of ICAO, the Arab states expressly requested that
AVSEC-Confl2 "strongly condemns Israel for the destruction of Gaza
International Airport and its air navigation facilities."35 9
Since this issue was not already on the agenda for the AVSECConf/2 meeting, the written presentation was astutely labeled as an
information paper, as opposed to a working paper, which meant that
AVSEC-Conf/2 was not required to take any action on it, despite
ferocious calls for it to do so. 360 AVSEC-Confl2 noted its content and
decided to refer it to the Council for consideration. 361 One of the
Council's mandatory functions is to precisely examine any Chicago
Convention issue that a Member State may wish to refer to its
attention. 362 The Council discussed this issue on March 11 and 13,
2002,363 and both Israel and Palestine were invited as observer states
to plead their respective cases. 36 4
Palestine argued that Israel's acts contravened the Chicago
Convention, the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention, and

355.
See id. ("On January 10th 2002, the 60 million USD runway was completely
destroyed by the Israeli army, shattering hopes for the resumption of flights to the
airport in the foreseeable future.").
356.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Destruction of Gaza InternationalAirport (ICAO,
Information Paper No. AVSEC-Conf/02-IP/29, Feb. 18, 2002).
357.
Id. at 2.
358.
Id.
359.
Id. at 3.
360.
At AVSEC-Confl02, ACAC states petitioned that the conference i) strongly
condemn Israel for the attack on Gaza International Airport; ii) reaffirm the aviation
community's condemnation of all acts of unlawful interference; iii) call on Israel to
respect international law; and iv) call upon the Council to strive to develop measures to
prevent further acts of unlawful interference against airports and air navigation
infrastructure. Id. at 3-4.
361.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Destruction of Gaza InternationalAirport
(ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11790, Mar. 5, 2002) (presented by the president of
the Council).
362.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 143, at art. 54(n) (outlining the
mandatory functions of the Council).
363.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 165th Session, Summary Minutes of the
Ninth Meeting (ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, Mar. 22, 2002) [hereinafter ICAO, C-MIN 165/9];
Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 165th Session, Summary Minutes of the Tenth
Meeting (ICAO, C-MIN 165/10, Mar. 13, 2002) [hereinafter ICAO, C-MIN 165/10].
364.
ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, supra note 363; ICAO, C-MIN 165/10, supra note 363.
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the Montreal Protocol 1988. 365 Israel was a State Party to these
instruments, but Palestine was not. 366
Israel claimed that ICAO had neither the authority nor
jurisdiction to address this issue.3 67 Moreover, Israel contended that
Gaza International Airport was being used to support terrorist
activities against it. Thus, Israel was in a state of war, and its actions
were in self-defense. 368 In hindsight, these facts would certainly place
Israel outside the scope of the Beijing instruments. On the other
hand, Palestine said that the aggression took place during a time
where both countries were at peace. 3 69 The determination of whether
Israel's actions on Gaza International Airport satisfied the rules of
international law governing armed conflict would have most likely
depended on the facts of the case. Given its intrinsically technical
nature, one may question ICAO's genuine ability to conduct such an
assessment.
All four Arab countries on the Council at the time3 70 invited the
Council to "accept its responsibilities and solemnly condemn the
unlawful act perpetrated by Israel" for the destruction of Gaza
International Airport and its air navigation facilities. 371 During
Council discussions, some states supported Palestine's view that
Israel's actions at Gaza International Airport represented flagrant
violations of the Chicago Convention, Hague Convention, and
Montreal Convention. 372 Others, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, contended that, given its complexity,
the issue should have been best handled by the UN Security
Council.3 73 Right after the first meeting, the president of the Council
circulated a proposal for a draft resolution. 37 After extensive
discussions, the Council passed the resolution with twenty-four states

365.
ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, supra note 363, at 6.
366.
Palestine's political complaint against Israel before the ICAO Council poses
some intriguing legal questions from the perspective of public international law. For
instance, does the respondent state (Israel) owe the applicant (Palestine) a duty to
fulfill international obligations under the Chicago, Hague, and Montreal Conventions,
given that the applicant is not a party to any of these instruments but the respondent
is? If adhesion to these instruments was not an issue, one may infer that parties
assumed that these obligations form part of customary international law-at least in
the case of the Chicago Convention.
ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, supranote 363 at 3.
367.
Id. at 8, 15.
368.
369.
Id.
370.
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.
371.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Destructionof Gaza InternationalAirport 2, T
3.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11791, Mar. 8, 2002) (presented by Algeria,
Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia).
372.
ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, supranote 363, at 8.
373.
Id.
374.
See ICAO, C-WP/11791, supra note 371. At the time, Mr. Assad Kotaite
(Lebanon) was president of the Council.
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in favor, two against, and seven abstentions.3 7 5 The United States
expressly requested that the president put the resolution to a vote.3 7 6
Examinations of Council meetings' minutes unambiguously reveal
that Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom did not
support ICAO's involvement on this issue.37 7 Not surprisingly, those
three states were also the most forceful supporters of the inclusion of
8
the military exclusion clauses in the Beijing instruments.3 7
This is most unique in the sense that it is the only ICAO
resolution, emanating either from the Assembly or the Council, which
expressly spells out that acts of armed forces against international
civil aviation infrastructure, such as airports and air navigation
facilities, are contrary to the principles of the Hague and the
Montreal Conventions, as well as the Montreal Protocol 1988.379
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also true that when condemning
Israel's unlawful actions, the operative clause of the resolution only
made reference to the Chicago Convention.3 8 0 The resolution, which
urged Israel to comply with the Chicago Convention's aims and
objectives and to take necessary measures to restore the aeronautical
infrastructure, did not per se establish that the infringing state's acts
were a violation of ICAO's international aviation security
instruments.3 8 1 Be that as it may, one can certainly infer from the
vigorous Council debates that some states firmly believed that ICAO
had stepped beyond its competence with the adoption of this
resolution. 382 Yet, one can reasonably suppose that the Gaza
International Airport incident and its subsequent ICAO resolution
played a rather decisive role in the approach that some states

Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Council, 165th Session, Summary of Decisions of
375.
the Tenth Meeting $ 8 (ICAO, C-DEC 165/10, Mar. 13, 2002). At the time, the ICAO
Council was composed of thirty-three members. With the adoption of the Chicago
Convention's Article 50 (a) amendment of October 26, 1990, which entered into force on
November 28, 2002, membership was extended to thirty-six states. See Protocol
Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 50
(a), May 10, 1984 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1998), available at http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legal/List%20of/20Parties/3bisEN.pdf [hereinafter Article 3 bis].
ICAO, C-MIN 165/10, supra note 363, at 11, T 38.
376.
377.
Id.
Id.
378.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Resolution Strongly Condemning the
379.
Destruction of the Gaza International Airport and Its Air Navigation Facilities, pmbl.,
1 4 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/O/
4C7354F26BB24Fl685256B8000612610 [hereinafter ICAO, Gaza Resolution] (stating
that "acts of violence jeopardizing the safety of airports" violate the Montreal
Convention and the Montreal Protocol); see also ICAO, C-MIN 165/10, supranote 363.
4 ("Urg[ing] Israel to fully
See ICAO, Gaza Resolution, supra note 379,
380.
comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention."); see also ICAO, CMIN 165/10, supra note 363, at 15.
ICAO, Gaza Resolution, supra note 379, 4.
381.
ICAO, C-MIN 165/9, supra note 363, at 10-11; ICAO, C-MIN 165/10, supra
382.
note 363, at 2-14 (highlighting the lengthy debate).
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adopted with regard to the inclusion of the military exclusion clause
in the Beijing instruments.
Leaving the DRC and Gaza International Airport incidents
aside, while ICAO has predominantly relied on the Chicago
Convention to condemn the use of military force against civil aviation,
for the most part, individual state practice has been the opposite.38 3
Thus, in the context of international dispute settlements before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), states have most often
invoked ICAO's aviation security conventions.3 84 Such was the case
with the DRC on the downing of the Congolese Airlines' aircraft in
1998,385 where the DRC filed a complaint with the ICJ against
Rwanda and Burundi.
Similarly, Iran also invoked both the Chicago and Montreal
Conventions when it brought proceedings before the ICJ against the
United States for the downing of Iranian Airlines flight 655 on July 3,
1988.386

Generally, applicant states have contended that the Montreal
Convention is applicable to attacks perpetrated by military forces
against civil aviation.38 7 On the other hand, respondent states, such
as the United States, have always argued that the downing of an
aircraft is governed by the rules of armed conflict.3 88 Unfortunately,
the ICJ has, thus far, never ruled on whether the activities of
military forces against civil aviation fall within the scope of ICAO's
aviation security instruments. The DRC complaint was dismissed on
procedural grounds, and in the Iran case the parties later settled
their dispute.3 8 9 Likewise, in the Lockerbie case, when demanded to
hand over the alleged perpetrators of the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103, Libya claimed that such a request posed difficulties of
compliance with the Montreal Convention: that is, the prosecution of
the alleged offenders in Libya.39 0 Conversely, the United States and
the United Kingdom have emphatically argued that acts involving

383.

Id.

384.
See TRAPP, supra note 302, at 165 (explaining that "states have invoked the
ICAO TSCs as a source of legal obligation (and ICJ jurisdiction) in [international]
disputes regarding state responsibility for military activities").
385.
Id. at 169 ("The DRC equally invoked the Montreal Convention (alongside
the Chicago Convention) in its suits against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi before the
ICJ . . .. ").
386.
See Memorial of Iran, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1990
I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 112-29 (July 24) (discussing the ICJ's jurisdiction under the
Montreal and Chicago Conventions).
387.
See id. at 172-77 (explaining the applicability of the Montreal Convention
to military actors).
See TRAPP, supra note 302, at 165 (explaining that, though states typically
388.
rely on the Chicago Convention instead of the Montreal Convention, states that have
applied the Montreal Convention have used it to condemn "Israeli uses of force against
civil aircraft and airports").
Memorial of Iran, 1990 I.C.J. Pleadings at 123.
389.
390.
Id.
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state terrorism fall outside the scope of the Montreal Convention.3 9 '
This is consistent with the position that both countries took with
regard to the military exclusion clause throughout the whole
negotiation process of the Beijing instruments.
7.

Assessment

The dichotomy between what appears to be ICAO's views and the
practice of some states may explain why a significant number of
states at the Beijing Diplomatic Conference were of the firm belief
that the military exclusion clause was a sine qua non requisite for the
success of the Beijing instruments. 392 Much more than mere
historical anecdotes, the incidents mentioned above also explain the
defensive mode various states adopted. Arguably, given these
precedents, the inclusion of the highly politically charged military
exclusion clause sought not only to provide some additional
clarification but also to very clearly draw the line of what falls within
ICAO's jurisdiction and what does not.

F. Liability of Legal Entities
As a result of a proposal jointly presented at the Beijing
Diplomatic Conference by Algeria, Canada, India, Singapore, and the
United Kingdom, the Beijing instruments create the liability of a
legal entity "when a person responsible for management or control"
commits, in that capacity, an act that constitutes an offense under
the new regime.3 9 3
This innovation finds its roots in the Financing of Terrorism
Convention and the SUA Protocol. 394 No similar provision is found in
either the Hague or the Montreal Conventions.3 9 5 The threshold test

391.
See id. at 174 (explaining that when the International Law Association
debated State Terrorism, "[ilt acknowledged ... that the kind of acts which are
prohibited by the Montreal Convention are performed by people; and even government
officials might become liable by virtue of authorizing or ratifying such acts").
392.
See id. at 197-205 (discussing international law and precedent regarding
military actions and the doctrine of self-defense).
393.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010, Diplomatic Conference on
Aviation Security, ProposedAmendments to Deal with the Notion of "Person"Under the
Montreal Convention, (ICAO DCAS Flimsy No. 1, Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter ICAO,
DCAS Flimsy No. 1] (proposing that legal entities within a state be held liable for
violations of the Convention).
394.
See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 43, at art. 5 (stating the
liability of legal entities under the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism); SUA Protocol, supra note 76, at art. 5 (providing that states
shall "establish . . . jurisdiction over the offences . . . by a national of that State").
395.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (establishing liability for
persons); Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2 (specifying that the liability applies
to "any person" under the Hague Convention).
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here is that the wrongdoer's actions are carried out in the context of a
managerial function.
Without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals who
have committed a principal offense, this provision creates a form of
corporate liability, be it criminal, civil, or administrative in nature.
Indeed, this is the only provision in the Beijing instruments that
speaks about forms of liability other than criminal liability. 39 6 The
rationale behind this is that a number of jurisdictions do not
recognize the notion that corporate entities can incur criminal
liability because a corporation cannot have the "intent" to commit a
criminal offense.3 97 Those states have the option to impose civil or
administrative liability. On the other hand, for those states that do
recognize criminal liability for corporate entities, sanctions are likely
to be monetary in nature.39 8
In order for a state to be able to pursue a legal entity, the entity
in question must either be located in its territory or registered under
its laws.399 This would suggest that the legal entity must have some
sort of physical presence in the state where it is being prosecuted,
either by virtue of having a domicile or by having been organized
under the laws of that state.
It will be interesting to see if this wording will be sufficient to
catch legal entities that, without a physical presence in the state
where an offense is committed, may nonetheless sponsor its
execution, harbor those who ultimately carry out the offense, or
simply manage matters from a distance.
Given the wording of the provision, it is doubtful that the state
where the offense was committed will be able to prosecute, for there is
no physical attachment. However, under the nationality jurisdiction
principle, one may argue that the state where such a legal entity is

396.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 4, 2 bis (indicating that a legal
entity can "be held liable when a person responsible for management or control of that
legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence" and that "[s]uch liability may
be criminal, civil or administrative"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4
(stating that liability for a legal entity "may be criminal, civil or administrative" and
that "[s]uch liability is incurred without prejudice to ... criminal liability").
397.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 4, 2 bis (establishing that a
legal entity can be held civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for violations of
the Protocol); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4 (discussing the availability of
criminal, civil, and administrative liability for legal entities).
398.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 4 (indicating that "[elach State
Party . . . may take the necessary measures" to hold a legal entity liable under
criminal, civil, or administrative laws); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4, § 3
(indicating that "sanctions may include monetary sanctions").
399.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 4 (providing that a state will
establish liability for "a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its
laws"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4, § 1 ("Each State Party, in
accordance with its national legal principles, may take the necessary measures to
enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held
liable .... ).
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registered may assert its jurisdiction and prosecute the offense, 40 0
provided that the prosecution is able to determine nationality. For
this to happen, it will be necessary to show that, since the legal entity
is registered in that state, it is also a "national of that State." The
latter are the exact words used in the Beijing instruments. 40 1
Under the Beijing instruments, the liability of legal entities is
not mandatory but discretionary, in contrast to the Financing of
Terrorism Convention and the SUA Protocol. 4 02
Although it would have been preferable to make the provision
mandatory, this approach was necessary because this provision was
only proposed at the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, very late in the
negotiation process. 40 3 Given the novelty of the concept, it seems that
its proponents might have thought that by making it optional, states
would be more inclined to accept it. The decision to impose some sort
of liability on legal entities will be fruitless, unless states adopt
implementing legislation when ratifying the Beijing instruments.

G. Severe Penalties
The texts that emerged from LC/34 did not specify the penalties
to be imposed on persons found guilty of having committed one of the
proposed offenses. On this point, the Diplomatic Conference changed
nothing, and the Beijing instruments remain faithful to the previous
language adopted in both the Hague and Montreal Conventions
where States Party simply undertake to make the offenses
punishable by "severe penalties."404 The use of the word undertake

400.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1(e) (providing that
"[e]ach State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction . . . when the offence is committed by a national of that State"); Beijing
Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(e) (stating that States Party shall establish
jurisdiction "when the offence is committed by a national of that state").
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1(e); Beijing Convention,
401.
supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(e).
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 23, at arts. 4, 2 bis (indicating that states
402.
"may take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity ... to be held liable");
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4, §§ 1, 3 (stating that "[elach State
Party . .. may take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity . . . to be held
liable"); SUA Protocol, supra note 76, at art. 5 (providing that states shall
"establish ... jurisdiction over the offences . . . by a national of that State"); Financing
of Terrorism Convention, supra note 43, at art. 5 (stating that signatory states "shall
take the necessary measures" to hold "legal entities located in [their] territory[ies] or
organized under [their] laws" liable for violations of the Convention).
See ICAO, DCAS Flimsy No. 1, supra note 393, fJ 2-3 (recommending that
403.
the Convention "make the extension of liability to legal persons optional").
See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and
404.
Multilateral Responses to Aircraft Hijacking, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 437 (1986)
(explaining that "[u]nder each Convention, Contracting Parties are obligated to punish
the described offenses by 'severe penalties "'); George B. Zotiades, The International
Criminal Prosecution of Persons Charged with an Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 23
REVUE HELL9NIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 12, 22 (1970) (commenting that this requirement
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has been criticized as imposing a rather soft obligation on states. 405
This provision could have been made mandatory by stating that
"[s]tates shall make the offenses punishable by severe penalties," but
in reality, states will always wish to retain some discretion in this
area.
Another option would have been to use a widely accepted
formulation of other UN conventions: "punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature." 406 This
wording seems to give more discretion to states, and one might argue
that it would potentially be subject to diverse national
interpretations. However, would that have been any less effective
than the final wording that was adopted?
The exact type of penalty for each given offense will be
established in accordance with the domestic law of the court hearing
the case. The rationale for this may be explained by the fact that the
degree of penalty applied will vary considerably from jurisdiction to

imposes an obligation "upon States not only to provide for the penal prosecution of the
offenders and their accomplices but also to carry severe penalties commensurate with
the gravity of such offences"). Other international instruments, such as the Terrorist
Bombings Convention, only require that states adopt measures "to make ... offences
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature" thereof.
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 50, at art. 4(b).
405.
See Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 59, at 253-54
(comparing the ordinary meanings of "shall" and "undertake" to conclude that
undertake is less obligatory than shall).
406.
See SUA Protocol, supra note 76; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 204, at art. 5(b) (indicating that
states will make violations of the Convention "punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account the grave nature of these offences"); Financing of Terrorism
Convention, supra note 43, at art. 4(b) (providing that Member States shall "make
offenses punishable by appropriate penalties"); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra
note 50, at art. 4(b) (indicating that "[e]ach State Party shall adopt such measures as
may be necessary . . . [t]o make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account the grave nature of those offences"); Convention of the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 5, Mar.
10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime Navigation Convention] (indicating
that states "shall make the offences set forth in article 3 punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences"); SUA
Convention, supra note 75, at art. 5 ("Each State Party shall make the offences set
forth in article 3 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave
nature of those offenses."); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, supra note 204;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note 203, at art. 7,
§ 2 (indicating that the offenses established under the Convention shall be made
"punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature");
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art. 2, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention] (stating that signatories "shall make
the offences ... punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave
nature of those offences"); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note
203, at art. 2, § 2 ("Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature").

2014/

THE NEW ICA 0-BEIJING INSTRUMENTS

203

jurisdiction. This is an area where there is a complete lack of
uniformity in international law, and it leaves domestic legal systems
with complete discretion to interpret what constitutes severe
penalties. Indeed, during the Beijing Diplomatic Conference some
states, such as Tanzania, recommended defining the term severe
penalties.407 Can the Beijing instruments truly be said to create
"international" offenses since there is no common, international
standard of punishment to fit the enormity of the crimes involved?
This Article will further analyze the requirement to adopt
implementing legislation to precisely establish such "severe
penalties."
H. PoliticalOffense Exclusion Clause
In the past, it was not uncommon for certain states to deny an
extradition request on the basis that the extraditable offense in
question was categorized as a "political offence." 408 That 'exception
was contemplated in most bilateral extradition treaties. 409 Tensions
escalated when Venezuela ratified the Montreal Convention because
it also filed a reservation stating that it "will take into consideration
clearly political motives and the circumstances under which offences
described in . .. [the] Convention are committed, in refusing to
extradite or prosecute an offender, unless financial extortion or injury
to the crew, passengers, or other persons has occurred." 410
Although one may argue whether or not a reservation
reinterpreting (or indeed rewriting) an international instrument
should be allowed,- the fact is that the reservation sought to expand
Venezuela's discretion when considering whether or not to extradite
an alleged offender. This obviously created some uneasiness amongst
other States Party.4 1 ' The United Kingdom and Italy, for instance,
filed counter-reservations expressly declaring that they considered
Venezuela's reservation as being invalid because it sought to limit its
obligations under Article 7 of the Montreal Convention-namely,
"without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was

407.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Comments on the Proposed Amendments to the
Montreal Convention, 1971 as Amended by the Airports Protocol of 1988, at art. 3
(DCAS Doc. No. 9, July 15, 2010).
408.
See John P. McMahon, Air Hijacking: Extradition as a Deterrent, 58 GEO.
L.J. 1135, 1138 (1969) (explaining that "the political offence exception ... excludes
offenses that are primarily political in nature").
409.
See id. ('"The greatest obstacle against the use of the present system of
bilateral extradition treaties to effectively deter hijacking through certain extradition,
however, is the political offense exception. . . .").
410.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at 5.
411.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7 (providing the United
Kingdom and Italy's statements that the Venezuelan reservation was not valid).
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committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution." 4 12
As a remedy to these types of episodes, the offenses of the Beijing
instruments cannot be regarded as political offenses for the purposes
of extradition or mutual legal assistance. 413 In other words, an
offense will be prosecuted, irrespective of the perpetrator's political
motives. 414 This also purports to remove some of the discretion that
states have when deciding whether to extradite an alleged offender.
I. Fair Treatment Clause
Continuing the pattern established by a number of other
international conventions, 415 the Beijing instruments wisely
introduce the principle that "any person who is taken into
custody . .. shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment

of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in
the territory of which that person is present." 416 The aim of this
provision is to impose an additional obligation on states to ensure
(greater) respect for human rights. 417 Given the divergence in

412.
Id.
413.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 12, 8 bis (stating that "[n]one of
the offences . . . shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal
assistance, as a political offence"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 13 ("None
of the offences set forth in Article 1 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or
mutual legal assistance, as a political offence . . . .").
414.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., InternationalConvention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings 3 (ICAO Working Paper No. C-WP/11065, Mar. 10, 1999).
415.
See SUA Protocol, supra note 76, at art. 9; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, supranote 204, at art. 12 (guaranteeing "fair
treatment" for "[a]ny person who is taken into custody" for violating this Convention);
Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 43, at art. 17 (stating that "[a]ny
person who is taken into custody" in relation "to this Convention shall be guaranteed
fair treatment"); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 50, at art. 14 (stating that
"[a]ny person who is taken into custody ... shall be guaranteed fair treatment"); SUA
Convention, supra note 75, at art. 10, § 2 (stating that "[a]ny person regarding whom
proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences set forth in
article 3 shall be guaranteed fair treatment"); Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, supra note 203, at art. 12 ("Any person regarding whom proceedings
are being carried out in connection with any of the offenses set forth in article 7 shall
be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings."); Hostages Convention,
supra note 406, at art. 8, § 2 ("Any person regarding whom proceedings are being
carried out in connexion with any of the offences set forth in article 1 shall be
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings . . . ."); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 203, at art. 9 (stating that anyone subjected to
proceedings under the Convention "shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of
the proceedings").
416.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 10, 7 bis; Beijing Convention, supra
note 23, at art. 11; Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 43, at art. 17.
417.
See ICAO, Report No. LC/SC-NET, supra note 209, at 2-11, TJ 10.9.1
(explaining that "Article 6 . . . reflects the comparable clauses in the more recent UN
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Member States' human rights records, Will offenders be comforted by
the additional wording of "applicable provisions of international law,
including international human rights law"?4 18 Or is the addition of
the clause simply wishful thinking in the context of highly politically
charged offenses, such as acts of unlawful interference involving civil
aviation?
J. ContractingStates or States Party?
Both the Hague and the Montreal Conventions use the term
ContractingStates.4 19 Following the trend of recently adopted ICAO
instruments, the Beijing instruments decided to adopt the term
States Parties.420
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes a very
subtle difference between the two terms. 4 21 The former refers to a
state that has consented to be bound by a treaty that has yet to enter
into force. The latter refers to a state that has consented to be bound
by a treaty that is already in force. 422
Given that treaty obligations will, for the most part, only apply
once the Beijing instruments enter into force, it does indeed seem
more sensible to use the terms State Party and States Parties.
K. To Extradite or to Prosecute: That Is the Question!
The Beijing instruments maintain unaltered the extradition and
prosecution mechanisms of the Hague and Montreal Conventions. 4 23

conventions for the purpose of ensuring respect for human rights and for the rule of
law").
418.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 10, 7 bis; Beijing Convention, supra
note 23, at art. 11.
419.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3 (referring to participating
states as "Contracting State[s]"); Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2 ("Each
Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties.").
420.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24 (referring to signatories as "State
Parties"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23 (referring to signatories as "State
Parties").
421.
See Vienna Convention on the Laws of the Treaties art. 2 (f)-(g), May 22,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining a "contracting
state" as "a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the
treaty had entered into force" and "party" as "a State which has consented to be bound
by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force").
422.
Id.
423.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 11, 8, 12, 8 bis, 13, 8 ter, 15, 10
(indicating the Beijing Protocol's procedures for extradition and prosecution); Beijing
Convention, supra note 23, at arts. 10, 12-14, 17 (describing extradition and
prosecution procedures under the Beijing Convention); Montreal Convention, supra
note 2, at arts. 6-8, 11 (explaining the procedures for extradition and prosecution of
offenders); Hague Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 7-8, 10 (discussing the extradition
and prosecution of offenders).
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In those instruments, States Party undertook the obligation
either to extradite the offender found in their territory or "submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,"424
thus applying the Roman law principle aut dedere aut judicare.425
This wording leaves states with wide discretion to extradite or
prosecute the offender.
Furthermore, there is no clear priority given between the options
to extradite or prosecute. 426 Which comes first? The Hague
Convention sought to create, so far as possible, a degree of universal
jurisdiction that would in turn prevent the existence of "safe
havens." 42 7 In discussions during the Diplomatic Conference that led
to the adoption of the Hague Convention, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Israel strongly advocated unconditional extradition
to the state of registration of the aircraft. 428 African states were
against that idea because of the apartheid regime in South Africa. 429
They feared extradition of their citizens to South Africa. 430 In
addition, Arab states were not particularly fond of the idea of having
their nationals extradited to Israel. 43 1 Some commentators have also
indicated that in the past Western states have refused to grant
extradition to alleged offenders, particularly those wanted in Eastern
European countries. 432 A compromise was reached by granting the
flexibility permitted by the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 4 33
However, what appears to be an unambiguous text may in fact
give rise to a real international dispute. The Montreal Convention did
not envisage "situations in which a state is complicitous in a terrorist
action." 434 The Pan Am 103 case best illustrates the complexity of

424.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7.
425.
Following the precedent set by the Hague and the Montreal Conventions,
the 1988 International Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, as well as other instruments that later followed,
incorporated this principle. See David Freestone, The 1988 International Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 3 INT'L
J. ESTAURINE & COASTAL L. 305, 311 (1998) (explaining that "[1]ike the ICAO
Conventions the principle of aut dedere out judicare (extradite or try) underpins the
philosophy of the 1988 Convention").
426.
MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 29, at 226.
427.
Id. at 224.
Id.
428.
Id.
429.
430.
Id.
431.
Id.
432.
See NicoLAs MATEESCO MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 372
(1981) ("It is to be noted that despite the confirmed willingness to fight against
hijacking, Western countries tend to refuse extradition of fugitives from Eastern
Europe.").
MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 29, at 227.
433.
See Jonathan A. Frank, A Return to Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention
434.
in the Wake of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: Ramifications of Past Security
Council and International Court of Justice Action, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 535

2014/

THE NEW ICA0-BEIJING INSTRUMENTS

207

that issue. 435 When requested to extradite the alleged terrorists
involved in the Lockerbie bombing, Libya refused extradition on the
basis of the customary international law principle of aut dedere aut
judicare 436 but expressed a willingness to prosecute the accused if
provided with relevant evidence.4 3 7 The Montreal Convention is silent
on extradition of a national from his or her own state when that state
has sponsored terrorist activities, a scenario that had allegedly taken
place in the Lockerbie case.4 38 In the absence of bilateral extradition
treaties, there is no customary rule of international law imposing a
duty to extradite.4 3 9
In the face of the mounting international pressure, the UN
Security Council passed a resolution requesting Libya to cooperate. 440
Libya failed to do so and economic and diplomatic sanctions were
imposed shortly thereafter. 44 1 These sanctions were finally lifted in
2003 after extensive diplomatic negotiations. 442 Although it would
have been appropriate to include language to impose more stringent
rules on the extradition mechanism, precisely to avoid the situation of
a state refusing to prosecute the alleged offender in its own courts,
the reality is that states are not yet willing to move beyond the

(2002) ("The Montreal Convention simply does not address situation in which a state is
complicitous in a terrorist action.").
435.
See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 46, at 306 (describing the numerous
laws applicable to the extradition, transfer, and trial of the defendants in the Pan Am
103 case and the "solution to the problems raised by the 'aut dedere, aut judicare'
principle of the Montreal Convention [that] was quite unprecedented").
See Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie Extradition by Analogy Agreement:
436.
Exceptional Measure or Template for Transnational Criminal Justice, 18 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 163, 175 (2002) (explaining that Libya "contended that it was not required to
extradite and stated that, in accordance with the customary international law principle
of aut dedere aut judicare ('extradite or prosecute'), it would conduct its own
prosecution").
437.
See id. (noting that Libya offered to "conduct its own prosecution of its two
accused nationals pursuant to the Montreal Convention").
438.
See id. at 176, n.47 (explaining that "the Montreal Convention was the only
instrument applicable to the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie").
See id. at 172-73 ("Under international law, the duty to extradite depends
439.
on the existence of a bilateral or multilateral treaty .... .").
440.
See S.C. Res. 731, 11 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992) ("Urg[ing]
the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and effective response to those
requests so as to contribute to the elimination of international terrorism.").
441.
See S.C. Res. 748, 1 4-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (listing
and explaining the sanctions imposed on Libya).
See Frank, supra note 434, at 536-38 (describing the process through which
442.
Libya "eventually capitulated to a long-debated plan to have the alleged terrorists
extradited" in lieu of paying sanctions).
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already well-established aut dedere aut judicare principle. 4 4 3 The
Beijing instruments confirm that view. 444

L. Jurisdiction
There is no mandatory obligation to establish jurisdiction since
the Beijing instruments require only that a State Party "take[s] such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction." 445 Just
like the Hague and Montreal Conventions, the drafters of the Beijing
instruments decided not to include mandatory language along the
lines of "States shall establish jurisdiction." 44 6 In fact, for the most
part, it is fair to say that the Beijing instruments did not introduce
substantive variations into the international law regime.
What then is the extent of a state's duty with regard to
establishing jurisdiction on a given offense?
One could reasonably argue that the words "take such
measures . . . to establish jurisdiction" could be assimilated to a "best
efforts" obligation by virtue of which a state is only obliged to carry
out certain duties, such as an inquiry into the facts, taking custody of
the offender, and turning him or her over to the authorities. 44 7 Based
on the specific circumstances of the case, the prosecution will decide
whether or not to press charges. There may well be situations in
which the prosecution does not believe that it is in a position to do so.
This would be, for instance, when the offender is accidentally found in
such a state but all the evidence and elements associated with the
offense are situated elsewhere. This flexibility would allow the state
in question to refrain from asserting its jurisdiction but at the same
time extradite the offender to another state with more connecting
elements to the case. Arguably, the Beijing instruments do not
impose an obligation to prosecute either. 448

See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 13, 8 ter (indicating that
443.
"[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at
arts. 10, 12 (setting forth the Convention's extradition procedures).
444.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at arts. 10, 12 (demonstrating that
States Party agreed to keep the aut dedere aut judicare principle).
445.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1; Beijing Convention,
supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1.
446.
See Dionigi M. Fiorita, Aviation Security: Have All the Questions Been
Answered, XXII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 69, 71-75 (1995) (comparing the jurisdictional
requirements of the Hague, Montreal, and Tokyo Conventions).
447.
See NARINDER AGGARWALA, MICHAEL J. FENELLO & GERALD F. FITZGERALD,
AIR HIJACKING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1971), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION No. 585, 73-74 (1971) ("Initially, as provided by Article 5(1), there is an
undertaking of each contracting state to take necessary measures to establish its
jurisdiction over offenses .... ).
448.
See contra S.K. GHOSH, AIRCRAFr HIJACKING AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 32
(1985) (arguing that the Hague Convention "obligates contracting parties to prosecute
the offender").
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The instruments nonetheless recognize the following grounds for
jurisdiction:
i) State where the offense is committed; 449
ii) State of registration of the aircraft;4 50
iii) State of landing where the offense is committed on board
an aircraft and the alleged offender is still on board; 4 51
iv) State of lessee; 4 52 and
v) State of nationality of the offender.45 3
A state may also decide to establish jurisdiction on the basis of
the nationality of the victim or on the basis of habitual residence of a
stateless person in that state. 4 54 If a state finds an alleged offender in
its territory, but it is unwilling to extradite that person, such a state

449.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1(a) (providing that
states will establish jurisdiction "when the offence is committed in the territory of that
State"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(a) (encouraging states to
establish jurisdiction "when the offence is committed in the territory of the State").
450.
See Beijing Protocol, supranote 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1(b) (establishing that
a state has jurisdiction "when the offence is committed onboard an aircraft registered
in that State"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(b) (indicating that a
state will establish jurisdiction "when the offence is committed against or on board an
aircraft registered in that State").
451.
Following the precedents set by the Hague and Montreal Conventions, the
Beijing instruments incorporate the "State of Landing" jurisdiction. This is of utmost
importance when the alleged offender that commits an offense aboard, arrives in a
state other than the aircraft's state of registry. This is precisely one of the major
shortcomings of the Tokyo Convention. See Alejandro Piera & Michael Gill, Unruly &
Disruptive Passengers:Do We Need to Revisit the InternationalLegal Regime, XXXV pt.
I ANNALs AIR & SPACE L. 355, 358-62 (2010) (discussing the various shortcomings of
the Tokyo Convention in relation to onboard offenses); Alejandro Piera, ICAO's Latest
Efforts to Tackle Legal Issues Arising from Unruly/Disruptive Passengers: The
Modernization of the Tokyo Convention 1963, 37 AIR & SPACE L. 231 (2012).
452.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 1(d) (indicating that a
state has jurisdiction "when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft
leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business or . . . permanent
residence is in that State"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 1(d)
(providing that a state will establish jurisdiction "when the offence is committed
against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of
business or . . . permanent residence is in that state").

453.
Some delegations cautioned that establishing jurisdiction (solely) on the
basis of the nationality of the offender may be quite problematic, in particular for those
states that adhere to a territorial approach. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Drafting
Proposalfor the Establishment of JurisdictionBased on Nationality of the Offender 1 2,
(DCAS Doc No. 8, July 15, 2010).
454.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 2 (indicating that a
state "may also establish its jurisdiction ... when the offence is committed against a
national of that state," "when the offence is committed by a stateless person whose
habitual residence is in the territory of that State," or both); Beijing Convention, supra
note 23, at art. 8, § 2(b) (explaining that a state can establish jurisdiction "when the
offence is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the territory
of that state").
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must take measures to establish jurisdiction. 45 5 This would mean
submitting the case to its authorities for prosecution. 4 56
In any event, the Beijing instruments do not in any way exclude
45 7
the criminal jurisdiction of local courts.
M. Format: The Chinese Proposal
Since the first meeting of the SSCLC, amendments to both the
Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention were intended to be
effected by two separate protocols. 458 At the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference, China suggested that the Hague Convention could be
updated through a protocol, given that it had not been amended
before and that the proposed changes were not of a substantive
nature.4 59 Similarly, China recommended that the more substantial
amendments to the Montreal Convention and the Montreal Protocol
1988 be implemented through a completely new convention that
would be known as the Beijing Convention. 460 This was thought to be
a more user-friendly approach to establishing the format of the new
regime, given that using a protocol to amend a protocol would have
been quite confusing for all concerned.
The plenary of the Beijing Diplomatic Conference accepted
China's proposal without much opposition. 4 61

See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 3 (providing that a
455.
state shall also establish jurisdiction when "the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite that person"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at
art. 8, § 3 (explaining that a state will also "take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction . . . in the case where the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite that person").
456.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 3 (indicating that a
state will "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction ... in
the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite
that person"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 10 ("The State Party in the
territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite that
person, be obliged . .. to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.").
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 7, art. 4, § 4 ("This Convention
457.
does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.");
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 8, § 4 (explaining that "[t]his Convention
does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law").
458.
ICAO, Report, Doc. No. 9926-LC/194, supra note 80, 1 2.2.
459.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Possible Forms of Instruments to be Adopted at
the Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security 1 3.1 (DCAS Doc No. 16, Aug. 31, 2010)
Doc.
No. 16] (explaining that "[tihe Hague
[hereinafter ICAO, DCAS
Convention ... has never been amended, and would therefore not have the
complications of multiple protocols . . . and . .. the proposed amendments to The Hague

Convention, while important updates, are less in scope than those proposed for the
Montreal Convention and would seem to be more appropriate for a protocol").
2.2 (proposing the creation of the Beijing Convention to
460.
See id.
consolidate existing conventions, existing protocols, and new amendments).
461.
Id. 1 1.1.
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N. Official Languages
Given that both the Hague and the Montreal Conventions, at the
time of their adoption, were only drafted in English, French, Russian,
and Spanish, 462 one of the ICAO Secretariat's most daunting
challenges was to make the Beijing instruments available in the
organization's six official languages. 463 This was a burdensome
administrative task, since there were no authentic Chinese or Arabic
versions of the original instruments and the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference worked from translations prepared for this purpose. 464
During the drafting exercise, some delegations spotted a number
of linguistic deficiencies in both of these texts. 465 That is why,
following long-standing practice of ICAO-sponsored conferences, 4 66
the president of the Beijing Diplomatic Conference assigned the
Secretariat the duty of removing all linguistic inaccuracies within a
period of ninety days from the date of adoption of the instruments on
September 10, 2010.467 This was done to bring the six different texts
into conformity with one another 468 and to produce six texts that are
equally authentic. 4 69
An international instrument's authenticity in all six of the
organization's working languages is particularly important when it
comes to judicial interpretation. For example, the Warsaw

462.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 16, § 2 (indicating that the
three original copies of the Convention would be "drawn up in four authentic texts in
the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages"); Hague Convention, supra note
2, at art. 14, § 2 (stating that the text would be "drawn up in four authentic texts in the
English, French, Russian and Spanish languages").
463.
These are English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese. See
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 16, supranote 459, T1 2.1-2, 3.1, 6.1.
464.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 18 ("The tests of the Convention
in Arabic and Chinese languages annexed to this Protocol shall, together with the texts
of the Convention in English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, constitute texts
equally authentic in the six languages."); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 25
(indicating that the Convention would be published "in the English, Arabic, Chinese,
French, Russian and Spanish languages").
465.
For instance, Saudi Arabia's comments on the Arabic text. See Int'l Civil
Aviation Org., Essential Correctionsand Additions to the Draft Texts Prepared by the
Legal Committee T 1.2-2.1.6 (ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 11, Oct. 16, 2010).
466.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 16, supra note 459,
6.1 (discussing ICAO's
language verification practice).
467.
Milde, Beijing Convention, supra note 29, at 13.
468.
See Int'l Conference on Air Law, Final Act, supra note 88, at 6 ("The texts
of the said Convention and Protocol are subject to verification by the Secretariat of the
Conference under the authority of the President of the Conference within a period of
ninety days from the date hereof as to the linguistic changes required to bring the texts
in the different languages into conformity with one another.").
469.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 25 (stating that "all texts [in the
English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish languages are] equally
authentic"); Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 25 (stating that the Convention
would be published "in the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish
languages").
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Convention 1929470 has always been notoriously challenging for nonFrench speaking courts, given that French is the instrument's only
official language. 4 71 By making the Beijing instruments available in
all six official languages, the Beijing Diplomatic Conference sought to
avoid that type of inconvenience and to facilitate national
implementation.
0. Settlement of Disputes
The Beijing instruments include a built-in dispute settlement
mechanism, applicable to any dispute over the instruments'
interpretation or application. 472 Under this provision, states must
first engage in and exhaust an arbitration proceeding. 473 If
unsuccessful, the dispute may then be referred to the ICJ.4 74
However, some states are notorious for not recognizing the
jurisdiction of the ICJ,475 and it is noteworthy that states may file a
reservation declining to be bound by the ICJ's jurisdiction when
ratifying or acceding to the instruments. 476 Given that twenty-five
states had filed reservations in the Hague Convention 4 77 and twenty-

470.
See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air art. 36, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.O.N. 11 (indicating that
"[t]he Convention is drawn up in French in a single copy").
471.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 18, 25; Beijing Convention, supra
note 23, at art. 20, § 1.
472.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 20, § 1 (explaining that "[a]ny
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration"); Beijing Protocol, supra note
24.
473.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 20, § 1 (stating that "[i]f
within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of thos Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice"); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24.
474.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 20, § 1 (explaining that if
parties are not able to "agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those
Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice"); Beijing Protocol,
supra note 24.
475.
For instance, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court of the
United States underscored that while decisions from the ICJ must be given "respectful
consideration" they are certainly not binding on U.S. courts. See 548 U.S. 331, 331, 353
(2006) ("Although the ICJ's interpretation deserves 'respectful consideration,' we
conclude that it does not compel the Court" and that "[n]othing in the ICJ's structure or
purpose suggests that its interpretations were intended to be binding on U.S. courts").
476.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 20, § 2 (stating that "[e]ach
State may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the
preceding paragraph"); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24.
477.
The following countries filed a reservation under the Hague Convention's
compromissory clause: Algeria, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt,
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Qatar, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. See Convention for the Suppression of
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six in the Montreal Convention, 478 it is likely that a number of states
will also exercise that prerogative under the Beijing instruments, 4 79
which would perhaps indicate a certain unwillingness to submit their
disputes to the ICJ automatically. During the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference, Uruguay expressed serious concerns on the convenience
of establishing an opt-out mechanism through reservations to the
settlement of disputes. 480

P. RelationshipBetween Instruments
Although the Beijing Convention seeks to supplant both the
Montreal Convention and the Airport Protocol in the long run, the
three instruments will continue to co-exist.48 1 The Beijing Convention
48 2
will prevail over the Montreal Convention and the Airport Protocol.
This means that for states that are parties to each of those
instruments, the rules of the Beijing Convention trump any potential
dispute. 483
In addition, if a state which is not party to the Hague Convention
ratifies or accedes to the Beijing Protocol, that state also accedes and
becomes a party to the Hague Convention as amended by the Beijing

Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970, INT'L CIVIL
AVIATION
ORG.,
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%200f/o2OParties/HagueEN.pdf (last updated Sept. 30, 2009) (listing reservations made to the Hague
Convention).
The following countries filed reservations with regard to paragraph 1 of
478.
Article 14 of the Montreal Convention: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, China,
Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Ukraine. See
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
Signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
http://www.icao.int/ secretariat/legal/List%20f/2OParties/Mtl7lEN.pdf (last updated
Sept. 30, 2009) (listing reservations made to the Montreal Convention).
Right after the fall of the Berlin wall, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungry
479.
withdrew their original reservations. See id. at 1-6 (indicating that Poland withdrew
its reservations on June 23, 1997, Bulgaria withdrew its reservations on May 9, 1994,
and Hungary withdrew its reservations on January 10, 1990).
Uruguay suggested that the dispute settlement provision should mirror
480.
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Draft
Consolidated Text of the Montreal Convention of 1971 as Amended by the Airports
2
Protocol of 1988, with Amendments Proposed by the Legal Committee art. 14,
(ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 6, Aug. 16, 2010). Regrettably, the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference did not give much thought to this very interesting proposal.
481.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 19 (indicating that "the
Convention and this Protocol shall be read and interpreted together as one single
instrument and shall be known as The Hague Convention as amended by the Beijing
Protocol, 2010").
Id.
482.
Id. at arts. 19, 22.
483.
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Protocol.48 4 This is standard ICAO practice when amending previous
international legal instruments.4 8 5

Q. CooperationAmongst States
Building upon the provisions of both the Hague and Montreal
Conventions, 486 the Beijing instruments not only establish the
obligation to "afford [amongst States Party] the greatest measure of
assistance" with regard to the offenses listed in those treaties but also
require that states share any relevant information on such offenses
with, other states that may be affected. 487 Recognizing that
combatting acts of unlawful interference requires a concerted effort
from the international community, this provision should foster
cooperation amongst States Party.
R. Signature and Entry into Force
In order for a state to sign the instrument being adopted at a
diplomatic conference, customary practice requires that the state in
question grants a letter of credentials and full powers. 48 8 Thus, its
representatives are authorized and given full powers to sign, on
behalf of the state, the international legal instrument or instruments
that the diplomatic conference may adopt.4 89 The head of the state or
the ministry of foreign affairs issues this document. 490

484.
Id. at art. 21, § 2.
See, e.g., Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention art. 21, § 2, Sept. 28,
485.
1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (indicating that "[r]atification of this Protocol by any State
which is not a Party to the Convention shall have the effect of adherence to the
Convention as amended by this Protocol").
486.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11 (stating that "Contracting
States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings"); Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10 (explaining that
"Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings"). The Hague Convention only required that
states grant assistance, whereas the Montreal Convention went a step further by
addressing the sharing of relevant information to the extent possible under national
laws.
487.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at arts. 15-16 (providing that "States
Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance" and
"shall ... furnish any relevant information in its possession"); Beijing Convention,
supra note 23, at arts. 17-18 (explaining that "States Parties shall afford one another
the greatest measure of assistance" and "furnish any relevant information in its
possession").
See ICAO, State Letter LM 1/16.1-10/10, supra note 85, at app. A (outlining
488.
the procedures for submitting credentials and full powers required by Rule 2 of the
Provisional Rules of Procedure).
489.
Id.
490.
Id.
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Most delegates attending the Beijing Diplomatic Conference did
not have this letter. 4 91 This may explain why on the last day of the
conference only eighteen states signed the Beijing Convention and
nineteen states signed the Beijing Protocol. 492 Unlike its
predecessors, which required only ten ratifications, 49 3 each of the
Beijing instruments requires twenty-two ratifications or accessions to
enter into force. 49 4
At the time of writing and over three years after its adoption,
thirty states have signed the Beijing Convention49 5 and thirty-two
have signed the Beijing Protocol. 496 But only eight states have
ratified or acceded to the Beijing Convention and seven to the Beijing
Protocol. 497 Although the number of signatures thus far is
significantly higher than those of the General Risks and Unlawful
Interference Conventions 2009,498 they are still much lower than
those of the Montreal Convention-one of ICAO's most successful

Id.
491.
The following states signed both instruments at the Beijing Diplomatic
492.
Conference: Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Gambia,
Indonesia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, the Republic of Korea, Senegal,
Spain, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Most notably, India and
Zambia signed the Beijing Protocol but not the Beijing Convention. See Convention on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation Done at
Beijing on 10 September 2010, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legall List%20of%2OParties/Beijing.ConvEN.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2014)
[hereinafter Parties to the Beijing Convention] (listing parties to the Beijing
Convention); ProtocolSupplementary to the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
10 September 2010, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
Done at Beijing on
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/ legallList%20of/2oParties/BeijingProt EN.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Parties to the Beijing Protocol] (listing parties to the
Beijing Protocol).
493.
Montreal Convention, supra note 2, at art. 15, § 3; Hague Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 13, § 3.
Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 23; Beijing Convention, supra note
494.
23, at art. 22, § 1.
See Parties to Beijing Convention, supra note 492, at 1 (noting that, as of
495.
2013, the Convention had "30 signatures, 5 ratifications, [and] 3 accessions").
See Parties to Beijing Protocol, supra note 492, at 1 (indicating that, as of
496.
2013, the Protocol had "32 signatures, 5 ratifications, [and] 2 accessions").
Angola, Cuba, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Mali,
497.
Myanmar, and Saint Lucia in the case of the Convention; Cuba, the Czech Republic,
the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Mali, Myanmar, and Saint Lucia in the case of the
Protocol. Parties to Beijing Convention, supra note 492; Parties to Beijing Protocol,
supra note 492, at 1-2.
At the time of writing, only thirteen states have signed the General Risks
498.
Convention and eleven states have signed the Unlawful Interference Convention. See
Convention on Compensation for Damage Cause by Aircraft to Third PartiesDone at
Montreal on 2 May 2009, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legal/List%20of/o2OParties/2009 GRCEN.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2014);
Convention on Compensationfor Damage to Third Parties,Resulting from Acts of Unlawful
Interference Involving Aircraft Done at Montreal 2 May 2009, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
httpJ/www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of/20Parties/2009_UICC_.EN.pdf (last visited
Jan. 4, 2014). Only Montenegro has acceded to both of those Conventions.
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international instruments to date, 499 except for the Chicago
Convention itself.5 00 This is indicative of the level of interest that
these instruments have so far generated within ICAO's membership.
If one bears in mind that that it took the Montreal Convention
more than 4 years to reach the thirty ratifications it required in order
to enter into force, 5 0 one might be tempted to predict that the Beijing
instruments will take at least 8 years to enter into force, if not
considerably longer.
S. Depositary
Like almost all recently adopted conventions under the auspices
of ICAO, the Beijing instruments delegate the role of depositary to
the secretary-general. 502 Both the Hague and the Montreal
Conventions had multiple states exercising this sensitive function,
but that can be explained by the historical context in which they were
adopted. At the peak of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were designated as "depositary
governments."50 3 Today, politically, there is not such a need for a
multiple-depositary system. 504 And it goes without saying that a
single depository is much more efficient and transparent.
T. What Drove the Adoption of the Beijing Instruments?
To a great extent, the adoption of the Beijing instruments is the
result of the remarkable and tireless efforts of three states in
particular that drove the process all the way from its early beginnings

499. A contrario, 104 states are parties to the Montreal Convention 1999. See
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for InternationalCarriage by Air Done
at Montreal on 28 May 1999, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legal/List%20of/ 2OParties/Mtl99_EN.pdf (last updated June 25, 2013)
[hereinafter Parties to the Montreal Convention].
At present, 191 states are parties to the Chicago Convention. See
500.
Convention on International Civil Aviation Signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944,
INVL CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legallList%20of%20Parties/
ChicagoEN.pdf (last updated Oct. 11, 2011).
501.
See Parties to Montreal Convention, supra note 499, at 1 (indicating that
"[tihe Convention entered into force on November 2003").
502.
See Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at art. 21, § 2 ("The instruments of
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of
the International Civil Aviation Organization, who is hereby designated as the
Depositary."); Beijing Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 21, § 1.
503.
Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13, § 2; Montreal Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 15, § 2. R.H. Mankiewicz argues that a three-depositary system
was established "[i]n order that states not parties to the Chicago Convention may
easily ratify and adhere to the [Hague and Montreal Conventions]." R.H. Mankiewicz,
The 1970 Hague Convention, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 195, 209 (1971).
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 16, supra note 459, T 5.1 ("The Hague and the
504.
Montreal Conventions respectively have three depositaries, which may not be
necessary today.").
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to the conclusion of the Beijing Diplomatic Conference: Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. It is simply unimaginable
that this initiative would have come to fruition without the active
involvement of these states. This included direct engagement
throughout the whole drafting process as well as lobbying before,
during, and after the Beijing Diplomatic Conference.
In the case of the United States, it is striking to compare its
leading role on this initiative with its more measured approach on the
Modernization of the Rome Convention process. Whether either of
these two quite separate international law codification initiatives will
ever see the light of day relies heavily on the degree of U.S.
involvement. At this stage, and despite considerable opposition, the
health of the Beijing instruments seems to be in a much better
condition, for they rank high on the U.S. agenda.

U. ICAO Assembly Declaration
At the Thirty-seventh Session of the Assembly, which took place
from September 27, 2010 to October 8, 2010, the United States, along
with other states,5 05 tabled a proposed stand-alone resolution to the
Legal Commission urging Member States to support "the universal
adoption" and ratification of the Beijing instruments. 50 6 Endorsing
the recommendation of the Legal Commission, the Assembly adopted
Resolution A37-23 unanimously. 507 The resolution directed the
secretary-general to provide all necessary assistance in the
ratification process. 508 In September 2013, at the Thirty-eighth
Session of the Assembly, the United States retabled this
resolution.50 9
Although some states had in the past proposed the passage of
stand-alone resolutions,51 0 normal ICAO practice would simply have
been to include the Beijing instruments in the standard resolution on

These states included Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the Czech
505.
Republic, France, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and the United Kingdom.
Assembly - 37th Session: List of Delegates, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
http://legacy.icao.int/Assembly37/docs/DOCSList ofDelegates.html (last visited Jan.
4, 2014).
506.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Agenda Item 59, at app. A (ICAO, Working Paper
No. 290).
Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Assembly, 37th Session, Resolution A37-23,
507.
Promotion of the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol of 2010 (2010).
Id.
508.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Agenda Item 46, at app. A (ICAO, Working Paper
509.
No. 109, Oct. 15, 2013).
510.
See Frank E. Loy, Some International Approaches to Dealing with
Hijacking of Aircraft, 4 INT'L L. 444, 449 (1970) (commenting that, at the Sixteenth
Assembly, the United States tabled a stand-alone resolution recommending states to
ratify the Tokyo Convention).
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the ratification of all ICAO-related international conventions.5 11 This
is indicative of the level of interest that the Beijing instruments
generate for some states.
IV. THE VIEWS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry supported "the thrust of the initiative to
further extend" criminal liability for certain acts that may unlawfully
and intentionally interfere with international civil aviation. 512
Clearly, the use of an aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction
(W1VID) or to disperse WMDs poses a serious threat to international
civil aviation, and the possibility that aircraft may again be used to
create a mass-casualty event persists.5 1 3 However, the industry was
concerned with the practical implications and operational
repercussions that the new regime might present. 514 Industry
representatives warned against the law of unintended consequences
placing unnecessary burdens on an already weakened airline
industry.sis In particular, the airline industry felt that the broad
scope of the requirement of unlawful and intentional conduct to
trigger the application of the offense would give significant discretion
to state prosecutors over the categories of parties against whom they
may decide to open criminal investigations. Thus, "innocent airlines
and their employees will almost certainly find themselves embroiled
in costly and time consuming defences to criminal investigations for
matters that arise out of the normal course of their operations." 516
But the industry received some comfort. At LC/34 discussions,
France noted that "[air] carrier[s] must act unlawfully, intentionally
and with certain knowledge before its liability can be incurred under
the [Beijing instruments]."5 1 7 Similarly, the delegate from Australia
noted that the transport offense would not capture "recklessness as to
the contents of air cargo or the status of a passenger and would not

511.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. Assembly, 37th Session, Resolution A37-22,
Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies in the Legal Field, at app. C
(2010) (commenting on the ratification process of ICAO international instruments).
1.2 ("The airline industry
512.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 13, supra note 185,
naturally supports the thrust of the initiative to further extend the scope of the
criminal law to certain categories of acts that unlawfully interfere with international
civil aviation.").
513.
Id.
514.
Id. ("IATA is concerned with the practical implications and operational
repercussions that may arise from the proposed amendments.").
1.4 ("IATA would urge the diplomatic conference to guard against the
515.
Id.
unintended consequences of the proposed amendments that would place unnecessary
and undesirable financial operational burdens on the airline industry").
516.
Id. 2.1.2.
517.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supranote 144, 2:41.
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apply to a carrier who unintentionally transports an item or person in
a prohibited manner."s1 s

A. Carriageof Dangerous Goods-End Use
Airlines already transport certain categories of dangerous
goodS519 on a daily basis. "Most explosives . . . are restricted to cargo
aircraft, although some may be shipped on passenger aircraft as well.
In this context, the transport of these commodities is not at all
uncommon." 520
Although airlines were "sympathetic to the intent of the
proposed changes to the existing conventions," there was concern that
"in trying to stop criminal activities, the legitimate and lawful
transport of these items [would be] negatively impaired." 52 1
Of particular importance was the carriage of radioactive
materials in the medical industry, "where there are already problems
with 'denial of shipments."' 522 This occurs "when shipments of
radioactive materials, that are in complete compliance with the
applicable transport regulations are [either] i) denied entry to a
country or port" or ii) prevented from being transported on a timely
basis "due to additional layers of non-transport regulations that delay
their movement." 5 23 "'Denial of shipment' is a particular problem that
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IATA, ICAO,
manufacturers, and transporters of radioactive materials have been
working to address for a number of years." 524 "These regulated
radioactive materials are a perishable commodity widely used in
medicine for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases and any
additional regulatory requirements imposed on the transport of these
materials will only further aggravate the problems in achieving their
transport by air."525
There is already a requirement for a mandatory acceptance
check of almost all dangerous goods. 526 The airline verifies that the

ICAO, Working Paper No. LC 34-WP/2-2, supra note 255, 1 2.2.
518.
Amongst others, these include infectious pathogens, microbial and
519.
biological agents, "toxic materials, explosives, and radioactive materials (including
fissile material)." See ICAO, LC/34-WP/2-3, supra note 237, 2.2.1.
520.
Id.
521.
Id. 2.2.2.
522.
Id. 2.2.3.
523.
Id.
524.
Id.
525.
Id
526.
ICAO defines the term dangerous goods as "[a]rticles or substances which
are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which
are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions or which are
classified according to those Instructions." See Int'l Civil Aviation Org, Annex 18: The
Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, in THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION, at ch. 1, 1 (3d ed. July 2001).
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document and the exterior appearance of the package comply with
the regulatory requirements. 527 But the airline has no way of
determining the so-called end use. This aspect is-thus far-not
covered by the safety regulations.52 8
Airlines are required to follow the provisions set out in the ICAO
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by
Air when transporting such materials. 529 For the most part, airlines
also use the IATA's Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR), which are
recognized as the "field guide" for the transport of dangerous goods by
air.5 30 The provisions in these regulations require that the shipper of
such goods "classify, pack, mark, label, and document" such goods as
set out in the regulations. 5 3 1 Airlines then have an obligation to
complete an acceptance checklist, with some small exceptions, for all
dangerous goods consignments.5 32
"[W]hen accepting dangerous goods for transport, airlines do not
know, and are never provided with, the intended end use for the
materials," and "indeed, the end use is not a condition of
transport."5 33 "Provided that the goods are presented in a condition
that complies with domestic and international [dangerous-goods]
regulations, they meet the safety conditions for transport."534
For example, an airline could transport goods that are intended
to be used for hostile purposes, but it would have no knowledge of
that intended use.5 35 Should this be the case, it would make sense
that the person who prepared and shipped such goods be held
criminally liable but certainly not the airline or its employees acting
within the context of their employment activities. If the requirements
set out in the DGR are satisfied, airlines and their employees should
not be held criminally liable for having accepted the transport of such
goods. The industry argued strongly that the new international
regime should affirm this concept.
At the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, the IATA proposed
language whereby the operator would have been conclusively deemed
not to have committed one of the transport offenses, when such
operator has complied with the requirements of the ICAO Technical
Instructionsfor the Safe Transportof DangerousGoods by Air in force

527.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, 2.2.4 (describing regulation
requirements concerning the shipping details of packages containing dangerous goods).
528.
Id.
2.2.5 ("[Airlines do not know, and are never provided with, the
intended end use for the materials.").
529.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air, (ICAO, Doc. 9284-AN/905, 2010) (providing the text of the
regulation).
530.
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, T 2.2.4.
531.
Id.
532.
Id.
533.
Id. J2.2.5.
Id.
534.
535.
Id. 9 2.2.6.
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at the time of the alleged offense. 536 The conference was not
persuaded by this proposal, and despite a number of statements from
states giving a certain degree of comfort, the issue remains one of
concern for the industry.5 3 7

B. Transport of BCN Weapons
At the present time, there is no reasonable, cost-effective method
to ensure that air carriers do not transport BCN weapons.538 Most of
the screening technologies available at airports throughout the
world-be they x-ray machines or Explosive Detection Systems
(EDS)-are able to detect explosive devices that might be associated
with BCN weapons but not necessarily stand-alone BCN weapons
themselves. " Although there is already technology available that
can detect a stand-alone BCN weapon, it is extremely expensive. 540
By making the transport of BCN weapons a criminal offense, the
industry argued that the new legal regime should not create
additional regulatory requirements for airports and aviation security
authorities to deploy devices with technological capabilities to screen
and detect them. 541 Such requirements would be exorbitantly costly
for the aviation industry. That concern had previously been noted at
LC/34 when one delegation underscored "that there should be no
requirement [in place] to detect biological, chemical or nuclear
material in baggage," 542 and the point was repeated at the Diplomatic
Conference. 543
In addition, a situation may arise where a state that was not
involved in the approved transport of BCN weapons, or components
thereof, considers such transport as an offense under its national
legislation, since the BCN weapons or components thereof were later
used to cause death or serious damage in its territory. This may arise,
for instance, in the context of countries involved in a conflict where a
party used BCN weapons to inflict damage. 544

536.
Id.
537.
See id. at A-2 (setting out the "specific revisions to the proposed
amendments to the Conventions").
538.
See id. T 2.3.4 ("Not only are such screening operations outside the
competency of the airline industry but they would, in any event, give rise to exorbitant
costs for the industry as a whole.").
539.
See id.
2.3.3 ("[Tjhe detection of BCN materials is extremely complex,
requires advanced technology and is extremely expensive to implement.").
Id.
540.
Id.
541.
542.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, at 2-3. Another delegation went even
further by saying that these matters should not be criminalized at all. Id.
543.
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, 2.3.3.
544.
See id. 1 2.4.1 (explaining how an airline could be guilty of an offense as a
result of transporting military components later used to inflict damage during an
armed conflict).
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For these specific situations, the IATA had argued that language
should be included to avoid the air carrier being held responsible for
an approved, declared transportation of BCN weapons or components
thereof. 545 Airlines should be blameless for W1VID attacks using their
assets, provided they have observed state security programs.
Although seconded by two states, LC/34 decided not to adopt this
recommendation, 5 46 and this was also the outcome of the Beijing
Diplomatic Conference. 547

C. The Air Carrier'sDilemma When TransportingMilitary Equipment
In certain cases, governments lease, wholly or partly, an aircraft
to transport weapons (including BCN weapons) for military
purposes. 548 Typically, these transactions involve a wet-lease
arrangement where the airline provides the aircraft and the crew. 54 9
"The airline may be an all-cargo carrier, a consolidator, or a
passenger airliner with cargo operations."5 5 0 Since the carriage of
such weapons is for military purposes, the airline in question "knows"
that the materials being transported may be used to inflict "serious
injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population." 5 51
This also poses the question of whether an aircraft completely leased
by a government agency is considered to be in use for "military
services." All previous ICAO international instruments exclude state
aircraft-that is "aircraft used in military, customs, or police
services." 552
This raises a number of questions:
1. Would the application of both Beijing instruments be
excluded in these types of situations?
2. If the aircraft were a commercial airliner transporting
passengers and cargo and only part of its cargo capacity was
leased by a government agency to transport explosive
materials or weapons for military purposes, Would that
aircraft be considered in use for military services as well?
These situations are not uncommon at all.55 3 As clearly noted in
an ICAO Secretariat comprehensive study on "Civil/State Aircraft"

545.
Id. ? 2.4.3.
546.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supra note 144, 1 2:12.
547.
Id.
548.
ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, 1 2.4.1.
Id.
549.
550.
Id.
551.
Id.
552.
See Beijing Protocol, supra note 23, at art. 3, § 2; Beijing Convention, supra
note 22, at art. 5, § 1; Chicago Convention, supra note 143, at art. 3 (a)-(b).
553.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Agenda Item 2: Report of the Secretariat:
Secretariat Study on "Civil/StateAircraft" 11 (ICAO, Report No. LC/29-WP/2-1, 1994)
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an aircraft is considered as civil or military
or outside the scope of international civil
"all the circumstances surrounding the flight,
a number of factors." 554 Such factors include:

i)
ii)

nature of the cargo carried;
ownership of the aircraft;

iii)

type of operation;

iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)

passengers or personnel carried;
aircraft registration and national markings;
potential secrecy of the flight;
customs clearances;
documentation; and
type of crew.555

With these background factors in mind, one may argue that if an
aircraft is dry leased to a military entity to transport military
equipment, it should be considered a military aircraft. Here, -the
degree of military control over the aircraft's operation would appear
to be high. Arguably, therefore, the Beijing instruments would not
apply.
The issue is more complex in those cases where the aircraft wet
leases civilian crew. If the aircraft is solely devoted to military
operations, there would certainly be more chances to categorize that
aircraft as being used for military services. Yet this may not be the
case where, as mentioned above, the aircraft is a scheduled
commercial airliner whose cargo compartments are only partially
devoted to transport military arsenal. In any case, the issue may be
subject to conflicting interpretations and applications.
One alternative to address this problem would have been to
include language so that the transport of explosives, radioactive
materials, and BCN weapons were excluded from the scope of the
Beijing instruments in cases where a government agency intervenes
in its capacity as a shipper, consignee, or both.
At the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, the IATA proposed that
the military aircraft clause be amended to also exclude those
commercial aircraft being used for military activities when the lessee
of the aircraft or the consignor or consignee of cargo is a state
entity. 556

(describing observations and doubts regarding aircraft status under the Chicago
Convention).
554.
Id. at 14.
Id.
555.
556.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc. No. 13, supra note 185, 1 2.4.3 (proposing to "include
drafting so that the transport of ... BCN weapons is excluded from the application of
both protocols where a government agency intervenes in its capacity as a shipper,
consignee or both").
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Although at LC/34, some delegations, including Canada and the
United States, acknowledged "that this matter merited further
consideration."5 57 By completely ignoring it, the Beijing Diplomatic
Conference missed a clear opportunity to shed some light on a rather
obscure operational and legal issue.

V. IS THE SUA PROTOCOL THE CURE OF ALL EVILS?

Much-if not all--of the effort undertaken to amend the existing
international conventions on aviation security to deal effectively with
new and emerging threats was based on the SUA Protocol.5 58 In fact,
at the time of writing only twenty-three states had ratified or acceded
to the SUA Protocol. 559 This may indicate the reluctance of the
international community to codify these proposed offenses in
international law.
Surprisingly, many if not all of those countries that were
enthusiastic about the proposed amendments in the aviation security
field and that drew inspiration from its wording have yet to ratify the
SUA Protocol. 560 As it is widely known, the United States has
strongly pushed for the development of this instrument. 56 1 Although
the U.S. Senate already gave consent for ratification, at the time of
writing, Congress has yet to pass the necessary implementing
legislation. 562 Will the Beijing instruments experience the same
result?
Critics of the SUA Protocol indicate that, although it may foster
international maritime security, it does not "create a strong-enough
defense against maritime terrorism." 563 The instrument is a reactive
response to what should otherwise be a mechanism to encourage
preventive measures. 564 Others have said that, "there is no

557.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/4-1, supranote 144, 2:25.
558.
International Maritime Organization Status of Conventions by Country,
INT'L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/
Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). The SUA Protocol entered into force on
July 28, 2010. Id.
559.
Id.
560.
Id.
561.
See Caitlin A. Harrington, Heightened Security: The Need to Incorporate
Articles 3BIS (1) (A) and 8Bis (5) (E) of the 2005 Draft SUA Protocol into Part VII of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 107, 120
("The United States strongly pushed for the development of the 2005 Draft Protocol.").
562.
Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 43 INT'L L. 915, 924
(2009).
563.
Harrington, supra note 561, at 109.
564.
See Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 337, 365 (2007) (commenting on criticism of the instrument as reactive rather
than preventive).
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to be

truly

effective."565

Throughout the history of the negotiation of the Beijing
instruments, the SUA Protocol was often cited as the role model to
follow. 566 Where states struggled with any new concepts, the SUA
Protocol was used as the precedent that had already been accepted by
the international community. 56 7 This is particularly true with regard
to the inclusion of the transport offense and the military exclusion
clause.
But that reliance on the SUA Protocol forgets that the drafting
history of that instrument was extremely controversial.5 6 8 Even the
IMO, as well as commentators, has recognized that the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the adoption of the SUA Protocol was one of
the "most politically charged conferences in [the organization's]
history."56 9 One delegation remarked that a number of states have
filed reservations with regard to the SUA transport offenses,
reflecting a clear lack of "international endorsement." 570 Others noted
that the instrument "[does] not focus on safety of transport in the
strict sense, but rather [it is] aimed at serving many [other] objectives
[way beyond the restricted confines of international maritime
activities], such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."5 71 Strict
and, to an extent, blind faithfulness to the SUA Protocol may not
necessarily be the cure of all evils.

565.
Harrington, supra note 561, at 129.
566.
See ICAO, LC/SC-NET-2, supra note 72, 2.3 ("Consequently, the majority
of members preferred to follow the precedent of the SUA Convention.").
567.
Id.
568.
Id.
569.
See Int'l Maritime Org., International Conference on the Revision of the
SUA Treaties: Closing Statement by Mr. E. E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General2 (IMO,
LEG/CONF.15/INF.5, Oct. 21, 2005) ("This Conference will go down in the annals of
IMO History as possibly the one most politically charged."); see also Ticy V. Thomas,
The Proliferation Security Initiative: Towards Relegation of Navigational Freedoms in
UNCLOS? An Indian Perspective, 8 CHINESE J. OF INT'L L. 657, 666 (2009) (describing
the SUA Protocol as "widely regarded as the most politically charged conference in the
history of the IMO"); Tuerk, supra note 564, at 357 (noting that the conference
resulting in the SUA Protocol was "one of the most politically charged conferences in
the history of the Organization").
570.
See ICAO, DCAS Doc No. 11, supra note 182, at 2 ("Many states made
reservations on criminalization of the transport of these materials, consequently the
text lacks the international endorsement and support required to insert it into the
texts of the Montreal Convention.").
571.
ICAO, LC/34-WP/5-2, supra note 161, 2:147.
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VI. ARE THE BEIJING INSTRUMENTS THE SOLUTION TO
SAFER CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY?

Most in the international community have wholeheartedly
praised the adoption of the Beijing instruments. 572 ICAO's secretarygeneral called them a "landmark achievement in the areas of civil
aviation law and security."5 73 Some commentators have also labeled
these instruments as "landmark against new and emerging threats to
civil aviation," 574 "a quantum leap for global civil aviation
security," 5s and "a step forward in the right direction." 576 The
chairman of LC/34 has written that the Beijing instruments "will
shape the aviation security framework for the rest of the century."5 7 7
ICAO itself recently said that the Beijing instruments "will
strengthen the capacity of States to prevent the commission of these
offences, and to prosecute and punish those who commit such
offences."5 78
One wonders if that optimism is misplaced. The idea that the
Beijing instruments will facilitate prosecution and the punishment of
offenses is conditional upon widespread ratification, adoption into
domestic legislation, and the will of states in complying with new
international obligations. However, some doubt must remain as to the
extent to which the new regime will make any contribution to the
prevention side of the equation. Can one seriously contend that the
existence and entry into force of such instruments serves as a strong
deterrent against the commission of terrorist acts? Is it really likely
that terrorists scattered around the world carry the United Nations'
corpus juris InternationalInstruments Related to the Prevention and
Suppression of International Terrorism to establish how, when, and
79
where to launch their next awful attacks?5

See Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at 246
572.
(describing the Beijing Convention as a "landmark to new and emerging threats to civil
aviation").
573.
Raymond Benjamin, Establishing a New Era of Consensus and Action on
GlobalAviation Security Priorities,66 ICAO J. 1, 3 (2011).
574.
Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at 246.
575.
Jennison, supra note 296, at 11.
576.
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Cyber Terrorism and Aviation - National and
InternationalResponses, 4 J. TRANSP. SEC. 337, 343 (2011).
577.
Jennison, supra note 296, at 12.
578.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Administrative Package for Ratification of or
Accession to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relation to
International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention, 2010), at 1 (ICAO, State Letter LE
3/44, LE 3/45-1153, June 30, 2011).
See, e.g., Lisa M. McCartan et al., The Logic of Terrorist Target Choice: An
579.
Examination of Chechen Rebel Bombings from 1997-2003, 31 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 60, 62 (2008) (noting that "terrorists choose very specific targets that will
demonstrate a regime's inability to protect its people").
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The Beijing instruments demand that states criminalize a
number of new criminal offenses. 580 Unlike human rights
conventions, international criminal instruments are not selfexecuting-regardless of whether the state in question adheres to the
monist or dualism theories of international law. 5 8 ' That is to say that
states will inevitably have to pass domestic legislation to internalize
the treaty obligations. To ensure its effectiveness, states will need to
enact national-implementing legislation, incorporating "severe"
punishments for persons committing such offenses.5 82
Furthermore, none of the UN instruments on the prevention and
suppression of international terrorism sets penalties. 583 Within
certain guidelines set out in the international instruments, these are
obligations left to the discretion of the state. If states fail to adopt
adequate penalties, the international instrument's effectiveness, to a
great extent, is moot. So notwithstanding the ratification of the
treaty, a local judge will not be able to sentence a terrorist, unless
there is domestic legislation internalizing the implementation of
obligations set forth in the international legal instrument. It should
come as no surprise then that each Assembly urges Member States to
internalize into their national legislation severe punishments for the
commission of offenses against civil aviation. 584
One could even go so far as to question the real effectiveness of
ICAO's current aviation security conventions, all of which have
enjoyed widespread acceptance from the international community.

580.
See ICAO, A37-WP/290, supra note 506, at 2 ("The Beijing Convention and
Beijing Protocol of 2010 will require parties to criminalize a number of new and
emerging threats to the safety of civil aviation, including using aircraft as a weapon
and organizing, directing and financing acts of terrorism.").
581.
See Giovanni Marchiafava, La Convenzione di Pechino del 10 Settembre
2010 sulla Repressioni di Atti Illeciti Relativi AllAviazione Civile Internazionale (Sept.
14, 2011) (unpublished paper, on file with the authors).
582.
See Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at 253
("Article 3 of the said Convention ... states that each State party undertakes to make
the offences discussed above punishable by severe penalties.").
583.
See International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, supra note 204, at art. 5(b) (emphasizing that Member States bear the
obligation to make crimes stipulated in the international instrument "punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature"); see, e.g., Terrorist
Bombings Convention, supra note 50, at art. 4(b); Financing of Terrorism Convention,
supra note 50, at art. 4(b); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, supra note 204, at art. 1
(making cross reference to the SUA Convention's obligation to make offenses
punishable); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note
203, at art. 2; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note
406, at art. 2; SUA Convention, supra note 75, at art. 5(1); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, supranote 203, at art. 2, § 2.
584.
See ICAO, A37-17, supra note 304, at 29 (calling upon contracting states to
con'm their support by enacting appropriate punishments).
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A 1999 ICAO progress report on the implementation of Assembly
Resolution A32-22 indicated that forty-five Member States had
national legislation in place implementing the organization's aviation
security instruments. 58 5 In 2000, the same report noted that the
number of states rose to fifty 8 6 but a year later when providing
another report, this time on the implementation of Assembly
Resolution A33-22, the number had dropped to forty-six states.5 8 7 In
the best-case scenario, the numbers correspond to roughly 26 percent
of ICAO's membership.5 8 8 Leaving inaccuracies aside, these numbers
may be indicative of the level of Member States' implementation of
ICAO's aviation security conventions. Although no data more recent
than 2001 is available, nothing would suggest that a significant
improvement has recently taken place in this respect. It is unlikely
that the Beijing instruments will escape the same fate. It will just not
be enough to ratify them. The adoption of national implementing
legislation is essential.58 9
It is clear that in the post-9/11 landscape, acts of unlawful
interference against civil aviation are a major threat to the orderly
development of international air transport. 590 The Beijing
instruments are the result of a predominant belief that there is "an
urgent need to strengthen the legal framework [in pursuit of a
significant improvement in] international cooperation." 59 1 Arguably,
international law may play a (limited) role in shaping certain
elements in enhancing aviation security. 592 In a way, the Beijing
585.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Progress Report on the Implementation of
Assembly Resolution A32-22, at app. A, (ICAO, C-WP/11103, 1999); see, e.g., Int'l Civil
Aviation Org., Report of the Rapporteur of the Special Sub-Committee on the
Preparationof an Instrument to Modernize the Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft of 1963, at 19 (ICAO, LC/SC-MOT-WP/1, May
25, 2012) (commenting on the little progress made among Member States toward
enacting appropriate supportive national legislation).
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Progress Report on the Implementation of
586.
Assembly Resolution A32-22: Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies
Related to the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Act of Unlawful
Interference, at app. A, (ICAO, C-WP/ 11445, Oct. 10, 2000).
Id.
587.
Id.; see Member States, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/
588.
MemberStates/Member%20States.English.pdf (last updated Oct. 10, 2013) (showing
that, at present, 191 states are members to ICAO).
See Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Aviation Terrorism and the International Civil
589.
Aviation Organization, 25 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 219, 240 (1987) ("ICAO has constantly
pointed out the need for full implementation of these conventions through the adoption
of appropriate national legislation, the application of that legislation and the
willingness of all states to discharge effectively their obligations under the
Conventions.").
See Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at 245
590.
(describing the connection between the development of the Beijing instruments and the
events of 9/11).
Beijing Convention, supra note 23, at pmbl.
591.
See generally Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at
592.
245 (praising the role of American law in its "war on terror").

2014/

THE NEW ICAO-BEIJING INSTRUMENTS

229

instruments, just like the SUA Protocol, demonstrate the "perception
that terrorism is an international crime that can only be tackled
successfully by concerted international action."5 93 The new treaties
would seem to be the logical response to best achieve this objective.
Yet codification of international law is far from being the Holy Grail
to resolve the pressing day-to-day challenges in aviation security.
The Beijing instruments are also the response of the
international community (or a part thereof) to those who argue that
terrorism is not a global problem but rather an issue that only affects
a handful of states whose foreign affairs policies are deplored in some
corners of the world. In other words, terrorism is the consequence of
tit-for-tat strategies adopted by some governments, and those outside
the boundaries of international controversy should not bear the cost.
However, the 2011 Norwegian attacks reminded us that terrorists
may strike when least expected. 594 One could hardly say that these
attacks are the direct result of Norway's foreign affairs policies. The
engagement and participation of the international community in the
sharing of information becomes paramount in the prevention of these
acts. This cannot be done without interaction.
A number of terrorist incidents suggest that aviation security
should focus elsewhere than on the adoption of international legal
instruments. For instance, on August 24, 2004, terrorist suicide
bombers detonated explosive devices on board two Russian aircraft
killing ninety people.59 5 The incident of December 25, 2009, when a
Nigerian passenger on board Northwest Flight 253 attempted to
detonate an explosive device containing pentaerythritol tetranitrate
while the aircraft was in flight from Amsterdam to Detroit reminds
us of the fragility of screening controls. 596 The alleged terrorist
successfully passed through two different screening checkpoints in
two different states.5 97 Furthermore, the bomb attack at Moscow

593.
Tuerk, supra note 564, at 366. See Rosalie Balkin, The International
Maritime Organization and Maritime Security, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 24 (2006)
(highlighting the recognition of terrorism as an international problem requiring
"international will" to effectively combat).
594.
Norway Attacks: Breivik Charged with TerrorAttacks, BBC EUROPE (Mar.
7, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17286154.
595.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., A35-1 Acts of Terrorism and Destruction of
Russian Civil Aircraft Resulting in the Deaths of 90 People Passengers and Crew
Members 1 (ICAO, A35-1, provisional ed. 2004) (describing the event and the reactions
of ICAO).
596.
Unsuccessful Attempt to Detonate a Bomb on Northwest Flight 253 near
Detroit, AIR SAFE.cOM NEWS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.airsafenews.com/2009/12/
unsuccessful-attempt-to-detonate-bomb.html.
597.
E.g., Pierre Thomas & Huma Khan, Nigeria Was Being Preparedfor Terror
Plot, ABC (Dec. 30, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Politics/security-failure-usaware-nigerian-prepared-terror-obama/story?id=9447061. According to ICAO's security
audits, Africa scores the lowest compliance rate with international aviation security
standards. This will be analyzed further below. It should not be then a surprise that
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Domodedovo International Airport on January 24, 2011, is another
unforgettable example of the "vulnerabilities [that] airport
installations and facilities" around the world are subject to every
day. 9 8 More recently, on June 23, 2011, a U.S.-naturalized stowaway
successfully cleared security control checkpoints at John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York and managed to board a Virgin
American flight to Los Angeles.59 9
More treaty law would not necessarily have prevented these
incidents. Rather than being the result of gaps in the existing
international regime, it could be argued that most, if not all, unlawful
interference events are due to the lack of effective implementation of
the provisions of Annex 17.600 The dreadful attacks of 9/11 are the
perfect example. As one experienced commentator has put it,
"[I]nternational civil aviation requires a high level of physical
protection by searching and screening passengers and baggage to
prevent the introduction of potential weapons on board." 601 And even
25 years ago, it was noted that "none of the written provisions [of the
aviation security international conventions] will be effective unless
the necessary trained personnel and equipment are in place."60 2 The
Beijing instruments represent an ex post facto60 3 response to what it
should otherwise be an ex ante approach to aviation security. 604
Arguably, ICAO's activities should be geared toward ensuring
that Member States fully comply with standards related to aviation
security. Member States ought to rapidly improve their ability to
oversee and manage aviation security issues.60 5 A much higher level
of implementation of Annex 17 standards and recommended
practices-as well as stringent observance of guidance material, such

alleged terrorists sought to exploit the weakness of the aviation security system in that
region.
598.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Review of the Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting
of the Aviation Security Panel 1.1.1.1 (ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/13724, Apr. 7,
2011).
599.
Suspected Flight Stowaway in Los Angeles Pleads Not Guilty, CNN TRAVEL
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEJ07/18/flight.stowaway.pleal.
600.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Council 186th Session: Report on Acts of
1.1, 1.2, (AVSECP/20-WP/9, Jan. 13, 2009) (citing
Unlawful Interference for 2008
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on Acts of Unlawful Interference for 2007 (ICAO,
Working Paper No. C-WP/13103, Feb. 11, 2008)).
MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 34, at 228.
601.
602.
Fitzgerald, supra note 589, at 241.
Abeyratne, The Beijing Convention of 2010, supra note 68, at 255.
603.
See Fiorita, supra note 446, at 89 ("[T]he development of legal deterrents
604.
resulted from a reactive process rather than a pro-active one.").
605.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Report on the Implementation of the Universal
2.4 (ICAO Working Paper No. C-WP/13725, Apr.
Security Audit Programme (USAP)
1 2011) (explaining that while the USAP indicated progress, "a number of States
continue to experience difficulties").
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as the ICAO Security Manual-is needed. The Thirty-seventh Session
of the Assembly echoed that sentiment. 606
Recent results of ICAO's Universal Security Audit Programme
(USAP)607 would seem to confirm that the road to improved aviation
security does not necessarily require more international law. In fact,
the roughly 129 audits conducted under USAP's second cycle revealed
a global 32.28 percent lack of effective implementation of the eight
critical elements 608 of a state's aviation security oversight program. 609
Previous reports indicated that the global average compliance with
6 10
Annex 17 "Aviation Security" standards was only 59 percent.
Although 93 percent of states have established a single organization
in charge of aviation security, audits have evidenced that in 43
percent of states, the authority in question does not have sufficient
resources to implement its assigned duties. 611
The level of noncompliance in Member States is stunning if one
considers that the lack of effective implementation of the security
aspects of facilitation is 45.65 percent; 6 12 quality control functions,
49.60 percent;6 1 3 response to acts of unlawful interference, 26.69
percent; 614 cargo, catering, mail, and security, 34.35 percent; 615
passenger and baggage security, 35 percent; 616 and training of
aviation security persons, 39.34 percent. 617

See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Assembly, 37th Session, Executive Committee
606.
Declaration on Aviation Security, at app. A, (ICAO A37-WP/75, Aug. 16, 2010) (urging
Member States to "strengthen and promote the effective application of ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices, with particular focus on Annex 17").
Before the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks, ICAO did not have an audit
607.
program for aviation security. ICAO's USAP stems from the High Level Ministerial
Conference on Aviation Security's recommendation to Council when it was suggested
that the organization establish an audit program to foster compliance with aviation
security standards.
See Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Universal Security Audit Program:Analysis of
608.
Audit Results, Reporting Period:January 2008 to December 2011, at 13 (4th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter ICAO, USAP Results 2012] (presenting critical elements that touch upon
the following key areas: i) aviation security legislation; ii) aviation security programs
and regulations; iii) state appropriate authority for aviation security and its
responsibilities; iv) personnel qualifications and training; v) provision of technical
guidance, tools, and security-critical information; vi) certification and approval
obligations; vii) quality control obligations; and viii) resolution of security concerns).
Id. at 15.
609.
610.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Universal Security Audit Program: Analysis of
Audit Results, Reporting Period: January 2008 to December 2010, at 5 (3d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter ICAO, USAP Results 2011].
ICAO, USAP Results 2012, supra note 608, at 29.
611.

612.

Id. at 41.

613.
614.
615.
616.
617.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

38.
40.
39.
37.
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Moreover, more than half of the audited states do not possess a
mechanism to oversee the training needs of personnel. 618 Deficiencies
in the procedures for certification of security screeners were also
detected in 56 percent of the audited states. 619 The audits also show
that almost half of the states do not have procedures in place for the
screening of persons other than the passenger. 620 This is quite
worrisome. One can certainly expect that terrorists would opt for
ways other than the standard passenger x-ray screening process to
break through the aviation security chain. They will exploit the
weakest points. The international community may witness more
creative forms of terrorism.
Furthermore, 46 percent of audited states struggled with
implementing technical guidance, tools, and security-critical
information. 621 USAP also shows the tremendous difficulties that
Member States routinely face with respect to a myriad of different
aviation security issues, such as not developing guidance material for:
i)

passengers and cabin baggage screening (62 percent of
audited states);622
ii) originating hold baggage screening (54 percent of audited
states);623

iii) hold

baggage

reconciliation

(41

percent

of audited

states);624

iv) cargo and mail security controls (47 percent of audited
states); and
v) perimeter protection (56 percent of audited states).62 5
In addition, it is worrisome that 46 percent of the audited states
do not ensure that airport security programs are reviewed and
approved. 626 It is also noteworthy that "a number of [member] States
have not participated fully in, or responded appropriately to, ICAO's
aviation security audit processes." 627 As ICAO's Secretariat has
already recognized, USAP "results [undisputedly] indicate that,

618.
Id. at 35.
619.
Id. at 33.
620.
Id. at 34.
621.
Id. at 31.
622.
Id.
623.
Id.
"Hold baggage reconciliation" refers to the match that aviation security
624.
inspectors make before flight departure to make sure that the baggage is that of the
passenger on board the aircraft. Hold baggage reconciliation became mandatory in the
mid-1990's, as one of the lessons learned from Pan Am flight 103. See Barry James,
1996),
(July 25,
Airlines Lack Common Security Rules, N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/25/news/25iht-secure.t 3.html.
ICAO, USAP Results 2012, supra note 608, at 32.
625.
626.
Id. at 35.
Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Assistance Strategy for Working with States
627.
Regarding Shortcomings with Aviation Security-Related SARPs 113.5 (ICAO, Working
Paper No. C-WP/12907, Apr. 5, 2007).
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despite the overall progress states have made in addressing
deficiencies identified through the first [and second] cycle[s] of audits,
a number of states continue to experience difficulties, particularly
relating to meeting their aviation security oversight obligations and
to increasing their level of compliance with the relevant ICAO
Standards and security-related provisions." 62 8 Yet, one of the more
enlightening results of ICAO's USAP is that only 15.92 percent of the
audited states reported deficiencies with aviation security
legislation. 629 In fact, this is one critical element of the audits that
states do better at. 630 Clearly, the problem is not insufficient
legislation, but rather implementation, compliance, and oversight.
Although ICAO's USAP has been extremely successful, if one takes
into account where the program started from, there is still significant
room for improvement. 631
One cannot help but wonder at the convenience of embarking on
a nine-year international law codification process instead of focusing
on what could be seen as a more pressing need. That political
question is relevant for a UN-specialized agency such as ICAO with
very limited financial and human resources and an annual budget of
just $100 million.6 32 Although the Beijing instruments are a laudable
response-reflecting Member States unquestionable moral obligation
to combat acts of terrorism against civil aviation-ICAO's USAP
results might suggest where the organization's focus on aviation
security should truly lie if we are ultimately seeking practical,
meaningful, and lasting results to prevent the occurrence of such
atrocious terrorist acts.6 33 However, this can only be achieved with
strong political will. This does not fall only to ICAO or its Secretariat
but is rather the collective responsibility of Member States.

ICAO, C-WP/13725, supranote 605.
628.
The level of compliance with aviation security legislation requirements is
629.
the highest amongst the eight critical elements of ICAO's USAP. In fact, 78 percent of
audited states have promulgated primary aviation security legislation, and 81 percent
have addressed the unrestricted access of aviation security inspectors to aircraft and
airport and aviation facilities. See ICAO, USAP Results 2012, supra note 608, at 27.
630.
See Ludwig Webber, Enhancement of the Legal Framework for Aviation
Security with Specific Reference to the Asia-PacificRegion (May 24, 2010) (unpublished
paper, on file with the authors) (noting that "further significant efforts are required to
ensure that the aviation security framework will be rendered adequate").
631.
See LUDWIG WEBER, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION: AN
INTRODUCTION 92-93 (2007) (providing the terms of the audit program and its use from
2004 to 2007).
See ICAO, Budgets for 2011, 2012 and 2013, at 88 (ICAO A37-26, 2010)
632.
(providing annual budget and spending reports for 2011, 2012, and 2013) (explaining
how ICAO has developed a database on findings from yearly audits that "will assist in
addressing deficiencies").
See Dempsey, supra note 404, at 458 (emphasizing airport security
633.
screening as one of the ways to prevent the occurrence of acts of unlawful interference).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Acts of unlawful interference present a daunting and serious
challenge for international civil aviation. ICAO has warned that
"[t]he threat to civil aviation continues to evolve and has become
more challenging to predict. All facets of civil aviation, including, but
not limited to, passenger aircraft, airport terminals and cargo
facilities are at risk."634
In this context, the adoption of the Beijing instruments
represents a notable effort on the part of the international community
to address terrorism involving civil aviation. The instruments are of
paramount importance to engage the international community in a
more cooperative mode. International cooperation and cooperation
between government and industry is the only way forward. The
Beijing instruments may contribute to achieve that end. They also
remove ambiguity in a number of key areas and contribute to
removing any sense of lawlessness in this field.63 5 In addition, they
constitute a valuable contribution of the international legal
community to the area of aviation security. 636
It has also been apparent that throughout 9 years of tough
negotiations, the Beijing instruments managed to generate discomfort
with some states. Almost 30 percent of states participating in the
Beijing Diplomatic Conference voted against the adoption of the
texts. 637 The wording of the final act hardly does justice to the
agonizing lobbying behind the scenes that led to the final adoption of
the texts:
The Commission of the Whole approved the text of the Convention on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil
Aviation with 55 votes in favour, 14 votes not in favour. It approved the
text of the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the

634.
ICAO, USAP Results 2012, supra note 608, at 45.
635.
See R.L. Smith McKeithen, Prospects for the Prevention of Aircraft
Hijacking Through Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 60, 80 (1970) (commenting on the
contribution of the Tokyo Convention and the 1970 Montreal Draft Convention).
Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Development of International Legal Rules for the
636.
Repression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 296-97 (1969)
(highlighting the important role of lawyers in formulating an international multidisciplinary response to terrorism).
637.
Int'l Conference on Air Law, Final Act, supra note 88. Although states
clearly prefer reaching some degree of consensus, voting was not at all uncommon in
the adoption of all the international aviation security instruments. A number of issues
in the Tokyo, the Hague, and the Montreal Conventions, as well as the Airport
Protocol, were voted upon. Fitzgerald, supra note 636, at 287 (describing how "many of
the decisions embodied in the draft [of the Tokyo Convention] were taken by majority
vote"); Philippe Kirsch, The 1988 ICAO and IMO Conferences: An International
Consensus Against Terrorism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 5, 29 (1990) (noting that the adoption
of these three international instruments was subject to a vote).
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Suppressionof Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft with 57 votes in favour, 13
6 38
votes not in favor.

Indeed, during discussions that led to the Council convening the
Diplomatic Conference, Russia and Venezuela had already voiced
their concerns that efforts should be made to avoid the situation
whereby this process of revisiting the existing legal regime on
aviation security instruments attracted such a low number of
signatory states.6 39 This is also a concern regarding both the General
Risks Convention 640 and the Unlawful Interference Convention, 641
which, at the time of writing, have only received one ratification each
and are some way off from entering into force.
In light of the uneasiness of some states with the proposed
reforms pursued by the initiative, one may certainly question
whether the Beijing instruments will ever achieve the same degree of
widespread ratifications enjoyed by their predecessor treaties. The
discontent of a large number of states would suggest the contrary.
However, given U.S. impetus, one may anticipate that the Beijing
instruments will-some day-enter into force. But, this may take a
number of years.
Yet, even if these instruments achieve widespread ratifications,
the question mark remains over implementation at the national level.
Will the majority of states that eventually decide to ratify the Beijing
instruments adopt implementing legislation? Only time will tell. Once
the instruments enter into force and once states adopt implementing
legislation, a high level of commitment to comply with the
international obligations will also be necessary. 642 In any event, aside
from encouraging ratification, there is a clear need for ICAO to go one
step further and develop guidance material to educate states on the
need to adopt implementing legislation.
The military exclusion clause was by far the most controversial
and tough-fought issue throughout the negotiating history of these
instruments. At this stage, it is hard to assess whether its inclusion
was appropriate or not. By thoroughly analyzing previous ICAO
pronouncements, both of the Assembly and the Council, this Article
has tried to understand why this clause was a sine qua non requisite
for some states and why it was so strongly opposed by others. After

638.
Int'l Conference on Air Law, Final Act, supra note 88.
639.
See ICAO, C-MIN 188/6, supra note 293, 20 (noting the shared concern of
Venezuela and Russia "regarding the low number of signatures of the two Conventions
adopted at the recent Diplomatic Conference on Compensation for Damage").
640.
General Risks Convention, supra note 22.
641.
Unlawful Interference Convention, supra note 22.
642.
See Peter Martin, Aviation Security in International and UK Law, in
NICOLAS MATEESCO MA'I'E, LIBER AMICORUM 204 (1989) ('The efficacy of international
legislation against crimes depends not only upon the extent of the application of the
conventions in the Contracting States' municipal law but also on the will of states to
meet their obligations.").
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all, in most cases states behave like rational actors. 64 3 The Gaza
International Airport incident clearly explains the conflicting
positions of states.
As Milde points out, "Further proliferation of the legal
instruments [may] not appear to offer an effective safeguard of
aviation security and the energy of States within ICAO should be
rather geared to prevention of the criminal acts."644 In other words,
more international law may not necessarily be the right deterrent for
the execution of acts of terrorism involving and against international
civil aviation. 645
ICAO should continue to place an emphasis on the prevention of
unlawful interference with international civil aviation. Strengthening
and expanding ICAO's USAP is crucial in this regard, as is
facilitating compliance with Annex 17 standards. An incremental and
comprehensive approach is required to ensure that the horrors of 9/11
are never repeated. But in order to achieve this, ICAO needs the
political commitment of its Member States. ICAO is often, and
incorrectly, blamed for its inability to quickly react and adopt the
changes required to respond to civil aviation's pressing needs,
aviation security being one notable example. But such a criticism
forgets that ICAO is nothing but the unequivocal reflection of the
"will" of its Member States. In the absence of that will, there is not
much that ICAO can do.
Last, but certainly not least, aviation security's primary goal
should not only be to "close the gaps and inadequacies" 64 6 in the
international legal regime but to prevent acts from happening. The
legal regime is one, arguably minor, component of the equation.
Perhaps the most effective approach to the problem of countering
international terrorism is to adopt a systemic, multidisciplinary
stance, including a basket of measures such as those listed in UN
Resolution A/RES/60/288, calling for the creation of a global
counterterrorism strategy. 6 4 7 Despite its significant achievement in

643.
See Oona A. Hatahaway, Why Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (2002) (noting that states "calculate the costs and
benefits of alternative courses of action in the international realm and act
accordingly").
644.
MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 34, at 258.
645.
As Michael Milde noted more than 20 years ago, "The present and future
challenge is to implement preventive security measures. Implementation requires
sound professional management, and law is only one of the tools of management."
Milde, Law and Aviation Security, supra note 5, at 97; Sakeus Akweenda, Prevention of
Unlawful Interference with Aircraft: A Study of Standards and Recommended
Practices, 35 INTL & COMvP. L.Q. 413, 444 (1986) (arguing that "emphasis must also be
laid on the effective implementation of existing programs").
646.
ICAO, Working Paper No. C-WP/11786, supra note 36, at A-3.
647.
See Luongo, supra note 26, at 115-18 (describing how UN resolutions can
be, and have been, used to pressure states into conforming to an international
strategy).
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international lawmaking, the Beijing instruments by themselves will
not build a Chinese wall for aviation security. That will always be the
collective responsibility of all states.
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